References of "Xia, Zhe"
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See detailTesting Voters' Understanding of a Security Mechanism Used in Verifiable Voting
Ryan, Peter UL; Schneider, Steve; Xia, Zhe et al

in 53 USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems (JETS) (2013), 1(1), 53-61

Proposals for a secure voting technology can involve new mechanisms or procedures designed to provide greater ballot secrecy or verifiability. These mechanisms may be justified on the technical level, but ... [more ▼]

Proposals for a secure voting technology can involve new mechanisms or procedures designed to provide greater ballot secrecy or verifiability. These mechanisms may be justified on the technical level, but researchers and voting officials must also consider how voters will understand these technical details, and how understanding may affect interaction with the voting systems. In the context of verifiable voting, there is an additional impetus for this consideration as voters are provided with an additional choice; whether or not to verify their ballot. It is possible that differences in voter understanding of the voting technology or verification mechanism may drive differences in voter behaviour; particularly at the point of verification. In the event that voter understanding partially explains voter decisions to verify their ballot, then variance in voter understanding will lead to predictable differences in the way voters interact with the voting technology. This paper describes an experiment designed to test voters’ understanding of the ‘split ballot’, a particular mechanism at the heart of the secure voting system Prˆet `a Voter, used to provide both vote secrecy and voter verifiability. We used a controlled laboratory experiment in which voter behaviour in the experiment is dependent on their understanding of the secrecy mechanism for ballots. We found that a two-thirds majority of the participants expressed a confident comprehension of the secrecy of their ballot; indicating an appropriate level of understanding. Among the remaining third of participants, most exhibited a behaviour indicating a comprehension of the security mechanism, but were less confident in their understanding. A small number did not comprehend the system. We discuss the implications of this finding for the deployment of such voting systems. [less ▲]

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See detailVerifiable Voting Systems
Ryan, Peter UL; Peacock, Thea; Schneider, Steve et al

in Computer and Information Security Handbook (2013)

The introduction of technology into voting systems can bring a number of benefits, such as improving accessibility, remote voting, and efficient, accurate processing of votes. A voting system that uses ... [more ▼]

The introduction of technology into voting systems can bring a number of benefits, such as improving accessibility, remote voting, and efficient, accurate processing of votes. A voting system that uses electronic technology in any part of processing the votes, from vote capture and transfer through to vote tallying, is known as an e-voting system. In addition to the undoubted benefits, the introduction of such technology introduces particular security challenges, some of which are unique to voting systems because of their specific nature and requirements. The key role that voting systems play in democratic elections means that such systems must not only be secure and trustworthy, but must be seen by the electorate to be secure and trustworthy. This chapter emphasizes the challenge to reconcile the secrecy of the ballot, with demonstrable correctness of the result. © 2013 Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. [less ▲]

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See detailA Supervised Verifiable Voting Protocol for the Victorian Electoral Commission
Burton, Craig Burton; Culnane, Chris; Heather, James et al

in EVOTE 2012 (2012)

This paper describes the design of a supervised verifiable voting protocol suitable for use for elections in the state of Victoria, Australia. We provide a brief overview of the style and nature of the ... [more ▼]

This paper describes the design of a supervised verifiable voting protocol suitable for use for elections in the state of Victoria, Australia. We provide a brief overview of the style and nature of the elections held in Victoria and associated challenges. Our protocol, based on Prêt à Voter, presents a new ballot overprinting front-end design, which assists the voter in completing the potentially complex ballot. We also present and analyse a series of modifications to the back-end that will enable it to handle the large number of candidates, 35+ , with ranking single transferable vote (STV), which some Victorian elections require. We conclude with a threat analysis of the scheme and a discussion on the impact of the modifications on the integrity and privacy assumptions of Prêt à Voter. [less ▲]

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See detailUsing Prêt à Voter in Victorian State Elections
Ryan, Peter UL; Schneider, Steve; Peacock, Thea et al

in Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (2012)

The Prêt à Voter cryptographic voting system was designed to be flexible and to offer voters a familiar and easy voting experience. In this paper we present a case study of our efforts to adapt Prêt à ... [more ▼]

The Prêt à Voter cryptographic voting system was designed to be flexible and to offer voters a familiar and easy voting experience. In this paper we present a case study of our efforts to adapt Prêt à Voter to the idiosyncrasies of elections in the Australian state of Victoria. The general background and desired user experience have previously been described; here we concentrate on the cryptographic protocols for dealing with some unusual aspects of Victorian voting. We explain the problems, present solutions, then analyse their security properties and explain how they tie in to other design decisions. We hope this will be an interesting case study on the application of end-to-end verifiable voting protocols to real elections. [less ▲]

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See detailVersatile Prêt à Voter: Handling Multiple Election Methods with a Unified Interface
Xia, Zhe; Culnane, Chris; Heather, James et al

in Proc. 11th International Conference on Cryptology in India (IndoCrypt'10) (2010)

Detailed reference viewed: 212 (6 UL)