![]() de Wit, Vincent ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2023) In this article, we present a proof-theoretical and model-theoretical approach to probabilistic logic for reasoning about uncertainty about normative state- ments. We introduce two logics with languages ... [more ▼] In this article, we present a proof-theoretical and model-theoretical approach to probabilistic logic for reasoning about uncertainty about normative state- ments. We introduce two logics with languages that extend both the language of monadic deontic logic and the language of probabilistic logic. The first logic allows statements like “the probability that one is obliged to be quiet is at least 0.9”. The second logic allows iteration of probabilities in the language. We axiomatize both logics, provide the corresponding semantics and prove that the axiomatizations are sound and complete. We also prove that both logics are decidable. In addition, we show that the problem of deciding satisfiability for the simpler of our two logics is in PSPACE, no worse than that of deontic logic. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 36 (5 UL)![]() ; Dauphin, Jérémie ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2022), 9(4), 853-886 In this chapter we give an overview of multi-agent abstract argumentation and dialogue, and its application to formalise legal reasoning. The basis of multi-agent abstract argumentation is input/output ... [more ▼] In this chapter we give an overview of multi-agent abstract argumentation and dialogue, and its application to formalise legal reasoning. The basis of multi-agent abstract argumentation is input/output argumentation studied by Baroni et al., distinguishing between the individual acceptance of agents and the collective acceptance of the system. The former may also be seen as a kind of conditional reasoning, and the latter may be seen as the reasoning of an external observer. We extend input/output argumentation in two ways. First, we introduce epistemic trust and agent communication, where the former is based on a social network representing epistemic trust, and the latter is based on so-called sub-framework semantics. Second, we introduce dialogue semantics for abstract argumentation by refining agent communication into dialogue steps. A dialogue is a sequence of steps from the framework to the extensions, where in each step of the sequence an agent can commit to accepting some arguments, or commit to hide or reveal one of his rejected arguments. The revealed arguments are then aggregated and an external observer, in our example a judge, can compute which arguments are finally acceptable at a global level. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 69 (14 UL)![]() ; ; et al in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2022), 9(4), 787-852 Studying normative change has practical and theoretical interests. Changing legal rules poses interpretation problems to determine the content of legal rules. The question of interpretation is tightly ... [more ▼] Studying normative change has practical and theoretical interests. Changing legal rules poses interpretation problems to determine the content of legal rules. The question of interpretation is tightly linked to those of determining the validity and the ability to produce effects of legal rules. Different formal models of normative change seem better suited to capture these dimensions: the dimension of validity appears to be better captured by the AGM approach, whereas syntactic methods are better suited to model how rules’ effects are blocked or enabled. Historically, the AGM approach of belief revision (on which we focus in this chapter) was the first formal model of normative change. We provide a survey on the AGM approach along with the main criticisms made to it. We then turn to a formal analysis of normative change that combines AGM theory and input/output logic, allowing for a clear distinction between norms and obligations. Our approach addresses some of the difficulties of normative change, like the combination of constitutive and regulative rules (and the normative conflicts that may arise from such a combination), the revision and contraction of normative systems, as well as the contraction of normative systems that combine sets of constitutive and regulative rules. We end our chapter by highlighting and discussing some challenges and open problems of normative change in the AGM approach. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 37 (6 UL)![]() van der Torre, Leon ![]() ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2022), 9(4), 1019-1062 There is a variety of ways to reason with normative systems. This partly reflects a variety of semantics developed for deontic logic, such as traditional semantics based on possible worlds, or alternative ... [more ▼] There is a variety of ways to reason with normative systems. This partly reflects a variety of semantics developed for deontic logic, such as traditional semantics based on possible worlds, or alternative semantics based on algebraic methods, explicit norms or techniques from non-monotonic logic. This diversity raises the question how these reasoning methods are related, and which reasoning method should be chosen for a particular application. In this paper we discuss the use of examples, inference patterns, and more abstract properties. First, benchmark examples can be used to compare ways to reason with normative systems. We give an overview of several benchmark examples of normative reasoning and deontic logic: van Fraassen’s paradox, Forrester’s paradox, Prakken and Sergot’s cottage regulations, Jeffrey’s disarmament example, Chisholm’s paradox, Makinson’s Möbius strip, and Horty’s priority examples. Moreover, we distinguish various interpretations that can be given to these benchmark examples, such as consistent interpretations, dilemma interpretations, and violability interpretations. Second, inference