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ORBi

Can intermediaries assure contracts? Experimental evidence Neugebauer, Tibor ; in Games and Economic Behavior (2020), 124 Detailed reference viewed: 54 (1 UL)Dynamic Bargaining and Stability with Veto Players Anesi, Vincent ; in Games and Economic Behavior (2017), 103 This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points ... [more ▼] This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it is a von Neumann–Morgenstern solution. We also apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to the persistent agenda setter environment of Diermeier and Fong (2012). We show that all equilibria are essentially pure, and we extend their characterization of absorbing sets to allow an arbitrary voting rule and by removing the restriction to pure strategy equilibria. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 73 (0 UL)Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games Anesi, Vincent in Games and Economic Behavior (2010), 70 This short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study stationary Markov equilibria (SMEs) of a noncooperative legislative ... [more ▼] This short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study stationary Markov equilibria (SMEs) of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following result emerges from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of pure strategy, stage-undominated SMEs of the bargaining game when voters are sufficiently farsighted. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 51 (0 UL)Axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices ; ; Marichal, Jean-Luc in Games and Economic Behavior (2006), 55(1), 72-99 In the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of interaction index, which can be regarded as an extension of that of value, has been recently proposed to measure the interaction phenomena among ... [more ▼] In the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of interaction index, which can be regarded as an extension of that of value, has been recently proposed to measure the interaction phenomena among players. Axiomatizations of two classes of interaction indices, namely probabilistic interaction indices and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices, generalizing probabilistic values and semivalues, respectively, are first proposed. The axioms we utilize are based on natural generalizations of axioms involved in the axiomatizations of values. In the second half of the paper, existing instances of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices encountered thus far in the literature are also axiomatized. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 101 (1 UL) |
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