Reference : Cryptanalysis of the Atmel Cipher in SecureMemory, CryptoMemory and CryptoRF
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/17070
Cryptanalysis of the Atmel Cipher in SecureMemory, CryptoMemory and CryptoRF
English
Biryukov, Alex mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Kizhvatov, Ilya [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Zhang, Bin [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
2011
Applied Cryptography and Network Security - 9th International Conference
Springer
91-109
Yes
International
978-3-642-21553-7
Applied Cryptography and Network Security - 9th International Conference
June 7-10, 2011
Nerja
Spain
[en] Stream ciphers ; RFID ; Frame ; SecureMemory ; CryptoMemory
[en] SecureMemory (SM), CryptoMemory (CM) and CryptoRF (CR) are the Atmel chip families with wide applications in practice. They implement a proprietary stream cipher, which we call the Atmel cipher, to provide authenticity, confidentiality and integrity. At CCS’2010, it was shown that given 1 keystream frame, the secret key in SM protected by the simple version of the cipher can be recovered in 2^39.4 cipher ticks and if 2640 keystream frames are available, the secret key in CM guarded by the more complex version of the cipher can be restored in 2^58 cipher ticks. In this paper, we show much more efficient and practical attacks on both versions of the Atmel cipher. The idea is to dynamically reconstruct the internal state of the underlying register by exploiting the different diffusion speeds of the different cells. For SM, we can recover the secret key in 2^29.8 cipher ticks given 1 keystream frame; for CM, we can recover the secret key in 2^50 cipher ticks with around 24 frames. Practical implementation of the full attack confirms our results.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/17070
http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/707.pdf
6715
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Lect Notes Comput Sci
1611-3349
0302-9743

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