Moral principles; Defeasibility; Reasons; Defeasible logic
Abstract :
[en] It's natural to think that the principles expressed by the statements "Promises ought to be kept" and "We ought to help those in need" are defeasible. But how are we to make sense of this defeasibility? On one proposal, moral principles have hedges or built-in unless clauses specifying the conditions under which the principle doesn't apply. On another, such principles are contributory and, thus, do not specify which actions ought to be carried out, but only what counts in favor or against them. Drawing on a defeasible logic framework, this paper sets up three models: one model for each proposal, as well as a third model capturing a mixed view on principles that combines them. It then explores the structural connections between the three models and establishes some equivalence results, suggesting that the seemingly different views captured by the models are closer than standardly thought.
Disciplines :
Philosophy & ethics
Author, co-author :
KNOKS, Aleks ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Medicine (FSTM) > Department of Computer Science (DCS)
External co-authors :
no
Language :
English
Title :
Moral Principles: Hedged, Contributory, Mixed
Publication date :
July 2021
Event name :
15th International Conference on Deontic Logic and Normative Systems (DEON 2020/21)
Event organizer :
LMU Munich
Event place :
Munich, Germany
Event date :
from 21-07-2021 to 24-07-2021
Audience :
International
Main work title :
Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, 15th International Conference, DEON 2020/2021