| Reference : Commodity taxation and regulatory competition |
| Scientific Presentations in Universities or Research Centers : Scientific presentation in universities or research centers | |||
| Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics | |||
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/19095 | |||
| Commodity taxation and regulatory competition | |
| English | |
| Moriconi, Simone [] | |
Picard, Pierre M  [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >] | |
| Zanaj, Skerdilajda [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >] | |
| Jan-2014 | |
| International | |
| Singapour Management University | |
| January 2014 | |
| Singapour Management University | |
| Singapour | |
| [en] Regulation ; commodity tax ; strategic interactions ; fiscal federalism | |
| [en] This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between
trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods, while regulation of entry determines the number of firms in the markets. We find (i) no strategic interaction in commodity taxes; (ii) regulation leads to lower commodity tax rates if demand for public goods is more sensitive to income than demand for private goods and (iii) regulation policy is a strategically complement instrument if consumers do not over value product diversity. In the empirical part of the paper, we test our predictions using panel data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1990-2008. | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/19095 |
| File(s) associated to this reference | ||||||||||||||
|
Fulltext file(s):
| ||||||||||||||
All documents in ORBilu are protected by a user license.
