Results 81-86 of 86.
Bookmark and Share    
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailA Supervised Verifiable Voting Protocol for the Victorian Electoral Commission
Burton, Craig Burton; Culnane, Chris; Heather, James et al

in EVOTE 2012 (2012)

This paper describes the design of a supervised verifiable voting protocol suitable for use for elections in the state of Victoria, Australia. We provide a brief overview of the style and nature of the ... [more ▼]

This paper describes the design of a supervised verifiable voting protocol suitable for use for elections in the state of Victoria, Australia. We provide a brief overview of the style and nature of the elections held in Victoria and associated challenges. Our protocol, based on Prêt à Voter, presents a new ballot overprinting front-end design, which assists the voter in completing the potentially complex ballot. We also present and analyse a series of modifications to the back-end that will enable it to handle the large number of candidates, 35+ , with ranking single transferable vote (STV), which some Victorian elections require. We conclude with a threat analysis of the scheme and a discussion on the impact of the modifications on the integrity and privacy assumptions of Prêt à Voter. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 219 (0 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailUsing Prêt à Voter in Victorian State Elections
Ryan, Peter UL; Schneider, Steve; Peacock, Thea et al

in Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (2012)

The Prêt à Voter cryptographic voting system was designed to be flexible and to offer voters a familiar and easy voting experience. In this paper we present a case study of our efforts to adapt Prêt à ... [more ▼]

The Prêt à Voter cryptographic voting system was designed to be flexible and to offer voters a familiar and easy voting experience. In this paper we present a case study of our efforts to adapt Prêt à Voter to the idiosyncrasies of elections in the Australian state of Victoria. The general background and desired user experience have previously been described; here we concentrate on the cryptographic protocols for dealing with some unusual aspects of Victorian voting. We explain the problems, present solutions, then analyse their security properties and explain how they tie in to other design decisions. We hope this will be an interesting case study on the application of end-to-end verifiable voting protocols to real elections. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 92 (1 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailA Modular Multi-Modal Specification of Real-Timed, End-To-End Voter-Verifiable Voting Systems
Kramer, Simon UL; Ryan, Peter UL

in 2011 International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for Electronic Voting Systems (REVOTE) (2011)

We propose a modular multi-modal specification of real-timed, end-to-end voter-verifiable voting systems, i.e., a formal but intuitive specification of real-timed voting systems that are accountable (and ... [more ▼]

We propose a modular multi-modal specification of real-timed, end-to-end voter-verifiable voting systems, i.e., a formal but intuitive specification of real-timed voting systems that are accountable (and thus trustworthy) to their users. Our specification is expressed as a single but well-compounded formula in a logical language of temporal, epistemic, and provability modalities. The intuitiveness of the specification is the fruit of its modular and multi-modal form. This means that the specification can be appreciated compound-wise, as a logical conjunction of separate sub-requirements, each of which achieving the ideal of a formal transcription of a suitable natural-language formulation, thanks to powerful descriptive idioms in the form of our multiple modalities. The modular form reduces our proof of the satisfiability (consistency) and thus implementability of the specification to a proof by inspection, and induces the parallelisability of implementation-correctness verifications. The specification also pinpoints the implementation-specific part of particular voting systems, reuses a generic definition of accountability inducing trust in a formal sense, and, last but not least, counter-balances by its implementability some previous results about the contradictory conjunction of certain desirable property pairs of voting systems. So in some sense, ideal voting systems do exist. Our specific formalisation principles are agent correctness, i.e., the behavioural correctness of the voting-system-constituting agents, and data adequacy, i.e., the soundness and (relative) completeness of the voting data processed by the system. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 141 (2 UL)
See detailSTAST 2011 Proc. of the 1st Workshop on Socio-Technical Aspects in Security and Trust
Coles-Kemp, Lizzie; Lenzini, Gabriele UL; Ryan, Peter UL et al

Book published by IEEE (2011)

Detailed reference viewed: 234 (11 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailSecurity protocols for Secret Santa
Mauw, Sjouke UL; Radomirovic, Sasa UL; Ryan, Peter UL

in Proc. 18th Security Protocols Workshop (2010)

Detailed reference viewed: 264 (8 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailVersatile Prêt à Voter: Handling Multiple Election Methods with a Unified Interface
Xia, Zhe; Culnane, Chris; Heather, James et al

in Proc. 11th International Conference on Cryptology in India (IndoCrypt'10) (2010)

Detailed reference viewed: 305 (7 UL)