[en] Code voting is a technique used to address the secure platform
problem of remote voting. A code voting system consists in secretly
sending, e.g. by mail, code sheets to voters that map their choices to entry
codes in their ballot. While voting, the voter uses the code sheet to
know what code to enter in order to vote for a particular candidate. In
effect, the voter does the vote encryption and, since no malicious software
on the PC has access to the code sheet it is not able to change the voter’s
intention. However, without compromising the voter’s privacy, the vote
codes are not enough to prove that the vote is recorded and counted as
cast by the election server.
We present a voter verifiable code voting solution which, without revealing
the voter’s vote, allows the voter to verify, at the end of the
election, that her vote was cast and counted as intended by just performing
the match of a few small strings. Moreover, w.r.t. a general code
voting system, our solution comes with only a minor change in the voting
interaction.
Disciplines :
Sciences informatiques
Auteur, co-auteur :
JOAQUIM, Rui ; Inesc-ID and Instituto Politécnico de Lisboa - IPL > GSD and Instituto Superior de Engenharia de Lisboa - ISEL
Ribeiro, Carlos; Inesc-ID and Universidade Técnica de Lisboa - UTL > GSD and Instituto Superior Técnico - IST
Ferreira, Paulo; Inesc-ID and Universidade Técnica de Lisboa - UTL > GSD and Instituto Superior Técnico - IST
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