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See detailClimate politics: how public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance
Prieur, Fabien; Zou, Benteng UL

in Mathematical Social Sciences (2019)

This paper aims at studying the impact of public persuasion, through information dissemination, on environmental and economic performance. A differential game in which opposite interest groups compete for ... [more ▼]

This paper aims at studying the impact of public persuasion, through information dissemination, on environmental and economic performance. A differential game in which opposite interest groups compete for bringing the majority’s environmental concern closer to their views is developed. The results show a strong asymmetry in the impact of public persuasion. It may bring the median voter economy closer to the social optimum in the long run, thereby reducing environmental and economic distorsions. But this only occurs when the environmental group exhibits a radical ideology and people are initially closer to the industrialists’ views. By contrast, economies where industrial groups are powerful and strongly opposed to environmental protection never benefit from the outcome of the game of persuasion. This may explain why the US have failed to take action on global warming up to now. [less ▲]

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See detailCommon agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
Attar, Andrea; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Piaser, Gwenaël UL et al

in Mathematical Social Sciences (2008), 56(1), 75-95

This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is ... [more ▼]

This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the Revelation Principle to hold when finite games with generic payoffs are considered. The result goes through without imposing any restriction on the principals’ payoffs. This provides a rationale for the restriction to direct mechanisms even when competition among principals is considered. [less ▲]

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