patterns can be used to compare different ways to reason with normative systems. Instead of analysing the benchmark examples semantically, as it is usually done, in this paper we use inference patterns to analyse them at a higher level of abstraction. We discuss inference patterns reflecting typical logical properties such as strengthening of the antecedent or weakening of the consequent. Third, more abstract properties can be defined to compare different ways to reason with normative systems. To define these more abstract properties, we first present a formal framework around the notion of detachment. Some of the ten properties we introduce are derived from the inference patterns, but others are more abstract: factual detachment, violation detection, substitution, replacements of equivalents, implication, para-consistency, conjunction, factual monotony, norm monotony, and norm induction. We consider these ten properties as desirable for a reasoning method for normative systems, and thus they can be used also as requirements for the further development of formal methods for normative systems and deontic logic. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 51 (8 UL)![]() ; ; Markovich, Réka ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2022), 9(4), 957-1018 Defeasible deontic logic uses techniques from non-monotonic logic to address various challenges in normative reasoning, such as prima facie permissions and obligations, moral dilemmas, deontic detachment ... [more ▼] Defeasible deontic logic uses techniques from non-monotonic logic to address various challenges in normative reasoning, such as prima facie permissions and obligations, moral dilemmas, deontic detachment, contrary-to-duty reasoning and legal interpretation. In this article, we use formal argumentation to design defeasible deontic logics, based on two classical deontic logics. In particular, we use the ASPIC+ structured argumentation theory to define non-monotonic variants of well-understood monotonic modal logics. We illustrate the ASPIC+-based approach and the resulting defeasible deontic logics using argumentation about strong permission. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 72 (5 UL)![]() Gabbay, Dov M. ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2021), 8(6), 1335-1338 Detailed reference viewed: 28 (0 UL)![]() Gabbay, Dov M. ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2021), 8(7), 1977--2034 The notion of negation is basic to any formal or informal logical system. When any such system is presented to us, it is presented either as a system without negation or as a system with some form of ... [more ▼] The notion of negation is basic to any formal or informal logical system. When any such system is presented to us, it is presented either as a system without negation or as a system with some form of negation. In both cases we are supposed to know intuitively whether there is no negation in the system or whether the form of negation presented in the system is indeed as claimed. To be more specific, suppose Robinson Crusoe writes a logical system with Hilbert type axioms and rules, which includes a unary connective *A. He puts the document in a bottle and let it lose at sea. We find it and take a look. We ask: is the connective "*" a negation in the system? Yet the notion of what is negation in a formal system is not clear. When we see a unary connective *A, (A a wff) together with some other axioms for some additional connectives, how can we tell whether *A is indeed a form of negation of A? Are there some axioms which the connective "*" must satisfy in order to qualify * as a negation? [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 23 (2 UL)![]() Benzmüller, Christoph ![]() ![]() ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2019), 6(5), 733--755 Detailed reference viewed: 86 (6 UL)![]() Benzmüller, Christoph ![]() ![]() ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2019), 6(5), 715--732 Detailed reference viewed: 72 (13 UL)![]() Markovich, Réka ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 84 (5 UL)![]() Markovich, Réka ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 71 (5 UL)![]() ; Benzmüller, Christoph ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2018), 5(7), 1567-1603 Computers may help us to better understand (not just verify) arguments. In this article we defend this claim by showcasing the application of a new, computer-assisted interpretive method to an exemplary ... [more ▼] Computers may help us to better understand (not just verify) arguments. In this article we defend this claim by showcasing the application of a new, computer-assisted interpretive method to an exemplary natural-language argument with strong ties to metaphysics and religion: E. J. Lowe’s modern variant of St. Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God. Our new method, which we call computational hermeneutics, has been particularly conceived for use in interactive-automated proof assistants. It aims at shedding light on the meanings of words and sentences by framing their inferential role in a given argument. By employing automated theorem reasoning technology within interactive proof assistants, we are able to drastically reduce (by several orders of magnitude) the time needed to test the logical validity of an argument’s formalization. As a result, a new approach to logical analysis, inspired by Donald Davidson’s account of radical interpretation, has been enabled. In computational hermeneutics, the utilization of automated reasoning tools effectively boosts our capacity to expose the assumptions we indirectly commit ourselves to every time we engage in rational argumentation and it fosters the explicitation and revision of our concepts and commitments. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 191 (0 UL)![]() ; van der Torre, Leon ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2017) This article gives an overview of several challenges studied in deontic logic, with an emphasis on challenges involving agents. We start with traditional modal deontic logic using preferences to address ... [more ▼] This article gives an overview of several challenges studied in deontic logic, with an emphasis on challenges involving agents. We start with traditional modal deontic logic using preferences to address the challenge of contrary-toduty reasoning, and STIT theory addressing the challenges of non-deterministic actions, moral luck and procrastination. Then we turn to alternative normbased deontic logics detaching obligations from norms to address the challenge of Jørgensen’s dilemma, including the question how to derive obligations from a normative system when agents cannot assume that other agents comply with their norms. We discuss also some traditional challenges from the viewpoint of normative systems: when a set of norms may be termed ‘coherent’, how to deal with normative conflicts, how to combine normative systems and traditional deontic logic, how various kinds of permission can be accommodated, how meaning postulates and counts-as conditionals can be taken into account,how sets of norms may be revised and merged, and how normative systems can be combined with game theory. The normative systems perspective means that norms, not ideality or preference, should take the central position in deontic semantics, and that a semantics that represents norms explicitly provides a helpful tool for analysing, clarifying and solving the problems of deontic logic. We focus on the challenges rather than trying to give full coverage of related work, for which we refer to the handbook of deontic logic and normative systems. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 157 (17 UL)![]() Parent, Xavier ![]() ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2017), 4(9), 2295-3039 There is a variety of ways to reason with normative systems. This partly reflects a variety of semantics developed for deontic logic, such as traditional semantics based on possible worlds, or alternative ... [more ▼] There is a variety of ways to reason with normative systems. This partly reflects a variety of semantics developed for deontic logic, such as traditional semantics based on possible worlds, or alternative semantics based on algebraic methods, explicit norms or techniques from non-monotonic logic. This diversity raises the question how these reasoning methods are related, and which reasoning method should be chosen for a particular application. In this paper we discuss the use of examples, inference patterns, and more abstract properties. First, benchmark examples can be used to compare ways to reason with normative systems. We give an overview of several benchmark examples of normative reasoning and deontic logic: van Fraassen’s paradox, Forrester’s paradox, Prakken and Sergot’s cottage regulations, Jeffrey’s disarmament example, Chisholm’s paradox, Makinson’s Möbius strip, and Horty’s priority examples. Moreover, we distinguish various interpretations that can be given to these benchmark examples, such as consistent interpretations, dilemma interpretations, and violability interpretations. Second, inference patterns can be used to compare different ways to reason with normative systems. Instead of analysing the benchmark examples semantically, as it is usually done, in this paper we use inference patterns to analyse them at a higher level of abstraction. We discuss inference patterns reflecting typical logical properties such as strengthening of the antecedent or weakening of the consequent. Third, more abstract properties can be defined to compare different ways to reason with normative systems. To define these more abstract properties, we first present a formal framework around the notion of detachment. Some of the ten properties we introduce are derived from the inference patterns, but others are more abstract: factual detachment, violation detection, substitution, replacements of equivalents, implication, para-consistency, conjunction, factual monotony, norm monotony, and norm induction. We consider these ten properties as desirable for a reasoning method for normative systems. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 353 (33 UL)![]() ; Gabbay, Dov M. ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2017) The growth in IoT will far exceed that of other connected devices. In contrast to the rapid assimilation of the IoT devices and interfaces, the technology that ensures these systems are safe and secure is ... [more ▼] The growth in IoT will far exceed that of other connected devices. In contrast to the rapid assimilation of the IoT devices and interfaces, the technology that ensures these systems are safe and secure is left behind. The IoT safety, security and privacy is composed of several key aspects. Attention has already been given to vulnerabilities associated with networked systems as authentication and encryption. However there exist more vulnerabilities issues in IoT systems for which we aim to develop a detection methodology and propose possible solutions. Specifically, here we propose techniques for security verification of an IoT system that mainly involves inconsistency and vulnerability. The proposed methods are logic based techniques that were developed especially for the new challenges that the IoT environment is facing. