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  <channel>
    <title>ORBi&lt;sup&gt;lu&lt;/sup&gt; Collection: Microeconomics</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/75</link>
    <description />
    <textInput>
      <title>The Collection's search engine</title>
      <description>Search this channel</description>
      <name>search</name>
      <link>http://orbilu.uni.lu/simple-search</link>
    </textInput>
    <item>
      <title>Spatial segregation and urban structure</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41545</link>
      <description>Title: Spatial segregation and urban structure
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Picard, Pierre M; mossay, pascal
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this paper, we develop a model of spatial segregation mediated by competitive land prices. Agents of two groups consume city land and benefit from social interactions. Because of cultural or ethnic differences, intra-group interactions are more frequent than inter-group ones. When group sizes differ, population groups sort into distinct neighborhoods. We characterize two- and three-district urban structures. For high population ratios or strong inter-group interactions, only a three-district city exists. In other cases, multiplicity of equilibria arises. Both groups generally rank these equilibria differently. However, when group sizes are similar, all individuals agree on which spatial equilibrium is best.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jan 2020 16:53:03 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Local Social Interaction and Urban Equilibria</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41543</link>
      <description>Title: Local Social Interaction and Urban Equilibria
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Picard, Pierre M; Augeraud-Veron, Emmanuelle; Maruhenda, Francisco
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this paper we investigate the effect of local interaction in a simple urban economics model. Agents interact with others if and only if their interaction benefit outweights their travel cost and therefore meet others only within finite geographic windows. We show that two or more cites may co-exist at the equilibrium provided that they are sufficiently distant. For any interaction surplus function, there exists a unique spatial equilibrium on not too large city supports. The population density within a city is determined by a second order advance-delay differential equation, whose solutions are fully characterized for linear interaction surplus functions. Numerical analyses show that more localized interactions yield flatter population density and land rents over larger extents of the city support. They do not give support to the idea that multiple subcenters can be caused by small and finite geographic windows of interaction.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jan 2020 16:43:48 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Empirical Essays on Institutional Determinants of Firm Entry and Exit</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/40671</link>
      <description>Title: Empirical Essays on Institutional Determinants of Firm Entry and Exit
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Murmann Geb. Wagner, Simona Christine
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This thesis is a collection of three essays investigating unintended and non-obvious effects of economic policy changes and established institutional systems on firm entry and exit. The first essay investigates the effect of personal preferences of insolvency trustees and judges on insolvency outcomes in Germany. The second essay reveals that governmental wage setting through minimum wages will not only affect dependent employees but also self-employment. In the third essay, introduction of high-speed internet effects on firm entries and exits are analyzed.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Oct 2019 10:20:49 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Consumption home bias and ethnocentrism: an international duopoly</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/40362</link>
      <description>Title: Consumption home bias and ethnocentrism: an international duopoly
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Zanaj, Skerdilajda
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We define a model with two countries and two vertically differentiated goods, a high and a low-quality variant, and heterogenous consumers with respect to their willingness to pay for quality. Consumers in one country are ethnocentric in consumption. They thrive additional satisfaction when consuming a domestic good rather than a foreign one since only the former can satisfy their sense of place. We investigate the role of trade costs and ethnocentric attitude in shaping the equilibrium configuration of the international duopoly.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Sep 2019 16:13:39 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Job Matching, Wage Dispersion and Unemployment, Dale T. Mortensen and Christopher A. Pissarides</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/39172</link>
      <description>Title: Job Matching, Wage Dispersion and Unemployment, Dale T. Mortensen and Christopher A. Pissarides
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Editor: Tatsiramos, Konstantinos; Zimmermann, Klaus</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2019 17:43:39 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Childcare, Quality and Location: A Hedonic Approach.</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/38633</link>
      <description>Title: Childcare, Quality and Location: A Hedonic Approach.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Dupuy, Arnaud</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Feb 2019 08:18:11 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The empirical content of marital surplus in matching models</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/38632</link>
      <description>Title: The empirical content of marital surplus in matching models
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Doorley, Karina; Dupuy, Arnaud; Weber, Simon</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Feb 2019 08:15:40 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Empirical Content of Marital Surplus in Matching Models</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/38626</link>
      <description>Title: The Empirical Content of Marital Surplus in Matching Models
