http://hdl.handle.net/10993/59 Search this channel search http://orbilu.uni.lu/simple-search http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41923 Title: Der antike pyrrhonische Skeptizismus / Aus dem Deutschen ins Ukrainische übersetzt von Volodymyr Abaschnik <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Heidemann, Dietmar http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41780 Title: Referat: Goten, Angela van der: Im Gespaltenen Zauberland. Oswald Spengler und die Aneignung des Fremden. Heidelberg: Winter, 2015 <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Kohns, Oliver http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41559 Title: The view from anywhere: A better orientation towards public justification? <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Burks, Deven <br/> <br/>Abstract: If reasoning proceeds from perspectives, from which perspective should one reason when pursuing the ideal of public justification (acceptability (Lister 2013) or justifiability (Vallier 2018) of statutes or policy to different perspectives)? Although recent debate focuses on the relative merits of consensus (Quong 2011) or convergence (Gaus and Vallier 2009), public justification may require both consensus and convergence, suitably understood. Accordingly, I survey two broad orientations towards public justification: the views “from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) and “from everywhere” (Muldoon 2016). I argue that neither is adequate to socio-political complexity and privilege instead the “view from anywhere”. I first take up individually the views from nowhere and from everywhere. The former consists in the individual ideal of a neutral perspective between preferences and beliefs, attained through following an impartial procedure. In political morality, Rawls’s original position and its associated standpoints are prominent examples (Rawls 1999). Yet this view underestimates the conceptual difficulties of navigating decisions from an alien perspective and avoiding prejudging what is and is not morally relevant. The latter is an epistemic-moral social orientation which aggregates individual perspectives in collective deliberation in order to evaluate proposals via evidentiary support from different perspectives (Muldoon 2016). Such support frames “economic” bargaining between persons and groups over local, fixed-term social contracts. Though both impartial and epistemically feasible, this view likewise encounters conceptual difficulties: a.) underestimating the importance of some uniformity in bargaining and the risks of epistemic bubbles and alternative facts (Frazer 2017); b.) reifying perspectives as insulated standpoints. Consequently, a distinct orientation to public justification is needed to secure impartiality and epistemic feasibility, to build disagreement into the orientation and to allow for perspectives and their transformation. The view from anywhere does so in two ways. First, it extends McMahon’s (2009) “moral nominalism” to show how perspectives inhere in a shared use-history of prescriptive terms in evaluative judgments. Because judgments constitutive of a perspective are susceptible to extension and novel use which may be challenged by others sharing those terms, perspectives may undergo considerable negotiation. Disagreeing parties may come to agree on certain matters or to see their differences. Deliberative conversions remain possible. Second, it fosters a “social picture of reasoning” (Laden 2012) whereon reasonableness consists in issuing one another invitations to alter certain elements of one’s perspective or judgment history to reach the point where each authorizes each to speak for her on some shared concern. Public reasons are not merely accessible in form and content but via their history of mutual invitation and response. The view from anywhere thus makes more sense of public justification’s perspectival character and provides a better picture of how public justification should proceed and public reasons develop in contemporary democracies by allowing that the person may start from anywhere in the justificatory landscape and, potentially, arrive at a conclusion anywhere therein. To Rawls’s reminder to heed “where we are and whence we speak” (Rawls 2005: 382), I add that one may be and speak from anywhere, with enough time, effort and good will. