Who benefits from air service agreements? The case of international air cargo operations

in Transportation Research Part B: Methodological (2022), 163

Air service agreements between countries spell out diverse provisions, such as reciprocal capacity allocations. We analyze how such agreements, which regulate total capacity in markets, affect total ... [more ▼]

Air service agreements between countries spell out diverse provisions, such as reciprocal capacity allocations. We analyze how such agreements, which regulate total capacity in markets, affect total welfare and its distribution. We consider the interactions between two competing cargo airlines, their end customers, logistics service providers—who serve as intermediaries between the former two agent types—as well as the policy makers. Accounting for demand uncertainty, we model this interaction as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the policy makers coordinate equal capacity allocations to the two asset providers, whereas in the second stage, the asset providers compete over prices in the spot market. Solving the model, we characterize the pricing strategies employed by the two competing capacity-constrained asset providers in the spot market when facing price sensitive demand from end customers. We further analyze the corresponding capacity decisions. We then compare this coordinated competitive setting with a collaborative setting where the two asset providers can (virtually) merge and act as a monopoly. We find that, compared with the monopoly setting, the coordinated duopoly results in lower capacity, lower profits to the asset providers, larger benefits to both end customers and logistics service providers, and overall lower total welfare. These results suggest that policy makers shall hold an open attitude towards a higher level of cooperation among the asset providers. We carry out robustness checks to verify our insights hold with three, rather than two, asset providers, with different demand distributions, when capacity is costly and when asymmetric capacities are allowed in the spot market. [less ▲]

Who benefits from partial tax coordination?

E-print/Working paper (2013)

In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to <br />countries within and outside a tax union, in which countries are supposed to compete <br />in taxes and infrastructure ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to <br />countries within and outside a tax union, in which countries are supposed to compete <br />in taxes and infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that, a subgroup of countries <br />agreeing on a common tax rate, can harm both member and nonmember <br />states. This is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonization <br />is Pareto improving. When a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union, we <br />demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries. <br />Moreover, both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off. This <br />conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high tax country benefits from <br />the imposition of a lower tax bound. [less ▲]

Who chooses what in the game store? The relationship between game preferences and dimensions of aggression

Scientific Conference (2009, November)

Who Decides What? Judicial Deference in International Economic Adjudication

Presentation (2018, February 01)

Who does not participate in elections in Europe and why is this? A multilevel analysis of social mechanisms behind non-voting

in European Societies (2010), 12(4), 521-542

This paper focuses on the research question ‘Who does not vote and why?’ regarding national elections in 24 European countries. We analyse determinants of non-voting both on the individual and the ... [more ▼]

This paper focuses on the research question ‘Who does not vote and why?’ regarding national elections in 24 European countries. We analyse determinants of non-voting both on the individual and the societal level employing a multilevel design. On the micro level, the sociological determinants under consideration are education, cohort and gender. Regarding psychological or motivational factors, we include in the analyses political efficacy, political interest, political trust and satisfaction with politics. On the macro level, we analyse characteristics of the electoral system, including opportunities for ‘direct democracy’, maturity of democracy, disproportionality factor, and if the participation in elections is compulsory. The data source of the analyses is the European Social Survey 2006. A first main finding is the fact that the probability of non-voting is higher among people with a low level of education and among younger cohorts. The motivational factors have similar impacts on non-voting across all analysed societies. Lack of political efficacy, lack of political interest, lack of political trust and dissatisfaction with politicians and the political system increase the probability of non-voting. Regarding macro influences, countries with compulsory voting and ‘old democracies’ turn out to have a lower rate of non-voting, although these effects vanish when simultaneously modelled with the social psychological micro level indicators. [less ▲]

Who is afraid of education?

in University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy Bulletin (2007), 10

Who Is the Dominant Lawmaker? Arbitrator’s Perception of Dispute Settlement Clauses as Substantive Rights in Investment Arbitration

Scientific Conference (2016, July)

Who Loses in the Downturn? Economic Crisis, Employment and Income Distribution

Book published by Emerald (2011)

Who makes the Pie Bigger? An Experimental Study on Cooperation

in New Zealand Economic Papers (2011)

Who owns the land? Highlights in the history of land reform

in Archplus (2018), (231),