Reference : Earmarked Taxation and Political Competition
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Special economic topics (health, labor, transportation…)
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/44302
Earmarked Taxation and Political Competition
English
Anesi, Vincent mailto [University of Luxembourg > > >]
2006
Journal of Public Economics
Elsevier
90
679-701
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
International
0047-2727
Lausanne
Netherlands
[en] Although tax earmarking constitutes a voluntary constraint for government's policymaking, it is widely used in the real world. This paper investigates the electoral dimension of earmarking in a model of political competition with ideological parties. Its main contribution is to derive new insights on the relationship between earmarking and parties' probability of winning the elections. We find that the electoral pressure may favor the existence of tax-earmarking equilibria, but that it sometimes creates a tendency against earmarked taxation even when, as shown by Brett and Keen (2000) [Brett, C., Keen, M., 2000. Political uncertainty and the earmarking of environmental taxes. Journal of Public Econonomics 75, 315–340], incumbent governments have strong incentives to use earmarking rules to constrain future policymakers.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/44302
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272705000733

There is no file associated with this reference.

Bookmark and Share SFX Query

All documents in ORBilu are protected by a user license.