| Reference : Response to my critics: In defense of Kant’s aesthetic nonconceptualism |
| Scientific journals : Article | |||
| Arts & humanities : Philosophy & ethics | |||
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/44971 | |||
| Response to my critics: In defense of Kant’s aesthetic nonconceptualism | |
| English | |
Heidemann, Dietmar  [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Humanities (DHUM) >] | |
| 2020 | |
| Con-Textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy | |
| Con-Textos Kantianos | |
| 12 | |
| 173-190 | |
| Yes (verified by ORBilu) | |
| International | |
| 2386-7655 | |
| Madrid | |
| Spain | |
| [en] Kant ; aesthetics ; non-conceptual content | |
| [en] In this article I respond to objections that Matías Oroño, Silvia del Luján di Saanza, Pedro
Stepanenko and Luciana Martínez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics. The objections are both, substantial and instructive. I first sketch my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s doctrine of judgments of taste and then turn to what I take to be the most important criticisms that these authors have put forward. Two difficulties with a non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics seem to be central: the cognitive status of judgments of taste and the representationalist capacity of aesthetic feeling as non-conceptual mental content. I respond to these and additional objections and defend my overall non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics against my critics. I argue that Kant’s aesthetics is highly relevant for the debate over whether or not Kant is a (non-)conceptualist. | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/44971 | |
| 10.5281/zenodo.4304075 |
| File(s) associated to this reference | ||||||||||||||
|
Fulltext file(s):
| ||||||||||||||
All documents in ORBilu are protected by a user license.
