| Reference : Taxation in matching markets |
| Scientific journals : Article | |||
| Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics | |||
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/43340 | |||
| Taxation in matching markets | |
| English | |
Dupuy, Arnaud  [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >] | |
| Galichon, Alfred [] | |
| Jaffe, Sonia [] | |
| Kominers, Scott [] | |
| In press | |
| International Economic Review | |
| Blackwell | |
| Yes (verified by ORBilu) | |
| International | |
| 0020-6598 | |
| 1468-2354 | |
| Oxford | |
| United Kingdom | |
| [en] Matching ; Taxation | |
| [en] We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have
heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative inefficiency can be non-monotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative non-pecuniary utility of working. We adapt existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate preferences in the college-coach football market. We show through simulations that standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss. | |
| Researchers | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/43340 | |
| FnR ; FNR8337045 > Arnaud Dupuy > CHILDCARE > Optimal policies in the market for childcare: theory and evidence from Luxembourg > 01/05/2015 > 30/04/2018 > 2014 |
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