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See detailPatent office governance and patent examination quality
Picard, Pierre M. UL; van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno

E-print/Working paper (2013)

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper ... [more ▼]

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination process. A higher effort in the examination process enhances the patent holders' protection in the judicial system and strengthens the screening of innovations with small inventive steps. We compare the quality of the examination process for various objectives of patent offices. Patent examination quality is the highest in an office maximizing incentives to innovate and the lowest in that maximizing the number of granted patents. A rent-seeking patent office can provide good incentives to innovate if it does not set too high markups on fees. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 206 (125 UL)
See detailSocial interactions, social capital and urban structure
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, July)

Detailed reference viewed: 40 (2 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, July)

Detailed reference viewed: 41 (8 UL)
See detailTrade, economic geography and the choice of product quality”
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, June)

Detailed reference viewed: 63 (8 UL)
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See detailAirline Alliances, Carve-Outs and Collusion
Brueckner, Jan; Picard, Pierre M. UL

in Review of Network Economics (2013), 12(2), 211

In this paper, we ask how antitrust immunity subject to a carve-out affects collusion incentives in international airline alliances. We show that the gains from economies of density due to higher ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we ask how antitrust immunity subject to a carve-out affects collusion incentives in international airline alliances. We show that the gains from economies of density due to higher interline traffic under the alliance strengthen the incentive to collude on the interhub route, while the accompanying revenue gain heightens the incentive to defect from collusive behavior. These two effects exactly cancel in the case of linear demand and linear economies of density. Under this approximation, the incentives for interhub collusion are no different before and after the formation of an airline alliance subject to a carve-out. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 243 (126 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, March)

Detailed reference viewed: 31 (4 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, February 28)

Detailed reference viewed: 24 (1 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, February 14)

Detailed reference viewed: 19 (1 UL)
See detailState owned firms: private debt, cost revelation and welfare
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, February)

Detailed reference viewed: 43 (11 UL)
See detailSustainable Migration Policies
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, January)

Detailed reference viewed: 21 (0 UL)
See detailSpatial segregation and urban structure
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013)

Detailed reference viewed: 58 (6 UL)
See detailSocial interactions, social capital and urban structure
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013)

Detailed reference viewed: 19 (2 UL)
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See detailA Theory of BOT concession contracts
Auriol, Emmanuelle UL; Picard, Pierre M. UL

in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2013), 89

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and Örm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and Örm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose BOT concessions. This result stems from a trade-o§ between the governmentís shadow costs of Önancing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period. The incentives to choose BOT concessions increase as a function of informational asymmetries between governments and potential BOT concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession project characteristics to the public authority at the termination of the concession. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 246 (125 UL)
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See detailSpatial Segregation and Urban Structure
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Mossay, Pascal

E-print/Working paper (2013)

In this paper, we study social interactions between two populations of individuals living in a city. Agents consume land and benefit from intra- and inter-group social interactions. We show that in ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we study social interactions between two populations of individuals living in a city. Agents consume land and benefit from intra- and inter-group social interactions. We show that in equilibrium segregation arises: populations get separated in distinct spatial neighborhoods. Two- and three-district urban structures are characterized. For high population ratios or strong inter-group interactions, only a three-district city exists. In other cases, multiplicity of equilibria arises. Moreover, for sufficiently low population ratios or very weak inter-group interactions, all individuals agree on which spatial equilibrium is best. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 90 (14 UL)
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See detailOn microfoundations of the city
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Tabuchi, Takatoshi

in Journal of Economic Theory (2013), 148(6), 2561-2582

This paper considers the spatial structure of a city subject to final demand and vertical linkages. Individuals consume differentiated goods (or services) and firms purchase differentiated inputs (or ... [more ▼]

This paper considers the spatial structure of a city subject to final demand and vertical linkages. Individuals consume differentiated goods (or services) and firms purchase differentiated inputs (or services) in product (or service) markets where firms compete under monopolistic competition. Workers rent their residential lots in an urban land market and contribute to the production of differentiated goods and inputs. We show that firms and workers co-agglomerate and endogenously form a city. We characterize and discuss the spatial distribution of firms and consumers in such cities on one- and two-dimensional spaces. We show that final demand and vertical linkages raise the urban density and reduce the city spread. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 183 (121 UL)
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See detailExtensive and intensive margins and the choice of exchange rate regimes
Picard, Pierre M UL; Hamano, Masashige

