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See detailMoral Hazard, central bankers, and Banking Union: professional dissensus and the politics of European financial system stability
Pierret, Laura UL; Howarth, David UL

in Journal of European Integration (2023), 45(1), 15-41

Banking Union was a major policy response to the financial crisis that began in 2007 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis. Moral hazard has frequently been presented as a major cause of these crises ... [more ▼]

Banking Union was a major policy response to the financial crisis that began in 2007 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis. Moral hazard has frequently been presented as a major cause of these crises. Therefore, Banking Union can be understood as a response to moral hazard in relation to banks and sovereigns. Yet, moral hazard was an acknowledged and supposedly managed problem prior to these events. Paradoxically, moral hazard has been used to justify contradictory policy options to safeguard European financial system stability, such as decentralized institutional arrangements for banking supervision but also a centralized system coordinated by the European Central Bank (ECB). To address this paradox, this paper investigates moral hazard as a political concept. Based on a comparison of how central bankers from the Bundesbank and the ECB understand and use the moral hazard concept, this paper argues that moral hazard is closer to the realm of politics than expertise. [less ▲]

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See detailIntroduction to the special issue: the persistent challenges to European Banking Union
Högenauer, Anna-Lena UL; Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in Journal of European Integration (2023), 45(1), 1-14

The papers of this special issue investigate the persistent challenges to European Banking Union and explore the tensions between broader financial stability objectives and national political and socio ... [more ▼]

The papers of this special issue investigate the persistent challenges to European Banking Union and explore the tensions between broader financial stability objectives and national political and socio-economic pressures through a diversity of lenses. In this introduction, we examine two main issues that need to be addressed in order to strengthen Banking Union: the incomplete institutional design of Banking Union and the difficulties encountered in applying the different elements of Banking Union to loosen sovereign-bank ties. These elements include the so-called ‘single’ rulebook, supervision, resolution, and financial mechanisms to support and resolve banks. [less ▲]

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See detailBanking on Europe: Reinforcing the Unstable Pillars of European Banking Union at Ten
Högenauer, Anna-Lena UL; Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in Journal of European Integration (2023), 45(1),

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See detailBank Politics: Structural Reform in Comparative Perspective
Howarth, David UL; James, Scott

Book published by Oxford University Press (2022)

The problem of banks being 'too big to fail' was the defining regulatory issue of the global financial crisis. However, attempts to tackle the problem by separating retail banking from higher risk trading ... [more ▼]

The problem of banks being 'too big to fail' was the defining regulatory issue of the global financial crisis. However, attempts to tackle the problem by separating retail banking from higher risk trading activities - known as structural reform - proved to be highly divisive and contributed to significant regulatory divergence. In this book, David Howarth and Scott James explain this variation by examining the politics of bank structural reform across six key jurisdictions: the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Integrating political economy and public policy approaches, they develop a novel 'comparative financial power' framework to analyse how financial industry influence is mediated by two factors: first, whether bank lobbying is unified and centralized (cooperative financial power) or divided and fragmented (competitive financial power); and second, policy makers' use of venue shifting to depoliticize contentious policy issues. The book explains that the US and UK governments implemented major reforms because the banking industry was divided and faced significant opposition. However, venue shifting to an independent committee led to durable reform in the UK, while political polarization in the US contributed to contested reform. By contrast, the French and German governments balanced unified bank lobbying and political pressures to act by pursuing limited symbolic reforms; the Dutch government deflected the issue through delegation to multiple commissions (no reform); while political stalemate at the EU level resulted from early venue shifting and concerted pan-European bank lobbying. The book makes a major contribution to scholarship on the political economy of finance and business power. [less ▲]

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See detailThe European Investment Bank, development banks and the promotion of public-private partnerships
Howarth, David UL; Liebe, Moritz

in Kavvadia, Helen; Coppolaro, Lucia (Eds.) Deciphering the European Investment Bank: History, Politics, and Economics (2022)

This chapter focuses on the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other development banks around the world in the promotion of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). In the late 1980s, PPPs (re ... [more ▼]

This chapter focuses on the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other development banks around the world in the promotion of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). In the late 1980s, PPPs (re-)emerged as a new form of infrastructure procurement in the European context, starting with the Channel (Euro-) Tunnel project. Procurement through PPPs increased significantly in European Union (EU) member states a decade later due to promotion efforts by the UK New Labour government, followed by a number of other EU member states. PPPs introduce private capital and participation into areas — for example, school and hospital construction and maintenance — which were predominately in the public realm. PPPs became popular with public authorities for a number of reasons, including perceived 'value for money' and the possibility of removing costs from the public ledgers. The main research question driving this chapter is: how should the EIB's role in PPP promotion best be understood? This chapter demonstrates that with regard to the promotion of PPPs, the activism of the EIB can be explained in terms of the bank's operation as a policy entrepreneur. We also argue that this framework for analysis — policy entrepreneurship — helps to explain to the promotion of PPPs by other development banks around the world. [less ▲]

