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Avoiding Leakage and Synchronization Attacks through Enclave-Side Preemption Control
Volp, Marcus; Lackorzynski, Adam; Decouchant, Jérémie et al.
20161st Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution (SysTEX '16)
 

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Keywords :
Information-flow; SGX-enclaves; microkernels; preemption
Abstract :
[en] Intel SGX is the latest processor architecture promising secure code execution despite large, complex and hence potentially vulnerable legacy operating systems (OSs). However, two recent works identified vulnerabilities that allow an untrusted management OS to extract secret information from Intel SGX's enclaves, and to violate their integrity by exploiting concurrency bugs. In this work, we re-investigate delayed preemption (DP) in the context of Intel SGX. DP is a mechanism originally proposed for L4-family microkernels as disable-interrupt replacement. Recapitulating earlier results on language-based information-flow security, we illustrate the construction of leakage-free code for enclaves. However, as long as adversaries have fine-grained control over preemption timing, these solutions are impractical from a performance/complexity perspective. To overcome this, we resort to delayed preemption, and sketch a software implementation for hypervisors providing enclaves as well as a hardware extension for systems like SGX. Finally, we illustrate how static analyses for SGX may be extended to check confidentiality of preemption-delaying programs.
Research center :
SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust
Disciplines :
Computer science
Author, co-author :
Volp, Marcus  ;  University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
Lackorzynski, Adam;  Kernkonzept GmbH und Technische Universität Dresden
Decouchant, Jérémie ;  University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
Rahli, Vincent ;  University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
Rocha, Francisco ;  University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
Verissimo, Paulo ;  University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
Avoiding Leakage and Synchronization Attacks through Enclave-Side Preemption Control
Publication date :
12 December 2016
Number of pages :
6
Event name :
1st Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution (SysTEX '16)
Event place :
Trento, Italy
Event date :
From 12 December 2016 to 16 December 2016
Audience :
International
FnR Project :
FNR8149128 - Strategic Rtnd Program On Information Infrastructure Security And Dependability, 2014 (01/01/2015-31/12/2021) - Marcus Völp
Funders :
FNR - Fonds National de la Recherche [LU]
SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust
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since 01 December 2016

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