References of "Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno"
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See detailPatent office governance and patent examination quality
Picard, Pierre M. UL; van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno

E-print/Working paper (2013)

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper ... [more ▼]

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination process. A higher effort in the examination process enhances the patent holders' protection in the judicial system and strengthens the screening of innovations with small inventive steps. We compare the quality of the examination process for various objectives of patent offices. Patent examination quality is the highest in an office maximizing incentives to innovate and the lowest in that maximizing the number of granted patents. A rent-seeking patent office can provide good incentives to innovate if it does not set too high markups on fees. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 229 (125 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailPatent Office Governance and Patent System Quality
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno

in CEPR Discussion Papers (2011), 11-06

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent systems from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model ... [more ▼]

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent systems from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination processes. Various objectives of patent offices' governors are considered. We show that the quality of the patent system is maximal for the patent offices that maximises either the social welfare or its own proffit. Quality is lower for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of patent applications and even smaller for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of granted patents. A labor union improves examination quality and may compensate for the potentialy inappropriate objectives of patent office management. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 74 (3 UL)