Bouvry, Pascal[University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Dec-2016
IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM) Workshops: Fifth International Workshop on Cloud Computing Systems, Networks, and Applications (CCSNA)
Yes
International
IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM) Workshops: Fifth International Workshop on Cloud Computing Systems, Networks, and Applications (CCSNA)
2016
Washington DC, USA
[en] Mobile crowdsensing ; Reputation systems ; User incentives
[en] Widespread use of connected smart devices that are equipped with various built-in sensors has introduced the mobile crowdsensing concept to the IoT-driven information and communication applications. Mobile crowdsensing requires implicit collaboration between the crowdsourcer/recruiter platforms and users. Additionally, users need to be incentivized by the crowdsensing platform because each party aims to maximize their utility. Due to the participatory nature of data collection, trustworthiness and truthfulness pose a grand challenge in crowdsensing systems in the presence of malicious users, who either aim to manipulate sensed data or collaborate unfaithfully with the motivation of maximizing their income. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic approach for trustworthiness-driven user recruitment in mobile crowdsensing systems that consists of three phases: i) user recruitment, ii) collaborative decision making on trust scores, and iii) badge rewarding. Our proposed framework incentivizes the users through a sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) and gamification techniques. Through simulations, we show that the platform utility can be improved by up to the order of 50\% while the average user utility can be increased by at least 15\% when compared to fully-distributed and user-centric trustworthy crowdsensing.
[University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
