Reference : Taxation in matching markets
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics
Taxation in matching markets
Dupuy, Arnaud mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
Galichon, Alfred []
Jaffe, Sonia []
Kominers, Scott []
In press
International Economic Review
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
United Kingdom
[en] Matching ; Taxation
[en] We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have
heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous
link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative
inefficiency can be non-monotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative non-pecuniary utility of working. We adapt
existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate
preferences in the college-coach football market. We show through simulations that
standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss.
FnR ; FNR8337045 > Arnaud Dupuy > CHILDCARE > Optimal policies in the market for childcare: theory and evidence from Luxembourg > 01/05/2015 > 30/04/2018 > 2014

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