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See detailThe Increasingly Differentiated European Single Market?
Howarth, David UL

in Leruth, Benjamin; Gänzle, Stefan; Trondal, Jarle (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Differentiation in the European Union (2022)

This contribution explores the range of differentiation in the EU Single Market and, specifically, differentiation created through the varying transposition and implementation of EU Single Market law and ... [more ▼]

This contribution explores the range of differentiation in the EU Single Market and, specifically, differentiation created through the varying transposition and implementation of EU Single Market law and policies and legally entrenched differentiation. Differentiation has in effect contributed to discrimination in the Single Market and has undermined market integration. Enlargement de facto increased soft and instrumental forms of differentiation. However, there is no correlation between the full transposition and implementation of EU legislation and policy and whether the member state is one of the older EU-15 or one of the newer EU-13. Moreover, it is clear from several legislative developments in the 2000s — including the directives on takeovers and energy production and supply, and the use of Enhanced Cooperation provisions on the Financial Transactions Tax (although not implemented) and the Unitary Patent — that the different preferences of the older member states — and notably German and French government preferences rooted in microeconomic interests — have driven legislated and, potentially permanent differentiation. [less ▲]

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See detailStillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules
Howarth, David UL; Asimakopoulos, Ioannis

in Journal of Common Market Studies (2022), 60(2), 264-282

Our contribution demonstrates and explains the ineffectiveness of European Union (EU) bank resolution rules, a core element of Banking Union. This inadequacy owes in large part to the limited access to ... [more ▼]

Our contribution demonstrates and explains the ineffectiveness of European Union (EU) bank resolution rules, a core element of Banking Union. This inadequacy owes in large part to the limited access to and insufficient availability of EU resolution funds and inadequate national deposit guarantee schemes in most EU member states, in conjunction with the relatively high minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for many EU banks. In many cases, these requirements are unlikely ever to be met – particularly for retail banks most likely to require resolution in the euro periphery. We offer a liberal intergovernmentalist analysis to explain the inadequacy of the EU resolution regime by examining German and French government preferences on EU rules on bank capital requirements agreed earlier in 2013 and national deposit guarantee schemes agreed in 2014. These government preferences were shaped significantly by the preferences of national banks and bank associations. [less ▲]

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See detailThe European Guarantee Fund and COVID-19: Agile But in Need of Greater Accountability
Howarth, David UL; Hodson, Dermot

E-print/Working paper (2022)

The European Guarantee Fund formed an important part of the EU’s first response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite delays from some member states and the European Commission over the creation of this ... [more ▼]

The European Guarantee Fund formed an important part of the EU’s first response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite delays from some member states and the European Commission over the creation of this instrument, the European Investment Bank (EIB) moved at high speed to support SMEs and mid-caps. The European Guarantee Fund was vertically accountable to national governments, but it needed stronger horizontal accountability to the European Parliament and diagonal accountability to NGOs. The EIB should commit to an independent ex-post evaluation of the European Guarantee Fund’s design, operation and impact. [less ▲]

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See detailThe European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms
Howarth, David UL; Fontan, Clément

in Politics and Governance (2021), 9(2),

In May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank’s participation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector Purchase Programme ... [more ▼]

In May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank’s participation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector Purchase Programme. Applying elements of a principal-agent analysis, this article analyses how the FCC ruling presents us with a new understanding of the relationship between the ECB, other EU institutions and Eurozone member states. Existing principal-agent analyses of the ECB focus upon its relations with other EU-level institutions and point to the limited ex ante control mechanisms and efforts to reinforce ex post control mechanisms—notably European Parliament oversight. The FCC ruling and the ECB’s reaction demonstrate the relative importance of national level controls over the ECB agent. This article understands the role of private plaintiffs in Germany as a form of ‘fire alarm’ on ECB policymaking against the background of weak ex post controls at the EU-level. [less ▲]

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See detailEconomic and Monetary Union at Twenty: A Stocktaking of a Tumultuous Second Decade
Howarth, David UL; Verdun, Amy

Book published by Routledge (2021)

