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   Algorithms for finding coalitions exploiting a new reciprocity conditionBoella, Guido  ; Sauro, Luigi ; van der Torre, Leon in Logic Journal of the IGPL (2009), 17(3), 273297 We introduce a reciprocity criterion for coalition formation among goal-directed agents, which we call the indecomposable do-ut-des property. It refines an older reciprocity property, called the do-ut-des ... [more ▼] We introduce a reciprocity criterion for coalition formation among goal-directed agents, which we call the indecomposable do-ut-des property. It refines an older reciprocity property, called the do-ut-des or give-to-get property by considering the fact that agents prefer to form coalitions whose components cannot be formed independently. A formal description of this property is provided as well as an analysis of algorithms and their complexity. We provide an algorithm to decide whether a coalition has the desired property, and we show that the problem to verify whether a single coalition satisfies the property is tractable. Moreover, we provide an algorithm to search all the sub-coalitions of a given coalition satisfying the new property. Even if this problem is not computationally tractable, we show that in several cases, also the complexity of this problem may decrease considerably. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 111 (0 UL)Dependency in Cooperative Boolean GamesSauro, Luigi ; van der Torre, Leon ; in Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, Third KES International Symposium, KES-AMSTA 2009, Uppsala, Sweden, June 3-5, 2009. Proceedings (2009) Cooperative boolean games are coalitional games with both goals and costs associated to actions, and dependence networks for boolean games are a kind of social networks representing how the actions of ... [more ▼] Cooperative boolean games are coalitional games with both goals and costs associated to actions, and dependence networks for boolean games are a kind of social networks representing how the actions of other agents have an influence on the achievement of an agent’s goal. In this paper, we introduce two new types of dependence networks, called the abstract dependence network and the refined dependence network. Moreover, we show that the notion of stability is complete with respect to the solution concept of the core in the case of cooperative boolean games with costly actions. We present a reduction, called Δ-reduction, to pass from a cooperative boolean game G to game G′ without loosing solutions. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 158 (0 UL)From Social Power to Social ImportanceBoella, Guido ; Sauro, Luigi ; van der Torre, Leon in Web Intelligence and Agent Systems Journal (2007), (5), 393404 In this paper we introduce a method to measure the social importance of an agent in a multiagent system, using a directed graph representing dependencies among agents to achieve their goals, so-called ... [more ▼] In this paper we introduce a method to measure the social importance of an agent in a multiagent system, using a directed graph representing dependencies among agents to achieve their goals, so-called dependence graphs pioneered by Castelfranchi, Conte and Sichman. Our measure is derived from van den Brink and Gilles' β-measure to rank agents, using a directed graph representing an abstract dominance relation among agents. In particular, we show how to define power structures and dependence networks from the goals and skills of individual agents, and how to adapt the β-measure for such dependence networks based on their topological properties. Moreover, we show that our notion of social importance can be given an intuitive meaning: it measures the discontent of the other agents in case the agent would leave the society. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 49 (0 UL) |
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