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41558 Title: The interplay of deliberative legitimacy, constituent power and constitutional form <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Burks, Deven <br/> <br/>Abstract: Enhanced legitimacy is a driving force behind deliberative innovations (Fung 2015, Curato and Böker 2016). This is no less the case for constitutional deliberative innovations. Assessing deliberative constitutionalism’s success in generating legitimacy necessitates a better grasp of the distinct legitimacy standards which constitutional deliberative innovations may meet. Bound up with those standards is deliberative constitutionalism’s attempt to navigate the tension between politics and law, constituent power (CP) and constituted form (CF). How do factors of deliberative legitimacy interact with standard ways of modelling that tension? To answer this question, I proceed in three parts, the first of which maps ten factors of deliberative legitimacy at four levels: personal, interpersonal, institutional, and systemic. The second lays out four ways of modelling the tension between CP and CF from Loughlin and Walker (2007): the containment, mutual articulation, radical potential, and irritant models. The last part sets out to determine whether the four models directly or indirectly support or neglect the realization of the forms of deliberative legitimacy and casts in a different light from Parkinson (2016) the landscape of deliberative democracy and constitutions. I conclude that certain forms of deliberative legitimacy may be more sensitive to and better served by some models of CP and CF than by others. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41557 Title: The real problem with Rawlsian reasonableness <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Burks, Deven <br/> <br/>Abstract: In The Law of Peoples, Rawls states that, if “political liberalism offers no way of proving that this specification [of reasonableness] is itself reasonable”, this is no great loss, for “it is simply politically reasonable to offer fair terms of cooperation to other free and equal citizens, and it is simply politically unreasonable to refuse to do so” (Rawls 1999: 87-8). While Rawls is undoubtedly right that public reason liberalism analytically requires some standard of reasonableness, it is less obvious this standard must take Rawls’s preferred form. Yet criticisms of Rawlsian “reasonableness” as “loaded” (Stout 2004: 184), “chimerical” (Young 2005: 308) or “entirely circular” (Mulhall and Swift 2003: 483) often equivocate on the meaning of reasonableness and so fall afoul of the “equivocation defense” (Freeman 2004: 2063-5). In this paper, I improve on those earlier criticisms by means of a narrow, immanent criticism whereon the two basic aspects of reasonableness – (A1) proposing and abiding by fair terms of cooperation and (A2) recognizing the “burdens of judgment” (Rawls 1996: 54-8) – may plausibly conflict: in some instances, accepting (A2) may give persons reason to disagree over the need to accept (A1). To show this, I first restate two aspects of reasonableness as a biconditional: a person is reasonable iff (A1) and (A2) obtain. I then examine whether Rawls’s burdens give reason to doubt the requirement in (A1). Insofar as the third, fourth and fifth burdens give reason to doubt just this requirement, I conclude that Rawlsian reasonableness should be reformulated. This reformulation preserves what Rawls gets right about reasonableness – namely, the burdens – but replaces the old standard with “reasonableness pluralism”, from which it follows that public reason cannot represent all the necessary conditions of political justification under circumstances of reasonable pluralism. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41556 Title: The real problem with Rawlsian reasonableness <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Burks, Deven <br/> <br/>Abstract: Rawlsian “reasonableness” has been the object of considerable and varied criticism. Reactions range from its being “loaded” (Stout 2004: 184) or “chimerical” (Young 2005: 308) to “entirely circular” (Mulhall and Swift 2003: 483). Yet more critical reactions often employ external standards or equivocal senses of reasonableness to their detriment (Freeman 2004: 2045, 2063-5) or marshal apparently conflicting materials from Rawls’s broader theory (Young 2005, 2006). In this paper, I put forward a narrow, immanent criticism whereon the two basic aspects of reasonableness are shown to be in tension: the “burdens of judgment” may give the person reason to disagree over the need to propose and to abide by a common basis of fair terms of cooperation. My aims in doing so are threefold. First, I try to make sense of and set on firmer ground Stout’s (2004) critique of reasonableness as being epistemologically untenable. My second and third aims stem from the first. The second consists in carving out a middling conceptual space wherein the negation of Rawlsian “reasonableness” is not merely “unreasonable” in the sense of being willing to impose one’s comprehensive doctrine on others as the terms of political justification and coercion (Rawls 1996: 60-1; Freeman 2004: 2049) nor “unreasonable” in the sense of persons’ culpably endorsing a doctrine inconsistent with acceptance of the burdens of judgment (Rawls 2001: 184, 190; Freeman 2004: 2064) but, instead, “reasonably unreasonable” in the sense of the person’s nonculpably or justifiably rejecting the requirement to offer and to abide by fair terms of cooperation in view of the burdens of judgment. Third, I attempt to salvage a minimal core of reasonableness from the two-conjunct Rawlsian reasonableness, a core which contemporary political philosophers are hard-pressed to do without: the second conjunct consisting in