References of "Journal of European Public Policy"
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See detailBrexit and the battle for financial services
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucial

in Journal of European Public Policy (2018), 25(8), 1118-1136

This paper analyses the policy developments concerning the Single Market in finance in the context of Brexit. Theoretically, we engage with two bodies of work that make contrasting predictions on European ... [more ▼]

This paper analyses the policy developments concerning the Single Market in finance in the context of Brexit. Theoretically, we engage with two bodies of work that make contrasting predictions on European financial market integration and the development of European Union (EU)policies on financial regulation: on focused upon a neo-mercantilist ‘battle’ amongst member states and the other stressing the importance of transnational financial networks (or coalitions). Empirically, we find limited evidence of the formation of crossnational alliances in favour of the United Kingdom (UK) retaining broad access to the EU Single Market in financial services, the presence of which would have aligned with the expectations of analyses focused upon transnational networks. By contrast, the main financial centres in the EU27 and their national authorities competed to lure financial business away from the UK — what we explain in terms of a ‘battle’ amongst member states and their national financial centres. [less ▲]

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See detailThe policy narratives of European capital markets union
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in Journal of European Public Policy (2018), 25(7), 990-1009

This paper examines the ‘making’ of Capital Markets Union (CMU) through the theoretical lens of ‘actor-centred constructivism’, by considering the ‘policy narratives’ that bureaucratic actors have ... [more ▼]

This paper examines the ‘making’ of Capital Markets Union (CMU) through the theoretical lens of ‘actor-centred constructivism’, by considering the ‘policy narratives’ that bureaucratic actors have employed strategically to promote the project. It is argued that two main narratives were articulated by the European Commission in order to mobilize the political support necessary to push forward CMU and reduce potential opposition to it. The first narrative was to boost the size and internal and external competitiveness of European Union capital markets. The second narrative was the increased funding to the real economy, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructural projects. The Commission used these narratives instrumentally in ‘framing’ CMU as a positive-sum game, rather than a zero-sum game with potential winners and losers. [less ▲]

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See detailEnforcing the European Semester: the politics of asymmetric information in the excessive deficit and macroeconomic imbalance procedures
Howarth, David UL; Savage, James

in Journal of European Public Policy (2018), 25(2), 193-211

The European Semester is an information-driven surveillance system that relies upon budgetary and economic statistics collected from the European Union’s member states and analyzed by the European ... [more ▼]

The European Semester is an information-driven surveillance system that relies upon budgetary and economic statistics collected from the European Union’s member states and analyzed by the European Commission. This is true for both the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). This article employs Principal–Agent theory to analyze the politics of asymmetric information in the EDP and MIP. The study explores how the statistical requirements of the Six-Pack have been enforced by the Commission and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council to strengthen the EDP, even as the statistical integrity of the MIP received less protection. The article examines how the misrepresentation of statistics by Spain’s Autonomous Community of Valencia provoked the first financial sanction in the history of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the Commission’s unsuccessful efforts to strengthen the reliability of MIP statistics. [less ▲]

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See detailThe ever incomplete single market: differentiation and the evolving frontier of integration
Howarth, David UL; Sadeh, Tal

in Journal of European Public Policy (2010), 17(7), 922-935

Progress in market integration over the past two decades has come at the expense of growing flexibility in the laws that govern the singlemarket (SM) as well as the way that these laws are implemented ... [more ▼]

Progress in market integration over the past two decades has come at the expense of growing flexibility in the laws that govern the singlemarket (SM) as well as the way that these laws are implemented. This differentiated integration comes in four forms: soft; informal; multi-speed; and opt-out differentiation. We examine how the completion of the SM has been held back in the varied implementation of EU competition policy and variation in national corporate law, energy markets, services and taxation. These sectors and issue areas form the frontier in which the main political struggles over the future shape of the SM take place, and in which differentiation is most clearly manifested. The SM notion supposedly entails a concrete set of substantive policy commitments that form the basis of the ‘ever closer union’. However, increasing differentiation undermines the identification of the EU’s core constitutional commitments. [less ▲]

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See detailPolicy with or without parties? A comparative analysis of policy priorities and policy change in Belgium, 1991 to 2000
Walgrave, Stefaan; Varone, Frederic; Dumont, Patrick UL

in JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY (2006), 13(7), 1021-1038

This paper confronts two models of policy: the party model states that policy-making is an orderly process initiated by parties implementing their party programme and carrying out their electoral promises ... [more ▼]

This paper confronts two models of policy: the party model states that policy-making is an orderly process initiated by parties implementing their party programme and carrying out their electoral promises; the external pressure model contends that policy change is a non-orderly process but rather a disjoint process coming in large bursts that are difficult to predict. Drawing upon eight policy agendas in Belgium covering the period from 1991 to 2000 we put both models to the test. Policy measures are operationalized via the budget and legislation. We found that budgets are as good as disconnected from any other policy agenda in Belgium. Legislation and the evolving legislative attention for issues in Belgium can be traced back to some extent to parties and external pressure at the same time. In terms of static policy priorities, we found that the party model indicators, party programmes and government agreements, are fairly good predictors of the lefislative attention an issue will receive during the governmental term. Regarding dynamic policy change from year to year, we found that the external pressure indicators parliamentary pressure, media coverage and street protest - performed much better and were able to grasp some variance in issue emphasis in legislation. [less ▲]

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