Transzendentaler Schematismus: Zum Verhältnis von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft

In my dissertation, I deal with one of the fundamental topics of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, that is, the relation between sensibility and understanding as the two main and a priori sources of human knowledge. I argue that most interpretations of the First Critique marginalise the role of sensibility as an isolable and irreducible representational capacity of the human mind and the importance of that role sensibility in order to understand some of the main Kantian arguments. In taking Kant’s position as what in contemporary philosophical debates is called a non-conceptualist viewpoint, I provide a detailed exegesis of some of the landmarks in the First Critique, which are, first, the Transcendental Aesthetic that uncovers the pure sensible nature of aspects of our representation of space and time, second, the second step of the Transcendental Deduction that relies on a sense of objectivity provided by sensibility alone, and finally, the Transcendental Schematism that implements our pure conceptual capacity within a non-conceptual representational framework.