the person’s acknowledgement of the burdens of judgment (Rawls 1996: 54-8). To that end, I proceed in two steps. First, I shall recall the two aspects of reasonableness and hold that their conjunction is necessary for a person to qualify as “reasonable”. In particular, this involves showing that a biconditional obtains: a person is reasonable if and only if the two basic aspects of reasonableness obtain, i.e. if and only if she is willing to propose fair terms of cooperation and she is willing to recognize the burdens of judgment. I also briefly define the site wherefrom one checks a person’s reasonableness: the “you and me” standpoint (Rawls 1996: 28). Secondly, I shall examine whether any burden gives reason to doubt the need to propose and to abide by a common basis of fair terms of cooperation. I find that each of the burdens, in its own way, leaves room to doubt whether reasonable persons in a well-ordered society would assent to such a need. For the first burden (complexity of evidence), the evidence backing the requirement of shared terms of cooperation defined ex ante is not obviously less complex than that contained in reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Regarding the second (relative weight of reasons), even supposing agreement on which reasons are relevant to deciding questions of justice, there may be still be disagreement over the relative priority of those reasons in deciding a given question. As to the third (conceptual indeterminacy and hard cases), such concepts as justice and fairness, cooperation and equality are all subject to the difficulties of identifying hard cases and probing a concept’s limits. Of the fourth (divergent total life experience), it is clear that, through her life experience, a person acquires a set of beliefs (political, moral, epistemological, religious, etc.) which could give the person reason to doubt or otherwise reject the first basic aspect of reasonableness, especially given its significant complexity. Finally, for the fifth burden (conflicting distinct normative considerations), persons may disagree over whether the first basic aspect in fact realizes these different considerations, the priority ordering to be fixed for such considerations and whether a common currency might be found so as to make such considerations commensurable, any of which may suffice for persons to be unable to reach agreement on the requirement, not simply on the reasons why it holds, but also on whether it holds at all. In reaching these findings, I parallel Clarke’s (1999: 639-41) claim that the burdens of judgment apply both to contractarianism’s “reasonable rejection procedure” and principles but do so from narrower, immanent grounds rather than the stronger claim that Rawls’s approach must be committed to substantive epistemological positions. This analysis yields two striking conclusions: First, public reason – the demand to present others with reasons which the person could reasonably expect them to accept – becomes looser and shifts to the domain of politics where one sees what public reasons others may in fact accept (Laden 2001). Seen from a different angle, one need not accept the idea that the first basic aspect and, hence, Rawlsian reasonableness are necessary conditions of political justification under conditions of reasonable pluralism (contra Krasnoff 2014: 696-7): rejecting this aspect and reasonableness in no way means that there can be no political justification under conditions of (reasonable) pluralism. Second, when conceiving justification and discourse, Rawls may be committed, despite himself, to accepting “reasonableness pluralism”, i.e. the view that there exist distinct, possibly irreconcilable accounts of reasonableness to which one may appeal when conceiving justification and discourse. Their combination may lead to a public reason liberalism framework which is at once looser and more actionable. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41555 Title: Can Rawlsians be constitutional deliberative democrats? <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Burks, Deven <br/> <br/>Abstract: Most see Rawls as a “constitutionalist” rather than a “proceduralist”. He insists that the basic schedule of freedoms, rights and governing procedures, once established, be removed from the table of governmental and democratic decision-making. Pragmatically, that schedule must be fixed to avoid majoritarian domination, acrimonious bargaining and gridlock and to realize the stabilizing effect of a permanent public set of institutional arrangements and values. Morally, one must affirm only those institutional principles which one would choose in perpetuity, for past, present and future generations. Accordingly, Rawlsians might wonder what good can come of constitutional deliberative democracy, i.e. enabling citizens to formulate and modify the constitution, potentially undermining its stability? Though a necessary element of any just political order and a great political good, stability is only such when stable institutions are also just and guarantee the “fair value of political