![]() Gabbay, Dov M. ![]() in Logic Journal of the IGPL (2016), 24(5), 807--837 Detailed reference viewed: 161 (0 UL)![]() Gabbay, Dov M. ![]() in Logic Journal of the IGPL (2016), 24(2), 186--218 Detailed reference viewed: 155 (0 UL)![]() Gabbay, Dov M. ![]() in Logic Journal of the IGPL (2015) We add strong negation N to classical logic and interpret the attack relation of `x attacks y' in argumentation as (x?Ny). We write a corresponding object level (using N only) classical theory for each ... [more ▼] We add strong negation N to classical logic and interpret the attack relation of `x attacks y' in argumentation as (x?Ny). We write a corresponding object level (using N only) classical theory for each argumentation network and show that the classical models of this theory correspond exactly to the complete extensions of the argumentation network. We show by example how this approach simplifies the study of abstract argumentation networks. We compare with other translations of abstract argumentation networks into logic, such as classical predicate logic or modal logics, or logic programming, and we also compare with Abstract Dialectical Frameworks. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 108 (2 UL)![]() Gabbay, Dov M. ![]() in Logic Journal of the IGPL (2015), abs/1510.00077 Detailed reference viewed: 95 (6 UL)![]() ; Pigozzi, Gabriella ![]() in Logic Journal of the IGPL (2010), 18(1), 13 Detailed reference viewed: 168 (0 UL)![]() Boella, Guido ![]() ![]() ![]() in Logic Journal of the IGPL (2009), 17(3), 273297 We introduce a reciprocity criterion for coalition formation among goal-directed agents, which we call the indecomposable do-ut-des property. It refines an older reciprocity property, called the do-ut-des ... [more ▼] We introduce a reciprocity criterion for coalition formation among goal-directed agents, which we call the indecomposable do-ut-des property. It refines an older reciprocity property, called the do-ut-des or give-to-get property by considering the fact that agents prefer to form coalitions whose components cannot be formed independently. A formal description of this property is provided as well as an analysis of algorithms and their complexity. We provide an algorithm to decide whether a coalition has the desired property, and we show that the problem to verify whether a single coalition satisfies the property is tractable. Moreover, we provide an algorithm to search all the sub-coalitions of a given coalition satisfying the new property. Even if this problem is not computationally tractable, we show that in several cases, also the complexity of this problem may decrease considerably. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 110 (0 UL)![]() Parent, Xavier ![]() in Logic Journal of the IGPL (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 147 (0 UL)![]() Gabbay, Dov M. ![]() in Logic Journal of the IGPL (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 90 (0 UL)![]() Boella, Guido ![]() ![]() ![]() in Logic Journal of the IGPL (2009) In this paper we consider the relation between beliefs and goals in agent theory. Beliefs play three roles in reasoning about goals: they play a role in the generation of unconditional desires from ... [more ▼] In this paper we consider the relation between beliefs and goals in agent theory. Beliefs play three roles in reasoning about goals: they play a role in the generation of unconditional desires from conditional ones, they play a role in adoption of desires as goals, and they play a role in the selection of plans to achieve goals. In this paper we consider the role of goals in reasoning about beliefs. Though we assume that goals do not play a role in the belief generation problem, we argue that they play a role in the belief selection problem. We show the rationality of the use of goals in belief selection, in the sense that there are cases in which agents that take their goals into account in selecting a belief set from a set of alternatives outperform agents that do not do so. We also formally distinguish between the rational role of goals in belief selection and irrational wishful thinking. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 131 (0 UL) |
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