Reference : Limits of a conjecture on a leakage-resilient cryptosystem
Scientific journals : Article
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/21827
Limits of a conjecture on a leakage-resilient cryptosystem
English
Galindo, David [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) > ; CNRS/LORIA, Nancy, France]
Venkatesh, Srinivas Vivek mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
2014
Information Processing Letters
Elsevier Science
114
4
192-196
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
International
0020-0190
[en] Cryptography ; Leakage-resilient cryptography ; ElGamal ; Hidden number problem ; Lattice-based attacks
[en] Recently it was conjectured that an ElGamal-based public-key encryption scheme with stateful decryption resists lunch-time chosen ciphertext and leakage attacks in the only computation leaks information model. We give a non-trivial upper bound on the amount of leakage tolerated by this conjecture. More precisely, we prove that the conjecture does not hold if more than a (3/8 + o (1)) fraction of the bits are leaked at every decryption step, by showing a lunch-time attack that recovers the full secret key. The attack uses a new variant of the Hidden Number Problem, that we call Hidden Shares – Hidden Number Problem, which is of independent interest.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/21827
10.1016/j.ipl.2013.11.014
The final publication is available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0020019013002949.

File(s) associated to this reference

Fulltext file(s):

FileCommentaryVersionSizeAccess
Open access
conjecture-ipl.pdfAuthor postprint357.65 kBView/Open

Bookmark and Share SFX Query

All documents in ORBilu are protected by a user license.