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Dupuy, Arnaud; Doorley, Karina; Weber, Simon</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Feb 2019 14:44:13 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>State‐owned firms and private debt</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/38553</link>
      <description>Title: State‐owned firms and private debt
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Picard, Pierre M; rusli, ridwan
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We study the role of private debt financing in reducing government transfers and information costs in a state‐owned firm. We show that debt contracts allow the government to reduce socially costly subsidies by letting underperforming state‐owned firms default. When the firm has private information, the government uses debt to reduce the firm's information rents. The option of default and privatization allows the government to stop subsidizing the firm. We identify the conditions under which information costs outweigh privatization costs and a positive debt level benefits governments.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 25 Jan 2019 16:09:41 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>State owned firms: private debt, cost revelation and welfare. Journal of Public Economic Theory.</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/38053</link>
      <description>Title: State owned firms: private debt, cost revelation and welfare. Journal of Public Economic Theory.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Picard, Pierre; Rusli, Ridwan
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We study the role of private debt financing in reducing government transfers and information costs in a state‐owned firm. We show that debt contracts allow the government to reduce socially costly subsidies by letting underperforming state‐owned firms default. When the firm has private information, the government uses debt to reduce the firm's information rents. The option of default and privatization allows the government to stop subsidizing the firm. We identify the conditions under which information costs outweigh privatization costs and a positive debt level benefits governments.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jan 2019 14:28:40 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Clean technology adoption under Cournot competition</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/36893</link>
      <description>Title: Clean technology adoption under Cournot competition
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Zanaj, Skerdilajda
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this paper we assess incentives for clean technology adoption by firms that compete&#xD;
ä la Cournot in local product markets subject to a tradable emission permits&#xD;
regulation. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show that permits prices may increase after clean&#xD;
technology adoption. Herein we show that, since strategic firms are able to predict&#xD;
such increase, this results in a non-innovation equilibrium (even for very low adoption&#xD;
costs). To the light of the previous result, we find a sufficient condition for the cap on&#xD;
emissions to ensure positive innovation incentives.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Oct 2018 22:30:45 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Global inequalities 1980-2050: a microdata oriented simulation – Worldsim</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/36190</link>
      <description>Title: Global inequalities 1980-2050: a microdata oriented simulation – Worldsim
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Chauvel, Louis; Bar-Haim, Eyal; Hartung, Anne; Leist, Anja
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Former global inequality models lack realistic features of the population (age, gender,&#xD;
education, behavior). Worldsim develops a panel sample based simulation of the world&#xD;
population until 2050, relying on UN, Cepii, etc, big data aggregated forecasts, that we&#xD;
individually disaggregate. The simulation confirms the decline of the world's Gini index,&#xD;
but underlines several paradoxes in the socioecodemography of the world, with increasing&#xD;
gaps between resources and needs. Compared to more standard socioeconomic&#xD;
simulations of inequalities, we provide more substantial characterization of the population,&#xD;
and compared to other global simulations, we capture the dimensions of social&#xD;
divergences between social groups and geographic regions.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jul 2018 09:22:06 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Do banks and microfinance institutions compete? Microevidence from Madagascar</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/34333</link>
      <description>Title: Do banks and microfinance institutions compete? Microevidence from Madagascar
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Leon, Florian; Baraton, Pierrick
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In recent years, both microfinance institutions (MFIs) and banks across the world have been converging towards the financing of small enterprises with high financing needs. This paper scrutinizes whether banks and MFIs compete each other as a result of recent transformations in both industries. In doing so, we study whether the loan strategy of a microfinance institution is shaped by the local presence of a bank. Specifically, we investigate whether bank proximity &#xD;
influences loan conditions provided by one of the largest microfinance institutions in Madagascar. We employ an original panel dataset of 32,374 loans granted to 14,834 borrowers over the period 2008-2014. We find that the closer a bank is located to a given MFI borrower, the larger the loan obtained and the less collateral required. These results are insensitive to several robustness tests for possible endogeneity of distance, sample selection issue, and alternative specifications. In addition, findings are stronger for larger and more established (older) firms in line with our hypothesis.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Feb 2018 12:58:56 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Electric vs. Conventional Vehicles: Environmental Externalities and Urban Spatial Policies</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/32647</link>
      <description>Title: Electric vs. Conventional Vehicles: Environmental Externalities and Urban Spatial Policies
