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See detailThe role of goals in belief selection
Boella, Guido UL; Pereira, Célia Da Costa UL; Pigozzi, Gabriella UL et al

in Logic Journal of the IGPL (2009)

In this paper we consider the relation between beliefs and goals in agent theory. Beliefs play three roles in reasoning about goals: they play a role in the generation of unconditional desires from ... [more ▼]

In this paper we consider the relation between beliefs and goals in agent theory. Beliefs play three roles in reasoning about goals: they play a role in the generation of unconditional desires from conditional ones, they play a role in adoption of desires as goals, and they play a role in the selection of plans to achieve goals. In this paper we consider the role of goals in reasoning about beliefs. Though we assume that goals do not play a role in the belief generation problem, we argue that they play a role in the belief selection problem. We show the rationality of the use of goals in belief selection, in the sense that there are cases in which agents that take their goals into account in selecting a belief set from a set of alternatives outperform agents that do not do so. We also formally distinguish between the rational role of goals in belief selection and irrational wishful thinking. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 85 (0 UL)
Peer Reviewed
See detailWhat You should Believe
Boella, Guido UL; Pereira, Célia Da Costa UL; Pigozzi, Gabriella UL et al

in Proceedings of The 19th Belgian-Dutch Conference on Artificial Intelligence (BNAIC 2007) (2007)

Detailed reference viewed: 35 (0 UL)
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See detailChoosing Your Beliefs
Boella, Guido UL; Pereira, Célia Da Costa UL; Pigozzi, Gabriella UL et al

in Normative Multi-agent Systems (2007)

This paper presents and discusses a novel approach to indeterministic belief revision. An indeterministic belief revision operator assumes that, when an agent is confronted with a new piece of information ... [more ▼]

This paper presents and discusses a novel approach to indeterministic belief revision. An indeterministic belief revision operator assumes that, when an agent is confronted with a new piece of information, it can revise its belief sets in more than one way. We define a rational agent not only in terms of what it believes but also of what it desires and wants to achieve. Hence, we propose that the agent's goals play a role in the choice of (possibly) one of the several available revision options. Properties of the new belief revision mechanism are also investigated. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 28 (0 UL)