References of "American Economic Journal. Microeconomics"
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See detailMaking Elections Work: Accountability with Selection and Control
Anesi, Vincent UL; Buisseret, Peter

in American Economic Journal. Microeconomics (in press)

We study the limits of dynamic electoral accountability when voters are uncertain about politicians’ characteristics (adverse selection) and their actions (moral hazard). Existing work argues that voters ... [more ▼]

We study the limits of dynamic electoral accountability when voters are uncertain about politicians’ characteristics (adverse selection) and their actions (moral hazard). Existing work argues that voters cannot achieve their first-best payoff. This is attributed to inherent deficiencies of the electoral contract, including voters’ inability to pre-commit, and the restriction to a binary retention-replacement decision. We provide conditions under which, despite these constraints, voters can obtain arbitrarily close to the first-best payoff in an equilibrium of the electoral interaction. Our paper resolves that there need not be a trade-off between selection and control. [less ▲]

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See detailPolicy Experimentation in Committees: A Case Against Veto Rights Under Redistributive Constraints
Anesi, Vincent UL; Bowen, Renee

in American Economic Journal. Microeconomics (2021), 13(3), 124-162

We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either a risky reform or a safe alternative each period. When no ... [more ▼]

We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either a risky reform or a safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When redistribution is allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule without veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights are more of an obstacle to optimal policy experimentation than the constraints on redistribution themselves. [less ▲]

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See detailCoercive Trade Policy
Anesi, Vincent UL; Facchini, Giovanni

in American Economic Journal. Microeconomics (2019), 11

Coercion is used by one government (the "sender") to influence the trade practices of another (the "target"). We build a two-country trade model in which coercion can be exercised unilaterally or ... [more ▼]

Coercion is used by one government (the "sender") to influence the trade practices of another (the "target"). We build a two-country trade model in which coercion can be exercised unilaterally or channeled through a "weak" international organization without enforcement powers. We show that unilateral coercion may be ineffective because signaling incentives lead the sender to demand a concession so substantial to make it unacceptable to the target. If the sender can instead commit to the international organization's dispute settlement mechanism, then compliance is more likely because the latter places a cap on the sender's incentives to signal its resolve. [less ▲]

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