E-print/Working paper (2013)

This paper studies how the choice of fixed or flexible exchange rate regimes is affected by the existence of intensive and extensive margins. We study two models where firms enter during or before each ... [more ▼]

This paper studies how the choice of fixed or flexible exchange rate regimes is affected by the existence of intensive and extensive margins. We study two models where firms enter during or before each period of production. We show how the the choice of those regimes depend on the level and the volatily of the intensive and extensive margins as well as on the congruence between consumers' preferences and the supply and diversity of products. We show that fixed exchange rate regimes are preferred for high enough labor supply elasticities. Fixed exchange rate regimes are unambigously better when entry occurs at the same time as production in each period. Fixed exchange rate regimes are less attractive in the presence of production lags and higher love of product diversity. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 55 (2 UL)
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See detailThe economics of airport noise: how to manage markets for noise licenses
Bréchet, Thierry; Picard, Pierre M. UL

in Transportation Research. Part D : Transport and Environment (2012), 17(2), 169-178

Noise-induced pollution constitutes a hot and topical societal problem for all major airports. This paper discusses various issues in the implementation of a market for noise licenses as a solution to ... [more ▼]

Noise-induced pollution constitutes a hot and topical societal problem for all major airports. This paper discusses various issues in the implementation of a market for noise licenses as a solution to solve the noise externality between the residents located around airports and the aircrafts moving in and to airports. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 49 (6 UL)
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See detailTrade, Economic Geography and the Choice of Product Quality
Picard, Pierre M. UL

E-print/Working paper (2012)

The present paper studies the effect of the choice of product quality on trade and location of firms. We build a quality-augmented model where consumers have preferences for the quality of a set of ... [more ▼]

The present paper studies the effect of the choice of product quality on trade and location of firms. We build a quality-augmented model where consumers have preferences for the quality of a set of differentiated varieties. Firms do not only develop and sell manufacturing varieties in a monopolistic competitive market but also determine the quality level of their varieties by investing in research and de- velopment. We explore the price and quality equilibrium properties when firms are immobile. We then consider a footloose capital model where capital is allocated to the manufacturing firms in the region offering the highest return. We show that the larger region produces varieties of higher quality and that the quality gap increases with larger asymmetries in region sizes and with larger trade costs. Finally, the home market effect is mitigated when firms choose their product quality. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 60 (4 UL)
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See detailState Owned Firms: Private Debt, Cost Revelation and Welfare
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Rusli, Ridwan UL

E-print/Working paper (2012)

In this paper we study the role of private debt financing in disciplining a state owned firm operating for a government that incurs a cost of public financing. We show that debt contracts allow the ... [more ▼]

In this paper we study the role of private debt financing in disciplining a state owned firm operating for a government that incurs a cost of public financing. We show that debt contracts allow the government to avoid socially costly subsidies by letting unprofitable state- owned firms default. Debt is never used when the firm and government share the same information about the firm. By contrast, when the state-owned firm has private information, the government has an incentive to use debt to reduce the firm's information rents. We identify the conditions under which a positive debt level benefits governments. They depend on the cost of public funds, the interbank funding rate, the share of foreign investors, the level and uncertainty of the firm's cost. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 42 (7 UL)
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See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Moriconi, Simone; Picard, Pierre M. UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

E-print/Working paper (2012)

This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods ... [more ▼]

This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods, while regulation of entry determines the number of firms in the markets. We find (i) no strategic interaction in commodity taxes; (ii) regulation leads to lower commodity tax rates if demand for public goods is more sensitive to income than demand for private goods and (iii) regulation policy is a strategically complement instrument if consumers do not over value product diversity. In the empirical part of the paper, we test our predictions using panel data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1990-2008. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 64 (15 UL)