Reference : Behind the last line of defense: Surviving SoC faults and intrusions
Scientific journals : Article
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/53089
Behind the last line of defense: Surviving SoC faults and intrusions
English
Pinto-Gouveia, Ines [University of Luxembourg > SnT]
Volp, Marcus mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > CritiX >]
Esteves-Verissimo, Paulo []
Dec-2022
Computers & Security
Elsevier
123
Yes
International
0167-4048
[en] Resilience ; Operating System ; Hardware Architecture
[en] Today, leveraging the enormous modular power, diversity and flexibility of manycore systems-on-a-chip (SoCs) requires careful orchestration of complex and heterogeneous resources, a task left to low-level software, e.g., hypervisors. In current architectures, this software forms a single point of failure and worthwhile target for attacks: once compromised, adversaries can gain access to all information and full control over the platform and the environment it controls. This article proposes Midir, an enhanced manycore architecture, effecting a paradigm shift from SoCs to distributed SoCs. Midir changes the way platform resources are controlled, by retrofitting tile-based fault containment through well known mechanisms, while securing low-overhead quorum-based consensus on all critical operations, in particular privilege management and, thus, management of containment domains. Allowing versatile redundancy management, Midir promotes resilience for all software levels, including at low level. We explain this architecture, its associated algorithms and hardware mechanisms and show, for the example of a Byzantine fault tolerant microhypervisor, that it outperforms the highly efficient MinBFT by one order of magnitude.
Fonds National de la Recherche - FnR
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/53089
10.1016/j.cose.2022.102920
FnR ; FNR12686210 > Marcus Völp > HyLIT > Architectural Support For Intrusion Tolerant Operating-system Kernels > 01/11/2018 > 31/10/2021 > 2018

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