liberty”, namely that “citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly an equal chance of influencing the government’s policy and of attaining positions of authority irrespective of their economic and social class” (Rawls 2005: 358). Formal equality is no replacement for effective equality. Despite lamenting that “one of the main defects of constitutional government has been the failure to insure the fair value of political liberty” (Rawls 1999: 198), Rawls’s institutional vision remains largely within familiar representative and electoral logics. His threefold view of deliberative democracy is similarly limited: an idea of public reason, an institutional framework including a deliberative legislature, and public uptake of the public reason idea(l) (Rawls 2005: 448). Accordingly, I argue that Rawls and his “fair value guarantee” are better served by promoting both freestanding and embedded citizen deliberation on constitutional arrangements. This vehicle for the fair value guarantee is more easily attainable than the transition to a his preferred alternative for political economy, “property-owning democracy” (Rawls 2001: §41) and may fulfill similar aims. Finally, I review two remaining objections from Rawlsians concerning compelled participation and institutional pluralism. All in all, given Rawls’s prominence in political theory, showing that Rawlsians can be constitutional deliberative democrats may help bring another piece to the constitutional deliberative democratic coalition. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41553 Title: Philosophical dialogue with the public: Two challenges and two replies <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Burks, Deven <br/> <br/>Abstract: Leiter (2016) throws down two gauntlets to philosophers engaged in dialogue with the broader public. If, with the first, public philosophers recognize that they cannot offer substantive answers but only sophisticated method, they nevertheless fail to realize that said method does not resonate with the very public whom they purport to help. For, with the second, that method does not engage the emotivist and tribalist cast of contemporary public discourse: emotivist because a person’s moral and political beliefs are a function of emotional attitudes or affective responses for which she adduces reasons post hoc; tribalist because the person tracks not the inferential relation between beliefs but her similarity with interlocutors. While this should not dissuade public philosophers, it should, per Leiter, make them reconsider the role of rhetoric within philosophy. What would extramural philosophical dialogue then look like? For one possible answer, we highlight two tactics employed in Jeffrey Stout's work. First, public philosophers might gauge how far persons are tracking reasons and apply rhetorical pressure to their self-image as reasonable. Second, public philosophers might embrace this affective turn through appealing to persons’ emotional attitudes and affective responses with “moral perceptions” which, though non-inferential, are inferentially connected to the underlying attitudes and responses. Such tactics may form part of a toolkit for philosophical dialogue whereby philosophers get a discursive grip on non-discursive factors underlying public discourse and push back on Leiter's dilemma. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41337 Title: Computational Metaphysics: New Insights on Gödel's Ontological Argument and Modal Collapse <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Benzmüller, Christoph <br/> <br/>Commentary: 3--4 http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41336 Title: Automated Reasoning with Complex Ethical Theories--A Case Study Towards Responsible AI <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Fuenmayor, David; Benzmüller, Christoph http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41308 Title: Epistemic Nonconceptualism. Nonconceptual Content and the Justification of Perceptual Beliefs <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Orlando, Andy <br/> <br/>Abstract: The questions whether the content of perception is nonconceptual and, if so, whether it can serve as the justificatory basis for perceptual beliefs have been at the epicentre of wide-ranging debates in recent philosophy of mind and epistemology. The present dissertation will set out to answer these matters. It will be argued that the content of perception is not necessarily conceptual, i.e. a specific understanding of nonconceptual content will be laid out and defended. Starting from the presentation and criticism of conceptualism, it will be concluded that the arguments brought forth against nonconceptualism can successfully be met. A specific version of nonconceptualism will be developed on this basis and will serve as the necessary framework for the remainder of the discussion. Flowing from these arguments, this specific version of nonconceptualism will be taken to task by clarifying, analysing and specifying its epistemological commitments and options. Several problem sets will have to