The contributions to this book examine the two main asymmetries of the Euro Area as they have intensified during the second decade of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): the first between monetary union ... [more ▼]

The contributions to this book examine the two main asymmetries of the Euro Area as they have intensified during the second decade of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): the first between monetary union (more supranational governance) versus ‘economic’ union (less centralised governance); the second between those Euro Area member states of the so-called ‘core’ and those of the ‘periphery’. EMU stands as one of the European Union’s (EU) flagship integration achievements. Set up in 1999, with the large majority of EU member states at the time, EMU was described as ‘asymmetrical’ even prior to its start. From the outset, it involved asymmetrical integration in monetary and ‘economic’ union. Although a major element of the blueprint that paved the way for the final stage of EMU, the concept of ‘economic’ union was insufficiently developed. The second decade of the single currency gave rise to a second asymmetry, namely one between those Euro Area member states of the ‘core’ and those of the ‘periphery’. The ten contributions to this volume speak to one or both of these asymmetries, covering the major political, political economy and policy dimensions of EMU and the ongoing debates about necessary policy and institutional reforms to overcome these asymmetries and bolster Euro Area stability. The outbreak of the Coronavirus (Covid-19) Crisis in 2020 created unprecedented socio-economic challenges for Euro Area member states, heightening the perceived urgency of reform. [less ▲]

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See detailRegional Development Banks and the promotion of Public-Private Partnerships: the EIB as a case study
Howarth, David UL; Liebe, Moritz

in Clifton, Judith; Diaz Fuentes, Daniel; Howarth, David (Eds.) Regional Banks in the World Economy (2021)

Most Regional Development Banks in the world have engaged in the increased promotion and use of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). To explain this rapid and ubiquitous spread of Public Private ... [more ▼]

Most Regional Development Banks in the world have engaged in the increased promotion and use of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). To explain this rapid and ubiquitous spread of Public Private Partnership promotion and use, this chapter argues that Regional Development Banks can be seen to have acted as agents engaged in slippage. Most—if not all—of their shareholding national governments and loan recipient countries had limited or no prior experience with and knowledge of PPP financing. This activism on the part of Regional Development Banks can also be seen in both Multilateral Development Bank and National Development Bank promotion of PPPs and reinforces wider claims in the literature. More generally, Gavin and Rodrik (1995) argue that International Financial Institutions (IFIs) bolster their long-acquired skills in technical and information expertise in order to remain relevant—a claim that this chapter explores with regard to PPPs in particular. The promotion of PPPs should also be seen in terms of Regional Development Banks operating as agents to move beyond the correction of market failure towards the creation and/or shaping of markets through a particular financing mechanism and with specific market actors (Mazzucato and Penna 2016: 305). [less ▲]

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See detailRegional Development Banks in the World Economy
Howarth, David UL; Clifton, Judith; Diaz Fuentes, Daniel

Book published by Oxford University Press (2021)

Regional development banks (RDB) have become increasingly important in the world economy, but have also been relatively under-researched to date. This timely volume addresses this lack of attention by ... [more ▼]

Regional development banks (RDB) have become increasingly important in the world economy, but have also been relatively under-researched to date. This timely volume addresses this lack of attention by providing a comprehensive, comparative, and empirically informed analysis of their origins, evolution, and contemporary role in the world economy through to the second decade of the twenty-first century. In Regional Development Banks in the World Economy, the editors provide an analytical framework that includes a revised categorisation of RDB by geographic operation and function. Part one offers detailed analyses of the origins, evolution, and contemporary role of the major RDB, including the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the Central American Bank, the Andean Development Corporation, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Part two offers comparative analyses of key topics on RDB, examining their initial design and their changing business models, their shifting role in promoting policies supported by the United States as hegemon and the private sector. The volume ends with a critical reflection on the role played by RDB to date and a strong defence of the need for these banks in an increasingly complex world economy. [less ▲]

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See detailRegional Development Banks in the World Economy
Howarth, David UL; Clifton, Judith; Diaz Fuentes, Daniel

in Clifton, Judith; Diaz Fuentes, Daniel; Howarth, David (Eds.) Regional Development Banks in the World Economy (2021)

In this introduction, we present the categories and the analytical framework that we apply to examine Regional Development Banks, and specifically a form of rational choice institutionalism—Principal ... [more ▼]

