Does eliminating international profit shifting increase tax revenue in high-tax countries?

in Economic Modelling (2020), 93

Does tax competition increase disparity among jurisdictions?

in Review of International Economics (2018)

Immigration, occupational choice and public employment

in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique (2017)

This paper investigates the theoretical effects of immigration in an occupational choice model with three sectors: a low-skilled, a high-skilled and a public sector. The originality of our approach is to ... [more ▼]

This paper investigates the theoretical effects of immigration in an occupational choice model with three sectors: a low-skilled, a high-skilled and a public sector. The originality of our approach is to consider (i) inter-sectoral mobility of labor and (ii) public employment. The combination of these two features yields a new mechanism by which immigration can have positive effects. The model demonstrates that immigration increases wages in the high-skilled and the public sectors, provided that the immigrant workforce is not too large and the access to public jobs is not too easy. The average wage of natives may also increase accordingly. Moreover, immigration may improve workers’ welfare in each sector. Finally, the mechanism underlying these results does not require complementarity between natives and immigrants. [less ▲]

Tax havens compliance with international standards: a temporal perspective

E-print/Working paper (2016)

Tax havens under pressure: How do they react?

Scientific Conference (2014, July)

Does size asymmetry exacerbate the inefficiency of tax competition?

in Economics Letters (2014), 122

Many authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition increases with the size asymmetry of the competing countries. Consequently, increasing country-size disparities exacerbates the ... [more ▼]

Many authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition increases with the size asymmetry of the competing countries. Consequently, increasing country-size disparities exacerbates the inefficiency of tax competition. The aim of this note is to show that this classical view has no general validity, if we consider that countries compete not only in taxes, but also in the provision of infrastructure. The simple model we develop for this purpose demonstrates that the effect of size disparity on efficiency depends crucially on the degree of international capital mobility. [less ▲]

Asymmetric Competition among Nation States: A Differential Game Approach

in Journal of Public Economics (2014)

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision-making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public services. The model shows that the long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility. In particular, we show that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public services and with the degree of international openness. [less ▲]

On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures

E-print/Working paper (2013)

In our paper we show that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure ... [more ▼]

In our paper we show that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure tax competition. The divergence is even worse when the competing jurisdictions differ in the quality of their institutions. If tax revenue is used to gauge the desirability of coordination, our model shows that imposing a uniform tax rate is Pareto-inferior to the non cooperative equilibrium when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures. This result is completely reversed with pure tax competition if countries are not too uneven in size. If a minimum tax rate lying between those resulting from the non-cooperative equilibrium is set, the low tax country will never be better off. Finally the paper shows that the potential social welfare gains from tax harmonization crucially depend on how heterogeneous the competing countries are. [less ▲]

From tax evasion to tax planning

E-print/Working paper (2013)

This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated but legal, tax ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated but legal, tax planning. Two alternative regimes are considered. A first, in which there is strict bank secrecy and a second, where there is international information exchange for tax purposes. In particular, we show that sharing tax information with onshore countries can be a dominant strategy for an OFC if there is enough scope for providing tax planning. Moreover, a partial reduction of tax liabilities can already prompt OFCs to voluntarily exchange relevant tax information. We also discuss the conditions under which the possible removal of bank secrecy may reduce or increase the onshore country's tax revenue. [less ▲]

The Dynamics of the Location of Firms– A Revisit of Home-Attachment under Tax Competition

E-print/Working paper (2013)

We revisit the investment home-bias situation of firms and extend the home attachment setting of Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and Ogura (2006) into a dynamic framework. We locate firms based on their home ... [more ▼]

We revisit the investment home-bias situation of firms and extend the home attachment setting of Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and Ogura (2006) into a dynamic framework. We locate firms based on their home attachment preferences, which is also changing over time based on some updated spillover information. Some applications, in static and dynamic tax competition, are presented following our home-attachment principle. [less ▲]