be introduced and evaluated, such as the divide between externalists and internalists, the phenomena surrounding epistemic defeaters and examinations pertaining to reasoning, specifically whether experiences could be the output states of inferential processes. These reflections will not only provide a more in-depth investigation of some of the most pressing epistemological questions surrounding nonconceptual content, but will also allow for a seamless transition into the problem of which specific epistemological theory best bears out the epistemological role of nonconceptual content. Specifically, disjunctivism, capacity approaches and phenomenal conservatism will be assessed as to their capacity to vindicate nonconceptual content. Phenomenal conservatism will be identified as the theory that best integrates nonconceptualism. While phenomenal conservatism will thus be defended, the closing sections of the present dissertation will mainly focus on questions surrounding rationality. Indeed, if perception and/ or perceptual experiences could be classified as rational, or more accurately put, if arguments pertaining to the evaluability of a perceptual experience’s aetiology are tenable, it can reasonably be asked whether phenomenal conservatism can satisfactorily meet this challenge. Ultimately, it will be concluded that there is room for a specific notion of nonconceptual content as the justificatory basis for basic perceptual beliefs. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41207 Title: Kant and the forms of realism <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Heidemann, Dietmar <br/> <br/>Abstract: Realism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical (i.e. nonmetaphysical) and transcendental (metaphysical) realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41103 Title: Six regards sur la master-classe de piano : phénoménologie et sémiotique de la rencontre musicale <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Kim, Seong Jae <br/> <br/>Abstract: Notre thèse propose de nouvelles voies pour saisir la dimension d’affect de l’expérience musicale, que la sémiotique comme la musicologie traditionnelle prennent peu – ou bien mal – en compte. En nous inspirant d’une pensée modélisante de facture dynamiciste, telle que développée à partir des années 1960 et depuis influente dans les disciplines sémiolinguistiques, nous cherchons à accompagner le mouvement des sémiogenèses au sein d’une master-classe de piano. Le terme de sémiogenèse, ici, est pris dans un sens large, embrassant tout déploiement de formes, qu’elles soient vagues ou articulées, diffuses ou bien cernées : formes tendues entre expressivité et normativité, et formes valorisées parce qu’appelant à participer à une ligne de vie qui par elles vient à exister. La master-classe est un cours donné par un grand maître à des élèves accomplis, qui témoignent ainsi véritablement de leur propre vie, de leur sentir éthique, à travers la recherche d’une autre praxis musicale. Ces dernières années, le champ de la master-classe a commencé de retenir l’attention de la communauté scientifique, notamment dans des domaines liés à l’enseignement et à l’expérience musicale, tels que la psychologie, l’esthétique et l’épistémologie (ou encore la sociologie). Pourtant il nous semble regrettable que la plupart des problématiques adoptées dans ces cadres n’intègrent rien ou si peu encore des métamorphoses de la sensibilité et du jeu du sentiment musical dans la caractérisation de leurs objets. Or le champ de la master-classe nous paraît particulièrement intéressant en ce que l’horizon d’affect y est prééminent dans toute l’activité sémiotique qui s’y noue. Nous avons ainsi assisté à plusieurs master-classes et suivi de près la praxis des musiciens (participations aux cours, enregistrements, entretiens, conversations …) dans l’esprit de rendre toute sa profondeur génétique à l’activité sémiotique, en l’abordant sous la perspective d’une rencontre et d’une orientation des sensibilités musicales. Une des tâches que nous nous sommes donc assignées dans la description de cette praxis musicale particulière consiste à comprendre les phénomènes sonores, langagiers et gestuels attenants comme les conditions sémiogénétiques de la constitution d’un sens musical. Il s’agit d’une méthode fondamentalement descriptive, en mode philosophique (Shaftesbury, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty) et sémiotique (Peirce, Saussure), qui rejoint la préoccupation sémiotique dès les premiers niveaux d’une microgenèse, et en la reprenant d’emblée au sein d’une phénoménologie herméneutique et existentielle. Cette problématique perceptive et sémiogénétique de la sensibilité musicale nous met notamment en mesure de retravailler la notion de motif musical, à la fois comme motif-de-praxis et comme motif-existentiel. Nous avons ainsi tenté de tirer au clair une certaine écoute du jeu musical en y retrouvant comme un passage constant entre une perception d’emblée éthique, et la recherche aussi, à travers le jeu et ses motifs, de personnalités musicales qui s’y trouvent engagées. De