In this introduction, we present the categories and the analytical framework that we apply to examine Regional Development Banks, and specifically a form of rational choice institutionalism—Principal-Agent analysis. We apply the categories and framework to each Regional Development Bank in its specific political economy context, with a view to setting out and analysing the similarities and differences among Regional Development Bank. We demonstrate and explain an important evolution in the main objectives of Regional Development Bank lending activities over three distinct periods: from regional integration and development, to market promotion and development, and then to geographical expansion—and multi-polarity promotion for some Regional Development Banks—and a more strategic interventionism in the market, that includes market shaping activities including industrial policy. We explain this evolution in terms of the agency of the Regional Development Banks in relation to their multiple principal—the shareholder national governments. [less ▲]

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See detailComment expliquer les reforms du secteur financier en Europe : acteurs, idées ou institutions
Howarth, David UL

in Saurugger, Sabine; Hassenteufel, Patrick (Eds.) Les Politiques Publiques dans la Crise (2021)

This chapter presents an analysis of the public policies carried out in Europe to regulate the financial sector over the pas fifteen years, focusing notably on the role of financial sector and government ... [more ▼]

This chapter presents an analysis of the public policies carried out in Europe to regulate the financial sector over the pas fifteen years, focusing notably on the role of financial sector and government actors, while considering the role of ideas and institutional frameworks. The concern for financial sector stabilization and reinforced supervision in the aftermath of the crisis has led to the adoption of various European-level and national regulations. Competitive pressures within a highly internationalized sector, as well as the many possibilities for regulatory arbitrage, have justified the use of international and, at least, EU-level financial sector control mechanisms. This chapter demonstrates that the crises from which the EU suffered from 2007 led to a rupture in policies and power relations between public and private actors. The strengthening of supervision and supranational supervision is the direct consequence, and resulted in the creation of the three European authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA), and above all the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the transfer of supervisory powers over the euro zone's largest banks to the European Central Bank. The possibility of inadequate national supervision — a situation in which national public authorities ignore or accept the problems of national banks for various reasons — has thus been reduced. The effect of Basel III (international capital guidelines) is also felt on the activities and organization of large banks, encouraged to limit their high-risk activities. Most of the major European banks have reduced, or are in the process of reducing, their balance sheets. Yet to speak of a paradigm shift in the approach of the governments of major European countries, or even the European Commission, to financial regulation is premature. The constraints imposed on the financial sector, apart from the banks, have only partially increased. As a result of the Banking Union, the overall influence of banks has probably diminished at the national level, at least with regard to banking supervision. However, the ongoing weakness of bank regulation in many areas — for example, the weakness or absence of bank structural reform in all European countries with the exception of the United Kingdom — demonstrates ongoing bank influence. Moreover, other financial sector actors continue to be under-regulated and, arguably, insufficiently supervised. [less ▲]

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See detailNein to ‘Transfer Union’: the German brake on the construction of a European Union fiscal capacity
Howarth, David UL; Schild, Joachim

in Journal of European Integration (2021), 43(2), 207-224

This paper argues that, on the development of European Union (EU)/Eurozone fiscal capacity German governments have consistently engaged in foot-dragging. Few German state elites have ever supported ... [more ▼]

This paper argues that, on the development of European Union (EU)/Eurozone fiscal capacity German governments have consistently engaged in foot-dragging. Few German state elites have ever supported European fiscal capacity building beyond the EC budget. Following the outbreak of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, German governments agreed to the creation of financial support mechanisms only with reluctance. We see a case of continuity in German policy preferences driven by consistent ordoliberal and, specifically, moral hazard concerns. The important longterm change that we can observe relates to the growing importance for successive governments of avoiding audience costs driven by sceptical public opinion and the rise of a challenger party in German politics. German government support for a massive EU fiscal response to the economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates an exceptional policy position in favour of temporary financial mechanisms involving no fiscal transfers among member state governments. [less ▲]

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See detailReforming the Institutions of Eurozone Governance
Högenauer, Anna-Lena UL; Howarth, David UL; Rehm, Moritz UL

in Politics and Governance (2021), 9(2),

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See detailDelivering value for money? The problematic accountability of the European Stability Mechanism
Howarth, David UL; Spendzharova, Aneta

in Stevenson, Paul; Sánchez-Barrueco, María-Luisa; Aden, Hartmut (Eds.) Financial Accountability in the European Union (2021)

This chapter undertakes a critical assessment of the accountability of one recent institutional addition to the Euro area governance system – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Regarding Euro area ... [more ▼]

This chapter undertakes a critical assessment of the accountability of one recent institutional addition to the Euro area governance system – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Regarding Euro area governance in general, Dawson (2015: 976) warns that many new structures designed in response to the Euro area crisis ‘depart from the mechanisms of legal and political accountability present in previous forms of EU decision-making without substituting new models of accountability in their place’. By examining in greater detail the financial accountability mechanisms applicable to an important new Euro area body, we identify accountability gaps and shortcomings in the complex EU architecture of financial control. [less ▲]

