References of "Journal of Public Economics"
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See detailAsymmetric Competition among Nation States: A Differential Game Approach
Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL et al

in Journal of Public Economics (2014)

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision-making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public services. The model shows that the long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility. In particular, we show that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public services and with the degree of international openness. [less ▲]

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See detailMergers in Fiscal Federalism
Breuillé, Marie-Laure; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in Journal of Public Economics (2013), 105

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See detailPatent Office Governance and Patent System Quality
Picard, Pierre M UL; Van Pottelsberghe, Bruno

in Journal of Public Economics (2013), 104

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper ... [more ▼]

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination process. A higher effort in the examination process enhances the patent holders' protection in the judicial system and strengthens the screening of innovations with small inventive steps. We compare the quality of the examination process for various objectives of patent offices. Patent examination quality is the highest in an office maximizing incentives to innovate and the lowest in that maximizing the number of granted patents. A rent-seeking patent office can provide good incentives to innovate if it does not set too high markups on fees. [less ▲]

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See detailSecessionism and Minority Protection in an Uncertain World
Anesi, Vincent UL

in Journal of Public Economics (2012), 1-2

With the changing political and economic circumstances confronting their countries, regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem, important aspects of which can be stylized as a ... [more ▼]

With the changing political and economic circumstances confronting their countries, regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem, important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community. This paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession, using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries. In a situation of asymmetric information, in which the policy-maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader, signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome, whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not. We also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre-committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy-maker. Additionally, the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders. [less ▲]

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See detailBank secrecy, illicit money and offshore financial centers
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL

in Journal of Public Economics (2011), 95(7-8), 942-955

International and national institutions regularly put pressure on offshore financial centers and their clients to enforce compliance with anti-money laundering regulations and that in spite of the ... [more ▼]

International and national institutions regularly put pressure on offshore financial centers and their clients to enforce compliance with anti-money laundering regulations and that in spite of the existence of bank secrecy. This paper discusses the winners and losers of such policies. Surprisingly, aggregate profits and tax revenues can increase under those policies. In addition, we show that offshore banks can be encouraged to comply with rigorous monitoring of the investor's identity and the origin of his/her funds when the pressure creates sufficiently high risk of reputational harm to this investor. Nevertheless, the efficient pressure policy is dichotomous in the sense that a social planner chooses zero pressure or the pressure that just entices offshore banks to comply. By contrast, the implementation of those pressure policies on an onshore institution may be inefficient. Finally, we show that deeper financial integration fosters compliance by the offshore center while it also gives better incentives for delegated organizations to effectively induce compliance. [less ▲]

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See detailEarmarked Taxation and Political Competition
Anesi, Vincent UL

in Journal of Public Economics (2006), 90

Although tax earmarking constitutes a voluntary constraint for government's policymaking, it is widely used in the real world. This paper investigates the electoral dimension of earmarking in a model of ... [more ▼]

Although tax earmarking constitutes a voluntary constraint for government's policymaking, it is widely used in the real world. This paper investigates the electoral dimension of earmarking in a model of political competition with ideological parties. Its main contribution is to derive new insights on the relationship between earmarking and parties' probability of winning the elections. We find that the electoral pressure may favor the existence of tax-earmarking equilibria, but that it sometimes creates a tendency against earmarked taxation even when, as shown by Brett and Keen (2000) [Brett, C., Keen, M., 2000. Political uncertainty and the earmarking of environmental taxes. Journal of Public Econonomics 75, 315–340], incumbent governments have strong incentives to use earmarking rules to constrain future policymakers. [less ▲]

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See detailOn the Income Dependence of Equivalence Scales
Koulovatianos, Christos UL; Schröder, Carsten; Schmidt, Ulrich

in Journal of Public Economics (2005), 89(5-6), 967-996

Household consumption exhibits economies of scale as the number of household members increases. We collect survey data from two countries, Germany and France, in order to obtain direct subjective ... [more ▼]

Household consumption exhibits economies of scale as the number of household members increases. We collect survey data from two countries, Germany and France, in order to obtain direct subjective estimates of household consumption economies of scale, and, in particular, to examine an additional dimension: whether household consumption economies of scale change as living standards go up. Our data from both countries indicate strongly that household economies of scale increase as the living standard goes up. We discuss the robustness of our survey method and compare our results to these of alternative estimation methods in the literature. [less ▲]

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See detailJob additionality and deadweight spending in perfectly competitive industries
Picard, Pierre M UL

in Journal of Public Economics (2001), 79(3), 521-541

This paper links the old literature on employment subsidies with the current theories of contract and regulation. One important source of inefficiency of employment subsidies is non-additional employment ... [more ▼]

This paper links the old literature on employment subsidies with the current theories of contract and regulation. One important source of inefficiency of employment subsidies is non-additional employment and deadweight spending which occur when private firms receive a subsidy for jobs that would have been created without the subsidy. We identify the asymmetry of information between the government and the private firm as the source of these problems. When the government proposes optimal incentive contracts to promote employment, we show that all employment creations are additional and that the deadweight spending is equal to the information rent, which may be null when firms’ types are discrete. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 64 (2 UL)