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Results 41-60 of 62.
  Forecasting Asset PricesNeugebauer, Tibor  Scientific Conference (2012) Detailed reference viewed: 42 (3 UL) Public Good and Private Good Valuation for Waiting Time Reduction: A Laboratory StudyNeugebauer, Tibor ; in Social Choice and Welfare (2012) Detailed reference viewed: 79 (3 UL) Excludability and Contribution: A Laboratory Study in Team ProductionNeugebauer, Tibor ; ; E-print/Working paper (2012) Detailed reference viewed: 92 (3 UL)Limited Liability, Moral Hazard and Risk Taking – A Safety Net GameNeugebauer, Tibor ; E-print/Working paper (2012) Detailed reference viewed: 40 (2 UL)Vertically Splitting a Firm:Promotion and Demotion in a Team Production ExperimentNeugebauer, Tibor ; ; et alE-print/Working paper (2012) Detailed reference viewed: 30 (1 UL)Public Good and Private Good Valuation for Waiting, Time Reduction: A Laboratory StudyNeugebauer, Tibor ; E-print/Working paper (2011) Detailed reference viewed: 82 (2 UL)Who makes the Pie Bigger? An Experimental Study on CooperationNeugebauer, Tibor ; ; in New Zealand Economic Papers (2011) Detailed reference viewed: 51 (2 UL)Moral Impossibility in the Petersburg Paradox : A Literature Survey and Experimental EvidenceNeugebauer, Tibor E-print/Working paper (2010) Detailed reference viewed: 102 (9 UL)Limited Liability, Moral Hazard and Risk Taking - A Safety Net Game ExperimentNeugebauer, Tibor ; E-print/Working paper (2010) Detailed reference viewed: 98 (4 UL)Who makes the pie bigger? An experimental study on co-opetitionNeugebauer, Tibor ; ; E-print/Working paper (2010) Detailed reference viewed: 104 (2 UL)Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon’s ‘Essays on Moral ArithmeticNeugebauer, Tibor ; ; E-print/Working paper (2010) Detailed reference viewed: 172 (1 UL)George Luis Leclerc de Buffon's Essays on Moral ArithmeticNeugebauer, Tibor ; ; in The Selten School of Behavioral Economics (2010) Detailed reference viewed: 82 (5 UL)Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experimentsNeugebauer, Tibor in Journal of Economic Psychology (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 31 (2 UL)An experimental analysis of optimal renewable resource management: the fisheryNeugebauer, Tibor in Environmental and Resource Economics (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 26 (2 UL)Individual Choice from a Convex Lottery Set: Experimental EvidenceNeugebauer, Tibor in Mohammed Abdellaboui and John D Hey (eds), Advances in Decision Making under Risk and Uncertainty, Theory and Decision Library C. Berlin: Springer (2008), 42 This article reports on simple individual choice experiments, in which subjects choose a lottery from a convex set involving dominated lotteries and perfect negative correlation between risky assets. All ... [more ▼] This article reports on simple individual choice experiments, in which subjects choose a lottery from a convex set involving dominated lotteries and perfect negative correlation between risky assets. All subjects’ choices obey to [violate] the dominance criterion when dominance is [not] transparent. Choices involve too much risk since subjects overlook covariances. The main result is that elicited preferences suggest a two-step boundedly rational diversification pattern: subjects allocate a share of their endowment risklessly and allocate the remainder extremely risky but losslessly. This pattern is in line with safety first theory and loss aversion theory, but contradicts both in choice. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 35 (2 UL)Preference Elicitation in Chicken: An Experimental StudyNeugebauer, Tibor ; ; in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2008), 66 We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk–Dove Game. A variety of recent models gives the same predictions for this game. This allows us to provide a general classification of individuals’ types ... [more ▼] We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk–Dove Game. A variety of recent models gives the same predictions for this game. This allows us to provide a general classification of individuals’ types. Contrary to a large number of studies of different games over the last decade, we observe a large group of subjects behaving in a self-interested way and observe only little reciprocity. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 28 (2 UL)An Experimental Analysis of Optimal Renewable Resource Management:The FisheryNeugebauer, Tibor ; ; E-print/Working paper (2008) Detailed reference viewed: 84 (1 UL)Bid and price effects of increased competition in the first-price auction: experimental evidenceNeugebauer, Tibor E-print/Working paper (2007) Detailed reference viewed: 48 (3 UL)Bidding At Sequential First Price Auctions With(Out) Supply Uncertainty: An Experimental AnalysisNeugebauer, Tibor in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2007) Detailed reference viewed: 23 (5 UL)How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experimentFatas, Enrique ; ; Neugebauer, Tibor in Journal of Economics (2007), 32(2), 167-196 We report on an experimental study with real-world politicians. These political experts face political choice problems under risk and probability. Thus, we test the frequently observed violations of ... [more ▼] We report on an experimental study with real-world politicians. These political experts face political choice problems under risk and probability. Thus, we test the frequently observed violations of rational choice theory -the reference point effect, loss aversion, framing effects, and the common ratio effect- with experts from the field. Their choices violate expected utility theory. Nevertheless, they appear to be more rational and less risk averse (loving) in the domain of gains (losses) than student subjects. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 26 (3 UL) |
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