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Habla, Wolfgang; Kyriakopoulou, Efthymia</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2017 19:39:43 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Electric vs. Conventional Vehicles: Environmental Externalities and Urban Spatial Policies</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/32646</link>
      <description>Title: Electric vs. Conventional Vehicles: Environmental Externalities and Urban Spatial Policies
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Habla, Wolfgang; Kyriakopoulou, Efthymia</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2017 19:37:25 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Natural Resource Management: A Network Perspective</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/32645</link>
      <description>Title: Natural Resource Management: A Network Perspective
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Kyriakopoulou, Efthymia; Xepapadeas, Anastasios</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2017 19:33:41 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Environmental Policy and the Size Distribution of Firms</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/32644</link>
      <description>Title: Environmental Policy and the Size Distribution of Firms
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Coria, Jessica; Kyriakopoulou, Efthymia
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this paper we analyze the e¤ects of environmental policies on the size distribution of firms. We model a stationary industry where the observed size distribution is a solution to the profit maximization problem of heterogeneous firms that di¤er in terms of their energy e¢ ciency. We&#xD;
compare the equilibrium size distribution under emission taxes, uniform emission standards, and&#xD;
performance standards. Our results indicate that, unlike emission taxes and performance standards, emission standards introduce regulatory asymmetries favoring small firms. These asymmetries cause significant detrimental e¤ects on total output and total welfare, yet lead to  reduced emissions and might help preserve small businesses.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2017 19:28:27 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>On the strategic effect of international permits trading on local pollution</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/32643</link>
      <description>Title: On the strategic effect of international permits trading on local pollution
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Antoniou, Fabio; Kyriakopoulou, Efthymia
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We introduce a model of strategic environmental policy where two firms compete à la Cournot in a third market in the presence of multiple pollutants. Two types of pollutants are introduced: a local and a transboundary one. The regulator can only control local pollution as transboundary pollution is regulated internationally. The strategic effect present in the original literature is also replicated in this setup. However, we illustrate that when transboundary pollution is regulated through the use of tradable emission permits instead of non-tradable ones then a new strategic effect appears which had not been identified thus far. In this case, local pollution increases further and welfare is lowered. We also provide evidence from the implementation of EU ETS over the pollution of particulate matters (PM10 and PM2.5).</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2017 19:24:34 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Atmospheric pollution in rapidly growing industrial cities: spatial policies and land use patterns</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/32642</link>
      <description>Title: Atmospheric pollution in rapidly growing industrial cities: spatial policies and land use patterns
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Kyriakopoulou, Efthymia; Xepapadeas, Anastasios
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We study the optimal and equilibrium distribution of industrial and residential land in a given region. The trade-off between agglomeration and dispersion forces in the form of pollution from stationary forces, production externalities and commuting costs, determines the emergence of industrial and residential clusters across space. In this context, we define two kinds of spatial policies that can be used in order to close the gap between optimal and market allocations. More specifically, we show that the joint implementation of a site-specific environmental tax and a site-specific labor subsidy can reproduce the optimum as an equilibrium outcome. The methodological approach followed in this article allows for an endogenous determination of land use patterns.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2017 19:16:38 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Environmental Policy, First Nature Advantage and the Emergence of Economic Clusters</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10993/32640</link>
      <description>Title: Environmental Policy, First Nature Advantage and the Emergence of Economic Clusters
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author, co-author: Kyriakopoulou, Efthymia; Xepapadeas, Anastasios
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We explain the spatial concentration of economic activity when the cost of environmental policy – which is increasing in the concentration of pollution – acts as a centrifugal force, while positive knowledge spillovers and a site with natural cost advantage act as centripetal forces. We study the agglomeration effects caused by trade-offs between centripetal and centrifugal forces which eventually determine the distribution of economic activity across space. The equilibrium solution with spatially myopic environmental policy results either in a monocentric or in a polycentric city with the major cluster at the natural advantage site. The regulator's optimum results in a bicentric city, which suggests that when environmental policy is spatially&#xD;
optimal, the natural advantage sites do not act as attractors of economic activity. In general, our results suggest that sites with inherent advantages can lose their comparative advantage when social costs at these spatial points are taken into account.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2017 19:06:09 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
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