References of "Journal of Public Economic Theory"
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See detailState‐owned firms and private debt
Picard, Pierre M UL; rusli, ridwan

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2018), 20(5), 672-702

We study the role of private debt financing in reducing government transfers and information costs in a state‐owned firm. We show that debt contracts allow the government to reduce socially costly ... [more ▼]

We study the role of private debt financing in reducing government transfers and information costs in a state‐owned firm. We show that debt contracts allow the government to reduce socially costly subsidies by letting underperforming state‐owned firms default. When the firm has private information, the government uses debt to reduce the firm's information rents. The option of default and privatization allows the government to stop subsidizing the firm. We identify the conditions under which information costs outweigh privatization costs and a positive debt level benefits governments. [less ▲]

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See detailState owned firms: private debt, cost revelation and welfare. Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Picard, Pierre; Rusli, Ridwan

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2018)

We study the role of private debt financing in reducing government transfers and information costs in a state‐owned firm. We show that debt contracts allow the government to reduce socially costly ... [more ▼]

We study the role of private debt financing in reducing government transfers and information costs in a state‐owned firm. We show that debt contracts allow the government to reduce socially costly subsidies by letting underperforming state‐owned firms default. When the firm has private information, the government uses debt to reduce the firm's information rents. The option of default and privatization allows the government to stop subsidizing the firm. We identify the conditions under which information costs outweigh privatization costs and a positive debt level benefits governments. [less ▲]

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See detailMeasuring social polarization with ordinal and categorical data
D'Ambrosio, Conchita UL; Permanyer, Inaki

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2015), 17

We examine the measurement of social polarization with categorical and ordinal data. This is particularly useful in many contexts where cardinal data are not available. The new measures we propose are ... [more ▼]

We examine the measurement of social polarization with categorical and ordinal data. This is particularly useful in many contexts where cardinal data are not available. The new measures we propose are characterized axiomatically. We partition the society into groups on the basis of salient social characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, and we take into account the extent to which these groups are clustered in certain regions of an attribute’s distribution. [less ▲]

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See detailTransfer pricing rules, OECD guidelines, and market distortions
Behrens, Kristian; Peralta, Susana; Picard, Pierre M. UL

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2014)

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on sales prices, firms' organizational structure, and consumers' utility within a two-country monopolistic competition model featuring source-based profit ... [more ▼]

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on sales prices, firms' organizational structure, and consumers' utility within a two-country monopolistic competition model featuring source-based profit taxes that differ across countries. Firms can either become multinationals, i.e., they serve the foreign market through a fully controlled a¢ liate; or they can become exporters, i.e., they serve the foreign market by contracting with an independent distributor. Compared to the benchmark cases, where tax authorities are either unable to audit firms or where they are able to audit them perfectly, the use of the OECD's Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) or Cost-Plus (CP) rule distorts firms' output and pricing decisions. The reason is that the comparable arm's length transactions between exporters and distributors, which serve as benchmarks, are not efficient. We show that implementing the CUP or CP rules is detrimental to consumers in the low tax country, yet benefits consumers in the high tax country. [less ▲]

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See detailMarket Games in Successive Oligopolies
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Gabszewicz, Jean; Laussel, Didier et al

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2013), 15(3), 397-410

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See detailWhen Redistribution Leads to Regressive Taxation
Hariton, Cyril; Piaser, Gwenaël UL

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2007), 9(4), 589-606

We introduce labor contracts in a framework of optimal redistribution: firms have some local market power and try to discriminate among heterogeneous workers. In this setting we show that if the firms ... [more ▼]

We introduce labor contracts in a framework of optimal redistribution: firms have some local market power and try to discriminate among heterogeneous workers. In this setting we show that if the firms have perfect information, i.e., they perfectly discriminate against workers and take all the surplus, the best tax function is flat. If firms have imperfect information, i.e., if they offer incentive contracts, then (under some assumptions) the best redistributive taxation is regressive. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 47 (2 UL)