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See detailA partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties
Lang, Jérome; Pigozzi, Gabriella; Slavkovik, Marija et al

in Social Choice and Welfare (2017), 48(2), 327--356

The literature on judgment aggregation is moving from studying impossibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific judgment aggregation rules. Here we give a structured list of ... [more ▼]

The literature on judgment aggregation is moving from studying impossibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific judgment aggregation rules. Here we give a structured list of most rules that have been proposed and studied recently in the literature, together with various properties of such rules. We first focus on the majority-preservation property, which generalizes Condorcet-consistency, and identify which of the rules satisfy it. We study the inclusion relationships that hold between the rules. Finally, we consider two forms of unanimity, monotonicity, homogeneity, and reinforcement, and we identify which of the rules satisfy these properties. [less ▲]

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See detailMeasuring rank mobility with variable population size
D'Ambrosio, Conchita UL; Bossert, Walter; Can, Burak

in Social Choice and Welfare (2016), 46

We provide a characterization of a class of rank-mobility measures. These measures generalize the Kemeny measure that is well-known from the literature on measuring the distance between orderings. We use ... [more ▼]

We provide a characterization of a class of rank-mobility measures. These measures generalize the Kemeny measure that is well-known from the literature on measuring the distance between orderings. We use replication invariance to ensure that our measures are applicable in variable-population settings. The rank-based approach to mobility has a natural connection with the study of social status. Rank-based measures are widely applied in empirical research but their theoretical foundation is still in need of further investigation, and we consider our approach to be a contribution towards this objective. [less ▲]

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See detailVoting under the Threat of Secession: Accommodation vs. Repression
Anesi, Vincent UL; De Donder, Philippe

in Social Choice and Welfare (2013), 41

We build a simple model of secession crises where a majority of voters may wish to accommodate a minority in order to prevent a secession attempt. We first show the existence of a majority voting ... [more ▼]

We build a simple model of secession crises where a majority of voters may wish to accommodate a minority in order to prevent a secession attempt. We first show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium, where the median voter is decisive and most prefers a government’s type that is biased in favor of the minority. We propose a measure of the secession risk at equilibrium, which depends upon the comparison of the willingness to secede by the minority and to accommodate by the majority. We show that focusing only on the willingness to secede, as previous literature has done, is misleading when studying the impact on the risk of secession of the size of the minority region, the probability that a secession attempt by the minority is successful, and the cultural heterogeneity in the country. [less ▲]

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See detailPublic Good and Private Good Valuation for Waiting Time Reduction: A Laboratory Study
Neugebauer, Tibor UL; Traub

in Social Choice and Welfare (2012)

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See detailA New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments
Anesi, Vincent UL

in Social Choice and Welfare (2012), 39

This article uncovers dynamic properties of the von Neumann–Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak ... [more ▼]

This article uncovers dynamic properties of the von Neumann–Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of tournament games. The exploration of a specific class of Markov perfect equilibria in these "dynamic tournament games" yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments—the A-stable set. The alternatives in an A-stable set constitute persistent, long-run policy outcomes in the corresponding dynamic tournament games. We find that, in any weak tournament, the class of A-stable sets coincides with that of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets. [less ▲]

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See detailSecondary Issues and Party Politics. An Application to Environmental Policy
Anesi, Vincent UL; De Donder, Philippe

in Social Choice and Welfare (2011), 36

This article develops a political economy model to assess the interplay between party formation and an environmental policy dimension viewed as secondary to the redistributive dimension. We define being a ... [more ▼]

This article develops a political economy model to assess the interplay between party formation and an environmental policy dimension viewed as secondary to the redistributive dimension. We define being a secondary issue in terms of the intensity of preferences over this issue rather than in terms of the proportion of voters who care for the environment. Equilibrium policies are the outcome of an electoral competition game between endogenous parties. We obtain the following results: (i) The Pigouvian tax never emerges in an equilibrium; (ii) The equilibrium environmental tax is larger when there is a minority of green voters; (iii) Stable green parties exist only if there is a minority of green voters and income polarization is large enough relative to the saliency of the environmental issue. We also study the redistributive policies advocated by green parties. [less ▲]

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See detailMoral Hazard and Free Riding in Collective Action
Anesi, Vincent UL

in Social Choice and Welfare (2009), 32

Most political and economic theorists point to moral hazard in teams as the main obstacle to lobbies’ collective action. In this paper, we address this important issue with a coalition-formation game. In ... [more ▼]

Most political and economic theorists point to moral hazard in teams as the main obstacle to lobbies’ collective action. In this paper, we address this important issue with a coalition-formation game. In the process of doing so, we characterize equilibrium lobby structures both in the absence and in the presence of moral hazard. Three notable results emerge from such an exercise: (1) an equilibrium lobby structure exists under both specifications of the model, (2) moral hazard in teams may raise large groups’ equilibrium lobby size, and (3) it may also raise the level of collective action of large groups with low organizational costs. [less ▲]

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See detailCommittees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets
Anesi, Vincent UL

in Social Choice and Welfare (2006), 27

The interpretation of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in voting games has been debated by most political scientists. The present paper addresses the issue in a model that consists of an infinite ... [more ▼]

The interpretation of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in voting games has been debated by most political scientists. The present paper addresses the issue in a model that consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of the standard committee game. The analysis of equilibrium processes leads to the following conclusion: when voters are farsighted, an alternative is the limit of an absorbing equilibrium process if and only if it belongs to some stable set of the underlying committee game. While the traditional interpretation of the core implicitly assumes myopic voters, we also demonstrate that the core of a strong committee is the unique limit of all absorbing equilibrium processes, provided that voters are arbitrarily patient. We finally proceed to an analysis of the Condorcet Paradox in this dynamic context. [less ▲]

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