References of "Wang, Huaxiong"
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See detailDistributed Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Bosch; Peter, Andreas; Leenders, Bram et al

in PST2014 International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (2014)

Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) allows a client to store encrypted data on a storage provider in such a way, that the client is able to search and retrieve the data selectively without the storage ... [more ▼]

Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) allows a client to store encrypted data on a storage provider in such a way, that the client is able to search and retrieve the data selectively without the storage provider learning the contents of the data or the words being searched for. Practical SSE schemes usually leak (sensitive) information during or after a query (e.g., the search pattern). Secure schemes on the other hand are not practical, namely they are neither efficient in the computational search complexity, nor scalable with large data sets. To achieve efficiency and security at the same time, we introduce the concept of distributed SSE (DSSE), which uses a query proxy in addition to the storage provider. We give a construction that combines an inverted index approach (for efficiency) with scrambling functions used in private information retrieval (PIR) (for security). The proposed scheme, which is entirely based on XOR operations and pseudo-random functions, is efficient and does not leak the search pattern. For instance, a secure search in an index over one million documents and 500 keywords is executed in less than 1 second. [less ▲]

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Peer Reviewed
See detailCryptanalysis of the LAKE Hash Family
Biryukov, Alex UL; Gauravaram, Praveen; Guo, Jian et al

in Fast Software Encryption (2009)

We analyse the security of the cryptographic hash function LAKE-256 proposed at FSE 2008 by Aumasson, Meier and Phan. By exploiting non-injectivity of some of the building primitives of LAKE, we show ... [more ▼]

We analyse the security of the cryptographic hash function LAKE-256 proposed at FSE 2008 by Aumasson, Meier and Phan. By exploiting non-injectivity of some of the building primitives of LAKE, we show three different collision and near-collision attacks on the compression function. The first attack uses differences in the chaining values and the block counter and finds collisions with complexity 2^{33}. The second attack utilizes differences in the chaining values and salt and yields collisions with complexity 2^{42}. The final attack uses differences only in the chaining values to yield near-collisions with complexity 2^{99}. All our attacks are independent of the number of rounds in the compression function. We illustrate the first two attacks by showing examples of collisions and near-collisions. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 99 (0 UL)