![]() Jamroga, Wojciech ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (2020), 175(1-4), 207-251 Some multi-agent scenarios call for the possibility of evaluating specifications in aricher domain of truth values. Examples include runtime monitoring of a temporal property over a growing prefix of an ... [more ▼] Some multi-agent scenarios call for the possibility of evaluating specifications in aricher domain of truth values. Examples include runtime monitoring of a temporal property over a growing prefix of an infinite path, inconsistency analysis in distributed databases, and verification methods that use incomplete anytime algorithms, such as bounded model checking. In this paper, we present multi-valued alternating-time temporal logic(mv-ATL∗→), an expressive logic to specify strategic abilities in multi-agent systems. It is well known that, for branching-time logics, a general method for model-independent translation from multi-valued to two-valued model checking exists. We show that the method cannot be directly extended to mv-ATL∗→. We also propose two ways of overcoming the problem. Firstly, we identify constraints on formulas for which the model-independent translation can be suitably adapted. Secondly, we present a model-dependent reduction that can be applied to all formulas of mv-ATL∗→. We show that, in all cases, the complexity of verification increases only linearly when new truth values are added to the evaluation domain. We also consider several examples that show possible applications of mv-ATL∗→and motivate its use for model checking multi-agent systems. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 54 (0 UL)![]() ; ; Trujillo Rasua, Rolando ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (2017), 152(3), 273-287 Detailed reference viewed: 124 (18 UL)![]() Horne, Ross James ![]() ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (2017), 153(1-2), 57-86 Attack trees profile the sub-goals of the proponent of an attack. Attack trees have a variety of semantics depending on the kind of question posed about the attack, where questions are captured by an ... [more ▼] Attack trees profile the sub-goals of the proponent of an attack. Attack trees have a variety of semantics depending on the kind of question posed about the attack, where questions are captured by an attribute domain. We observe that one of the most general semantics for attack trees, the multiset semantics, coincides with a semantics expressed using linear logic propositions. The semantics can be used to compare attack trees to determine whether one attack tree is a specialisation of another attack tree. Building on these observations, we propose two new semantics for an extension of attack trees named causal attack trees. Such attack trees are extended with an operator capturing the causal order of sub-goals in an attack. These two semantics extend the multiset semantics to sets of series-parallel graphs closed under certain graph homomorphisms, where each semantics respects a class of attribute domains. We define a sound logical system with respect to each of these semantics, by using a recently introduced extension of linear logic, called MAV , featuring a non-commutative operator. The non-commutative operator models causal dependencies in causal attack trees. Similarly to linear logic for attack trees, implication defines a decidable preorder for specialising causal attack trees that soundly respects a class of attribute domains. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 258 (4 UL)![]() Biryukov, Alex ![]() ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (2012), 114(3-4), 221-237 The block cipher Rijndael has undergone more than ten years of extensive cryptanalysis since its submission as a candidate for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in April 1998. To date, most of the ... [more ▼] The block cipher Rijndael has undergone more than ten years of extensive cryptanalysis since its submission as a candidate for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in April 1998. To date, most of the publicly-known cryptanalytic results are based on reduced-round variants of the AES (respectively Rijndael) algorithm. Among the few exceptions that target the full AES are the Related-Key Cryptanalysis (RKC) introduced at ASIACRYPT 2009 and attacks exploiting Time-Memory-Key (TMK) trade-offs such as demonstrated at SAC 2005. However, all these attacks are generally considered infeasible in practice due to their high complexity (i.e. 2^99.5 AES operations for RKC, 2^80 for TMK). In this paper, we evaluate the cost of cryptanalytic attacks on the full AES when using special-purpose hardware in the form of multi-core AES processors that are designed in a similar way as modern Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) such as the NVIDIA GT200b. Using today's VLSI technology would allow for the implementation of a GPU-like processor reaching a throughput of up to 10^12 AES operations per second. An organization able to spend one trillion US$ for designing and building a supercomputer based on such processors could theoretically break the full AES in a time frame of as little as one year when using RKC, or in merely one month when performing a TMK attack. We also analyze different time-cost trade-offs and assess the implications of progress in VLSI technology under the assumption that Moore's law will continue to hold for the next ten years. These assessments raise some concerns about the long-term security of the AES. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 211 (7 UL)![]() ; Rahli, Vincent ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (2012), 121 Detailed reference viewed: 50 (0 UL)![]() ; Mizera, Andrzej ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (2012), 116(1-4), 51-63 Detailed reference viewed: 71 (1 UL)![]() ; ; Rahli, Vincent ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (2012), 121 Detailed reference viewed: 70 (0 UL)![]() ; Jamroga, Wojciech ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 103 (1 UL)![]() ; ; Jonker, Hugo ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (2008), 89(4), 393-417 Detailed reference viewed: 65 (0 UL)![]() ; Pang, Jun ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (2008), 87(3-4), 287311 Detailed reference viewed: 56 (1 UL)![]() Mauw, Sjouke ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (1990), XIII Detailed reference viewed: 83 (1 UL) |
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