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See detailFailing forward in Economic and Monetary Union: explaining weak Eurozone financial support mechanisms
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in Journal of European Public Policy (2021), 28(10), 1555-1572

In this article, we apply the ‘failing forward’ approach to analyse the negotiations on and design of reforms to Eurozone economic governance to tackle the Covid-19-related crisis of Economic and Monetary ... [more ▼]

In this article, we apply the ‘failing forward’ approach to analyse the negotiations on and design of reforms to Eurozone economic governance to tackle the Covid-19-related crisis of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This crisis highlights both spill-overs from major asymmetries in EMU and weaknesses in the incomplete economic governance of the Eurozone. We focus on the financial support mechanisms agreed upon after intergovernmental negotiations in major crisis situations. These reforms represent compromise solutions that reflect well-entrenched disagreements among member states. We explain why more far-reaching reforms to Eurozone economic governance – notably, the adoption of mutualized Euro-denominated debt and the generalized use of grants over loans – have not been adopted, despite the severity of the Covid-19-related crisis. These reforms – notably the Next Generation European Union (NGEU) financial package adopted in July 2020 – fail to address and, rather, contribute to existing asymmetries, thus sowing the seeds of future crises. [less ▲]

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See detailTorn between Two Lovers: German Policy on Economic and Monetary Union, the New Hanseatic League and Franco-German Bilateralism
Howarth, David UL; Schild, Joachim

in German Politics (2021)

German governments and European Union (EU) member states forming the New Hanseatic League (HL) have had very similar preferences on EU / Eurozone financial support mechanisms. We would expect German and ... [more ▼]

German governments and European Union (EU) member states forming the New Hanseatic League (HL) have had very similar preferences on EU / Eurozone financial support mechanisms. We would expect German and HL governments to be close allies on these matters. However, empirically, we detect differences. German governments have repeatedly resisted participating in HL joint positions on EU financial support mechanisms and accepted compromises with France. In order to explain this divergence we consider the relative explanatory merit of economic preferences, based on both material interests and economic ideas—here ordoliberalism—on the one hand, and norms of cooperation—here Franco-German ‘embedded bilateralism’—and geo-strategic interests on the other hand. We disentangle economic preference formation and the choice in favour of a political strategy to pursue these preferences. Economic preferences are one factor explaining the extent of concessions made by Germany to the HL countries and France. However, norms of cooperation and geostrategic interests explain the choice of German governments on how and with whom best to pursue their preferences. German governments have performed a balancing act between the HL and France, skewed towards the latter. The presence of economic crises increases the degree to which this balancing act is skewed towards France. [less ▲]

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See detailThe role of the European Investment Bank in Times of COVID-19
Howarth, David UL; Kavvadia, Helen; Clifton, Judith et al

in McDonald, D.A.; Marois, T.; Barrowclough, D.V. (Eds.) Public Banks and Covid-19: Combatting the Pandemic With Public Finance. Municipal Services Project (2020)

The European Guarantee Fund (EGF) is spearheading European Investment Bank (EIB) action in response to Covid-19. It will provide guarantees to the EIB and the EIF to reimburse any possible losses incurred ... [more ▼]

The European Guarantee Fund (EGF) is spearheading European Investment Bank (EIB) action in response to Covid-19. It will provide guarantees to the EIB and the EIF to reimburse any possible losses incurred in their operations. By pooling credit risk across all of the EIB’s members, the overall average cost of the EGF will be significantly reduced, compared to national schemes. Financially speaking, this appears an efficient solution given the objectives of a Regional Development Bank – which the EIB can be categorised. Most of the EGF funding will be made available through financial intermediaries – National Promotional Banks and commercial banks. Once the funds are made available and the list of financial intermediaries established, companies can file requests directly with financial intermediaries. We argue that especially in view of the public health crisis, it is high time for the EIB to establish a health sector strategy and step up its contribution from its own funds, beyond risk-sharing facilities with the Member States and the Commission as EGF and IDFF respectively. In its response to Covid-19 economic crisis, it is imperative for the EIB to focus squarely on the final beneficiaries (SMEs, innovation, social and environmental projects) rather than the private financial intermediaries. For the EU’s public bank, the need for assuring transparency and accountability, in view of the increasing use of budgetary and Member States’ funds especially in the public good health sector, is higher than ever. [less ▲]

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