![]() Conac, Pierre-Henri ![]() ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 70 (0 UL)![]() Conac, Pierre-Henri ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2020) The initial evidence indicates that EU financial market governance has performed well in its response to the Covid-19 crisis. In the European Union (EU), the need for coordination and cooperation over ... [more ▼] The initial evidence indicates that EU financial market governance has performed well in its response to the Covid-19 crisis. In the European Union (EU), the need for coordination and cooperation over this crisis has been a particular concern given that national competent autho- rities (NCAs) operate under the single rulebook and supervisory action must, accordingly, be consistent. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has, however, shown itself to be nimble, responsive, and speedy in deploying its supervisory powers, including those additional powers it has recently been granted under the 2019 ESA Reform Regulation. This has particularly been the case as regards the application by NCAs of ‘supervisory forbearance’ and as regards the application of market disclosures rules, notably the financial reporting standard IFRS 9. ESMA has also been successful in coordinating the few NCAs which decided to impose restrictions on short selling. ESMA’s actions during the Covid-19 crisis underline the de facto power it wields through its soft supervisory convergence powers and the entrepreneurial but effective approach it deploys in their use. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 68 (0 UL)![]() Conac, Pierre-Henri ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2020) The need to promote cross-border regulation and cooperation between supervisors of financial markets has become acute ten years after the 2008 global financial crisis. This is due to a rise in extra ... [more ▼] The need to promote cross-border regulation and cooperation between supervisors of financial markets has become acute ten years after the 2008 global financial crisis. This is due to a rise in extra-territorial legislation and cross-border access to foreign markets conditioned on “equiva- lence” and “deference” among jurisdictions. Brexit has made the issue more critical in Europe because the United Kingdom will rely on “equivalence” decisions on many aspects of its future cross-border financial relationships with the European Union. Equivalence decisions by the Eur- opean Commission are based on a technical assessment but also include a political dimension which can punish or reward the other party. It is not just a European issue since the financial world will be more connected in the next twenty years and will need to rely even more on cross-border cooperation and equivalence. In addition, the amount of bilateral equivalence assessments and decisions could very quickly become unmanageable with dozens of jurisdictions dealing with hundreds of various regimes. The global financial architecture needs to be adapted, market frag- mentation to be pre-empted, and international standards to become more granular. The Inter- national Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO), made up of all securities supervisors in the world, should play a leading role in cross-border regulation and deference. It is the interest of many Europeans countries, and not just the European Union, to be the driving force to strengthen IOSCO so that a more rule-based and cooperative system can prevail and prevent future market fragmentation. For this goal to be achieved, IOSCO should become a new treaty- based World Finance Organisation. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 72 (2 UL)![]() Nabilou, Hossein ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2017), 14(1), 149-186 This Article attempts to define hedge funds and to distinguish them from a variety of similar investment funds. After reviewing the hedge fund definition in the U. S. and the EU, this Article argues that ... [more ▼] This Article attempts to define hedge funds and to distinguish them from a variety of similar investment funds. After reviewing the hedge fund definition in the U. S. and the EU, this Article argues that the current regulatory framework, which defines hedge funds by reference to what they are not rather than to what they are, is prone to regulatory arbitrage. Even in the presence of a statutory definition, due to the ineluctable indeterminacy of language and regulatory arbitrage problems, borderline issues will persist, which makes statutory definitions of hedge funds neither possible nor desirable. Therefore, regulators should avoid the temptation of proposing such statutory definitions. Instead, they should rely on regulatory discretion within a broad principles-based regulatory framework to do so. For such a principles-based regulatory regime to work, regulators should rely on a functional definition of hedge funds. Accordingly, this Article defines hedge funds as privately organized investment vehicles with a specific fee structure, not widely available to the public, aimed at generating absolute returns irrespective of market movements (Alpha) through active trading and making use of a variety of trading strategies. This functional definition is likely to help address regulatory problems that might originate from statutory definitions of hedge funds. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 197 (3 UL)![]() Conac, Pierre-Henri ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2015) Detailed reference viewed: 267 (6 UL)![]() Conac, Pierre-Henri ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2015), 12(2), 299-306 Detailed reference viewed: 183 (2 UL)![]() Conac, Pierre-Henri ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2013) Detailed reference viewed: 302 (5 UL)![]() Zetzsche, Dirk Andreas ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2013) Detailed reference viewed: 138 (5 UL)![]() Conac, Pierre-Henri ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2013), 2 Detailed reference viewed: 199 (7 UL)![]() Conac, Pierre-Henri ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2013), 3 Detailed reference viewed: 142 (2 UL)![]() Conac, Pierre-Henri ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2010) Detailed reference viewed: 144 (5 UL)![]() Zetzsche, Dirk Andreas ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2010) Detailed reference viewed: 169 (2 UL)![]() Conac, Pierre-Henri ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2007), 4(4), 491 All jurisdictions supply corporations with legal tools to prevent or punish asset diversion by those, whether managers or dominant shareholders, who are in control. As previous research has shown, these ... [more ▼] All jurisdictions supply corporations with legal tools to prevent or punish asset diversion by those, whether managers or dominant shareholders, who are in control. As previous research has shown, these rules, doctrines and remedies are far from uniform across jurisdictions, possibly leading to significant differences in the degree of investor protection they provide. Comparative research in this field is wrought with difficulty. It is tempting to compare corporate laws by taking one benchmark jurisdiction, typically the US, and to assess the quality of other corporate law systems depending on how much they replicate some prominent features. We take a different perspective and describe how three major continental European countries (France, Germany, and Italy) regulate dominant shareholders' self-dealing by looking at all the possible rules, doctrines and remedies available there. While the doctrines and remedies reviewed in this article are familiar enough to corporate lawyers and legal scholars from the respective countries, this is less true for many participants in the international discussion, which remains dominated by Anglophone legal scholars and economists. We suggest that some of these doctrines and remedies, namely the German prohibition against concealed distributions, the role of minority shareholders in the prosecution of abus de biens sociaux in France, and nullification suits in all three countries and especially in Germany and Italy, have not received the attention they deserve. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 164 (4 UL)![]() Conac, Pierre-Henri ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2005), 2(4), 487 Detailed reference viewed: 190 (0 UL)![]() Zetzsche, Dirk Andreas ![]() in European Company and Financial Law Review (2005) Detailed reference viewed: 82 (4 UL) |
||