References of "Mathematical Social Sciences"
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See detailLocal Social Interaction and Urban Equilibria
Picard, Pierre M UL; Augeraud-Veron, Emmanuelle; Maruhenda, Fransico

in Mathematical Social Sciences (2021), 112

In this paper we investigate the effect of local interaction in a simple urban economics model. Agents interact with others if and only if their interaction benefit outweighs their travel cost and ... [more ▼]

In this paper we investigate the effect of local interaction in a simple urban economics model. Agents interact with others if and only if their interaction benefit outweighs their travel cost and therefore meet others only within finite geographic windows. We show that two or more cites may co-exist at the equilibrium provided that they are sufficiently distant. For any interaction surplus function, there exists a unique spatial equilibrium on not too large city supports. The population density within a city is determined by a second order advance-delay differential equation, whose solutions are fully characterized for linear interaction surplus functions. Numerical analyses show that more localized interactions yield flatter population density and land rents over larger extents of the city support. They do not give support to the idea that multiple subcenters can be caused by small and finite geographic windows of interaction. [less ▲]

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See detailClimate politics: how public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance
Prieur, Fabien; Zou, Benteng UL

in Mathematical Social Sciences (2019)

This paper aims at studying the impact of public persuasion, through information dissemination, on environmental and economic performance. A differential game in which opposite interest groups compete for ... [more ▼]

This paper aims at studying the impact of public persuasion, through information dissemination, on environmental and economic performance. A differential game in which opposite interest groups compete for bringing the majority’s environmental concern closer to their views is developed. The results show a strong asymmetry in the impact of public persuasion. It may bring the median voter economy closer to the social optimum in the long run, thereby reducing environmental and economic distorsions. But this only occurs when the environmental group exhibits a radical ideology and people are initially closer to the industrialists’ views. By contrast, economies where industrial groups are powerful and strongly opposed to environmental protection never benefit from the outcome of the game of persuasion. This may explain why the US have failed to take action on global warming up to now. [less ▲]

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See detailCommon agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
Attar, Andrea; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Piaser, Gwenaël UL et al

in Mathematical Social Sciences (2008), 56(1), 75-95

This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is ... [more ▼]

This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the Revelation Principle to hold when finite games with generic payoffs are considered. The result goes through without imposing any restriction on the principals’ payoffs. This provides a rationale for the restriction to direct mechanisms even when competition among principals is considered. [less ▲]

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