References of "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization"
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See detailModifier words in the financial press and investor expectations
Kräussl, Roman UL; Bosman, Ronald; Mirgorodskaya, Elizaveta

in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2017), 138

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See detailExcludability: A laboratory study on forced ranking in team production
Neugebauer, Tibor UL; Croson, Rachel; Fatas, Enrique et al

in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2015), 114

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See detailImitation and Efficient Contagion
Boyer, Tristan; Jonard, Nicolas UL

in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2014), 100

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See detailCorporate Governance and Employee Power in the Boardroom – An Applied Game Theoretic Analysis
Balsmeier, Benjamin UL; Bermig, Andreas; Dilger, Alexander

in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2013), 91

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See detailA Theory of BOT concession contracts
Auriol, Emmanuelle UL; Picard, Pierre M. UL

in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2013), 89

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and Örm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and Örm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose BOT concessions. This result stems from a trade-o§ between the governmentís shadow costs of Önancing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period. The incentives to choose BOT concessions increase as a function of informational asymmetries between governments and potential BOT concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession project characteristics to the public authority at the termination of the concession. [less ▲]

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See detailCorporate Science in the Patent System: An Analysis of the Semiconductor Technology
Della Malva, Antonio; Hussinger, Katrin UL

in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2012)

Corporate scientific publications are often presented as a strategic means for firms to create prior art with the objective to prevent others from patenting related inventions. This presumes that ... [more ▼]

Corporate scientific publications are often presented as a strategic means for firms to create prior art with the objective to prevent others from patenting related inventions. This presumes that corporate publications enter the pool of prior art which is relevant to judge the novelty of patent applications at the patent office and that corporate science has the power to block patent applications. This paper analyses for the first time whether the presumed mechanism behind corporate publications as a means to preempt patents works. With a focus on the semiconductor technology, our results show that scientific publications by corporations challenge the novelty of patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) significantly more than other pieces of prior art. Detailed information from the EPO patent examination procedure allows us to show that corporate publications threaten the novelty of patent applications if combined with other pieces of prior art like patents rather than as standalone documents. This supports the claim that corporate scientific publishing can be an effective means for firms to protect their freedom to operate if used as a complementary part of a firm’s overall IP protection strategy. [less ▲]

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See detailMerit, Approbation and the Evolution of Social Structure
Jonard, Nicolas UL; Cowan, Robin

in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2007), 64(3-4), 295-315

In this paper we study a society in which individuals gain utility from income and from social approbation. Income is correlated with class. Approbation is given to an unobservable trait, which must be ... [more ▼]

In this paper we study a society in which individuals gain utility from income and from social approbation. Income is correlated with class. Approbation is given to an unobservable trait, which must be signalled through the agent’s social mobility, i.e. class change. Mobility is driven by a simple mechanism involving inheritance, effort and ability. Thus social structure (class composition) is affected by individuals’ quest for approbation, and we study how that affects the emergence and multiplicity of long run social organizations, including hybrid forms of dynasties and meritocracies. Specifically we observe that even though social mobility is driven purely by a meritocratic mechanism, pure dynasties can emerge. We then introduce a feedback between the size of the upper class and its income value, so that effort levels and social structure are jointly endogenous. We derive results on equilibrium effort levels and stationary (when they exist) social structures. Social organization can converge to a unique steady state, multiple long run equilibria or cycles. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 105 (10 UL)