[en] We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have
heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous
link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative
inefficiency can be non-monotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative non-pecuniary utility of working. We adapt
existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate
preferences in the college-coach football market. We show through simulations that
standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss.
Disciplines :
Microéconomie
Auteur, co-auteur :
DUPUY, Arnaud ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA)
Galichon, Alfred
Jaffe, Sonia
Kominers, Scott
Co-auteurs externes :
yes
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Taxation in matching markets
Date de publication/diffusion :
2020
Titre du périodique :
International Economic Review
ISSN :
0020-6598
eISSN :
1468-2354
Maison d'édition :
Blackwell, Oxford, Royaume-Uni
Volume/Tome :
61
Fascicule/Saison :
4
Pagination :
1591-1634
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Projet FnR :
FNR8337045 - Optimal Policies In The Market For Childcare: Theory And Evidence From Luxembourg, 2014 (01/05/2015-30/04/2018) - Arnaud Dupuy
