References of "Politics and Governance"
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See detailThe European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms
Howarth, David UL; Fontan, Clément

in Politics and Governance (2021), 9(2),

In May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank’s participation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector Purchase Programme ... [more ▼]

In May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank’s participation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector Purchase Programme. Applying elements of a principal-agent analysis, this article analyses how the FCC ruling presents us with a new understanding of the relationship between the ECB, other EU institutions and Eurozone member states. Existing principal-agent analyses of the ECB focus upon its relations with other EU-level institutions and point to the limited ex ante control mechanisms and efforts to reinforce ex post control mechanisms—notably European Parliament oversight. The FCC ruling and the ECB’s reaction demonstrate the relative importance of national level controls over the ECB agent. This article understands the role of private plaintiffs in Germany as a form of ‘fire alarm’ on ECB policymaking against the background of weak ex post controls at the EU-level. [less ▲]

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See detailReforming the Institutions of Eurozone Governance
Högenauer, Anna-Lena UL; Rehm, Moritz UL

in Politics and Governance (2021), 9(2), 159162

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See detailTug of War over Financial Assistance: Which Way Forward for Eurozone Stability Mechanisms?
Rehm, Moritz UL

in Politics and Governance (2021), 9(2), 173184

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See detailAvoiding the Inappropriate: The European Commission and Sanctions under the Stability and Growth Pact
Sacher, Martin UL

in Politics and Governance (2021), 9(2), 163-172

Fiscal policy surveillance, including the possibility to impose financial sanctions, has been an important feature of Economic and Monetary Union since its inception. With the reform of fiscal rules in ... [more ▼]

Fiscal policy surveillance, including the possibility to impose financial sanctions, has been an important feature of Economic and Monetary Union since its inception. With the reform of fiscal rules in the aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt crisis, coercive provisions have been made stricter and the Commission has formally gained power vis‐à‐vis the Council. Nevertheless, sanctions under the Stability and Growth Pact for budgetary non‐compliance have so far not been imposed. This article asks why the Commission has until now refrained from proposing such sanctions. Using minimalist process‐tracing methods, three post‐crisis cases in which the imposition of fines was possible, are analysed. Applying an adaptation of normative institutionalism, it is argued that the mechanism entitled “normative‐strategic minimum enforcement” provides an explanation of why no sanctions are imposed in the cases studied: Given that the Commission does not perceive punitive action as appropriate, it strategically refrains from applying the enforcement provisions to their full extent. [less ▲]

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See detailScrutiny or Complacency? Banking Union in the Bundestag and the Assemblée Nationale
Högenauer, Anna-Lena UL

in Politics and Governance (2021), 9(2), 219-229

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See detailReforming the Institutions of Eurozone Governance
Högenauer, Anna-Lena UL; Howarth, David UL; Rehm, Moritz UL

in Politics and Governance (2021), 9(2),

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See detailThe Politicisation of the European Central Bank and the Bundestag
Högenauer, Anna-Lena UL

in Politics and Governance (2019), 7(3),

The European Central Bank (ECB) became one of the key actors during the Eurozone crisis. However, its prominent role was not without controversy. On one hand, the Eurozone was stabilised, no member state ... [more ▼]

The European Central Bank (ECB) became one of the key actors during the Eurozone crisis. However, its prominent role was not without controversy. On one hand, the Eurozone was stabilised, no member state defaulted, and no state had to leave the Euro. On the other hand, the ECB had to stretch its mandate, expand its policy remit, and adopt so-called ‘unconventional’ monetary policies. These attempts to depoliticise political challenges through a technocratic approach reduced the opportunities for democratic contestation, but they also bred frustration that led to politicisation. This article studies to what extent this politicisation affected the perception of the ECB in national parliaments. For this purpose, it studies the extent to which ECB policy has become politicised in the German Bundestag through an analysis of plenary debates from 2005 to 2018. The Bundestag represents an unlikely case for politicisation despite wide-spread criticism of the ECB in the media, as Germany was traditionally attached to creating a highly independent ECB, until recently had no major Eurosceptic right-wing parties, and parliamentary scrutiny of the national central bank is low. However, by studying the salience of ECB policies, the polarisation of opinion in the parliament, as well as the range of actors participating in the debates, this article finds that the ECB’s policies have become politicised and the subject of scrutiny and dissatisfaction. [less ▲]

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