Response to my critics: In defense of Kant’s aesthetic nonconceptualism

In this article I respond to objections that Matías Oroño, Silvia del Luján di Saanza, Pedro
Stepanenko and Luciana Martínez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s
aesthetics. The objections are both, substantial and instructive. I first sketch my non-conceptualist
reading of Kant’s doctrine of judgments of taste and then turn to what I take to be the most
important criticisms that these authors have put forward. Two difficulties with a non-conceptualist
reading of Kant’s aesthetics seem to be central: the cognitive status of judgments of taste and the
representationalist capacity of aesthetic feeling as non-conceptual mental content. I respond to
these and additional objections and defend my overall non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s
aesthetics against my critics. I argue that Kant’s aesthetics is highly relevant for the debate over
whether or not Kant is a (non-)conceptualist.