telles notions de motif et de personnalité nous ont paru opportunes dans la mesure où elles permettent justement de proposer une certaine éthique du sentiment musical, sans le réduire à un savoir-faire, à une psychologie ou à l’exécution d’un rituel. Nous sommes ainsi parvenus à réinterroger toute notion de ‘signe’ musical en sollicitant l’horizon ‘motival’ de cette ‘activité symbolique’, comprise, dans la nature formelle et sensible des pratiques, comme une participation (un désir et un engagement de participer) à un certain régime de l’existence humaine. Par là on fraye la voie à une nouvelle conception de la praxis musicale, qui relie esthétique et éthique. La thèse développe ainsi cette problématique en posant sur elle six Regards successifs : Master-classe de piano ; Sentir, savoir, faire ; Champ et forme ; Motif et forme ; Lignes de vie ; Enchantement.; In this thesis, I suggest new ways of grasping the affective dimension of musical experience that which traditional semiotics and musicology take little into account. Inspired by a dynamistic modelling approach –which developed from the 1960s and since then has been influential in the domain of semiolinguistic disciplines–, I sketch out the fluctuating phases of semiogenesis within the field of piano masterclasses. The term ‘semiogenesis’ here, is taken in a broad sense, encompassing any deployment of sign-forms, either vague or articulated, diffused or well-defined. Such forms are conceived as being strained between expressiveness and normativity. They are also valorized in that they call the subject to participate in his or her own ‘lines of life’ which, in turn, may come to exist by those forms. A piano masterclass is given by a genuine master to highly accomplished students, both who truly testify to their own lives, to their own ways of ethical feeling, in the search for a unique musical praxis. In recent years, the field of masterclass has begun to attract the attention of the scientific community, especially in areas related to musical teaching and experience, such as psychology, aesthetics and epistemology or even sociology. Yet it is still suboptimal that most of the problems adopted in these frameworks incorporate nothing or so little in terms of the metamorphosis of sensitivity and the play of musical feeling in the characterization of their research objects. Nevertheless, the field of piano masterclass seems to be a particularly interesting and promising object of research in that the horizon of affect is preeminent in all the semiotic activities tied to it. Thus, I have attended several masterclasses in order to closely follow the praxis of the musicians (e.g., active and passive participation in masterclasses, audiovisual recordings, interviews, conversations and debates on music, etc.), in the spirit of making all its genetic depth to the semiotic activity, by approaching it under the perspective of an encountering and an orientation of musical sensibilities. One of the main tasks of my approach in the designing of the descriptions of this particular musical praxis consists in understanding the acoustic, gestural and linguistic phenomena, as giving birth to semiogenetic conditions of the constitution of a musical meaning. In this way, it is a fundamentally descriptive method, inspired by philosophical (Shaftesbury, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty) and semiotic (Peirce, Saussure) minds, which joins the semiotic preoccupation from the very initial levels of a microgenesis, and by promoting it immediately into a hermeneutical and existential phenomenology. The perceptive and semiogenetic issues of musical sensitivity allow us to remodel the notion of a musical motive, understood both as a motive-of-praxis and as an existential-motive. I tried to grasp the idea of a certain listening of the musical praxis by finding there a constant passage between an ethical perception, and the search –through the playing of the music and its motives–, for a musical personality engaged in the musical praxis. Such conceptions on motive and personality proved to be fruitful to the extent that they make it possible to suggest a certain ethic of musical feeling, without reducing it to a skill, a psychology or a ritual. I have thus managed to redefine the notion of a musical ‘sign’ by playing up on the 'motival' horizon of this semiotic activity, understood – in the formal and sensitive nature of musical practices– as participation (i.e., desire and commitment to participate) to a certain regime of human existence. In this way, I believe to be paving the way for a new conception of musical praxis, which interweaves aesthetics and ethics. The thesis thus addresses these problems by casting six successive contemplations on it: Piano Masterclass; Feeling, Knowing and Doing; Field and Form; Motive and Form; Lines of Life; Enchantment. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41068 Title: Luhmann's system and the Future of Legal Global Legal System <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Sosoe, Lukas http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41067 Title: Niklas Luhmann: The Place of Court in the Legal System <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Sosoe, Lukas http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41066 Title: Making Sense of Novalis's Europe or Christianity in today's European context <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Sosoe, Lukas http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41065 Title: Justice Globale Intergenerationnelle: Quelle Justice pour Quelles Generations, Congres of RCLS <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Sosoe, Lukas http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41064 Title: Le vivre ensemble et la pensee feministe, Colloque le concept du vivre emsemble saisi par le droit <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Sosoe, Lukas http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41063 Title: La Verite Dans La Theorie Des Systemes De Niklas Luhmann <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Sosoe, Lukas http://hdl.handle.net/10993/41005 Title: The real problem with Rawisian reasonableness <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Burks, Deven <br/> <br/>Abstract: Reactions to Rawlsian “reasonableness” range from its being “loaded” (Stout 2004: 184) or “chimerical” (Young 2005: 308) to “entirely circular” (Mulhall and Swift 2003: 483). Yet more critical reactions often employ external standards or equivocal senses of reasonableness to their detriment (Freeman 2004: 2045, 2063-5). In this paper, I put forward a narrow, immanent criticism whereon the two basic aspects of reasonableness are shown to be in tension: the “burdens of judgment” may give the person reason to disagree over the need to propose and to abide by a common basis of fair terms of cooperation. I proceed in two steps. First, I shall recall the two aspects of reasonableness and hold that their conjunction is necessary for a person to qualify as “reasonable”. In particular, this involves showing a biconditional: a person is reasonable if and only if the two basic aspects of reasonableness obtain. Secondly, I shall examine whether any burden gives reason to doubt the need to propose and to abide by a common basis of fair terms of cooperation. I find that each of the burdens, in its own way, leaves room to doubt whether reasonable persons in a well-ordered society would assent to such a need. For the first burden (complexity of evidence), the evidence backing the requirement of shared terms of cooperation defined ex ante is not obviously less complex than that contained in reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Regarding the second (relative weight of reasons), even supposing agreement on which reasons are relevant to deciding questions of justice, there may be still be disagreement over the relative priority of those reasons in deciding a given question. As to the third (conceptual indeterminacy and hard cases), such concepts as justice and fairness, cooperation and equality are all subject to the difficulties of identifying hard cases and probing a concept’s limits. Of the fourth (divergent total life experience), it is clear that, through her life experience, a person acquires a set of beliefs (political, moral, epistemological, religious, etc.) which could give the person reason to doubt or otherwise reject the first basic aspect of reasonableness, especially given its significant complexity. Finally, for the fifth burden (conflicting distinct normative considerations), persons may disagree over whether the first basic aspect in fact realizes these different considerations, the priority ordering to be fixed for such considerations and whether a common currency might be found so as to make such considerations commensurable, any of which may suffice for persons to be unable to reach agreement on the requirement, not simply on the reasons why it holds, but also on whether it holds at all. Thus, I parallel Clarke’s (1999: 639-41) claim that the burdens of judgment apply both to contractarianism’s “reasonable rejection procedure” and principles but do so from narrower, immanent grounds. This analysis yields two striking conclusions. First, public reason becomes looser and shifts to the domain of politics where one sees what public reasons others may in fact accept (Laden 2001). Seen from a different angle, one need not accept the idea that the first basic aspect and, hence, Rawlsian reasonableness are necessary conditions of political justification under conditions of reasonable pluralism (contra Krasnoff 2014: 696-7): rejecting this aspect and reasonableness in no way means that there can be no political justification under conditions of (reasonable) pluralism. Second, when conceiving justification and discourse, Rawls may be committed, despite himself, to accepting “reasonableness pluralism”, i.e. the view that there exist distinct, possibly irreconcilable accounts of reasonableness to which one may appeal when conceiving justification and discourse. Their combination may lead to a public reason liberalism framework which is at once looser and more actionable.