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 89 (3 UL)![]() ; ; et al in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2017) Formal argumentation is used to enrich and analyse normative multi-agent systems in various ways. In this chapter, we discuss three examples from the literature of handling norms by means of formal ... [more ▼] Formal argumentation is used to enrich and analyse normative multi-agent systems in various ways. In this chapter, we discuss three examples from the literature of handling norms by means of formal argumentation. First, we discuss how existing ways to resolve conflicts among norms using priorities can be represented in formal argumentation, by showing that the so-called Greedy and Reduction approaches can be represented using the weakest and the last link principles respectively. Based on such representation results, formal argumentation can be used to explain the detachment of obligations and permissions from hierarchical normative systems in a new way. Second, we discuss how formal argumentation can be used as a general theory for developing new approaches for normative reasoning, using a dynamic ASPIC-based legal argumentation theory. We show how existing logics of normative systems can be used to analyse such new argumentation systems. Third, we show how argumentation can be used to reason about other challenges in the area of normative multiagent systems as well, by discussing a model for arguing about legal interpretation. In particular, we show how fuzzy logic combined with formal argumentation can be used to reason about the adoption of graded categories and thus address the problem of open texture in normative interpretation. Our aim to discuss these three examples is to inspire new applications of formal argumentation to the challenges of normative reasoning in multiagent systems. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 141 (15 UL)![]() Gabbay, Dov M. ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2017) This editorial is about weaponising the Fallacies, and offering them as active additional components to modern formal logic, thus forming the new evolutionary logic for the 21st Century. Logicians since ... [more ▼] This editorial is about weaponising the Fallacies, and offering them as active additional components to modern formal logic, thus forming the new evolutionary logic for the 21st Century. Logicians since Aristotle considered the fallacies as wrong arguments which look correct but are not. They classified them into groups, discussed them and left them by the sidelines of logic as failures. Modern society, with the rise of the internet, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube showed the fallacies as most used and most effective in argumentation and debate. If this is the way humans reason and think then we need to develop the logical theory of the the use of the fallacies and legitimise them as a significant component of modern reasoning. This manifesto outlines our approach to the new logic of the 21st century which allows for the systematic use of the fallacies in argumentation and debate as practiced by people in the mass media. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 150 (1 UL)![]() Gabbay, Dov M. ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2017) We define and study the phenomenon of a universal distortion into a reasoning system or an argumentation network. Such distortions can happen for various reasons, for instance under the influence of ... [more ▼] We define and study the phenomenon of a universal distortion into a reasoning system or an argumentation network. Such distortions can happen for various reasons, for instance under the influence of alcohol or a fundamentalist religion, or as the result of a behavioural disorder such as paedophilia. We define the notion theoretically in the framework of abstract argumentation and present an actual case study of a sex offender. We then present a formal logical model. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 88 (2 UL)![]() Gabbay, Dov M. ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2017) This paper examines in detail the argumentation features in the domain of sex offender with some applications to the scheme of “Argument from Expert Opinion". We build a model for reasoning schemes ... [more ▼] This paper examines in detail the argumentation features in the domain of sex offender with some applications to the scheme of “Argument from Expert Opinion". We build a model for reasoning schemes, critical questions and expert opinion on the question of “the degree of risk of a sex offender". We discover that in order to properly model expert practice in this area we need to use numerical argumentation as well as the new notion of “Attack as Information Input". The model is generic and we believe is not restricted to the sex offence area of expertise. Our paper also offers a more detailed example for Walton’s argumentation scheme of Expert Opinion as well as a bridge between the argumentation community and the community dealing with sex offenders. We offer an introduction to the student on the subject of determining the degree of risk of sex offenders. We also look at standard international tools for determining the risk of sex offenders and see how the argumentation community can integrate these tools. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 130 (2 UL)![]() Cramer, Marcos ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2017) We discuss a feature of the natural language of mathematics – the implicit dynamic introduction of functions – that has, to our knowledge, not been captured in any formal system so far. If this feature is ... [more ▼] We discuss a feature of the natural language of mathematics – the implicit dynamic introduction of functions – that has, to our knowledge, not been captured in any formal system so far. If this feature is used without limitations, it yields a paradox analogous to Russell’s paradox. Hence any formalism capturing it has to impose some limitations on it. We sketch two formalisms, both extensions of Dynamic Predicate Logic, that innovatively do capture this feature, and that differ only in the limitations they impose onto it. One of these systems is based on Ackermann-like Function Theory, a novel foundational theory of functions that is inspired by Ackermann Set Theory and that interprets ZFC. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 117 (2 UL) |
||