References of "Schwarz, Paloma"
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See detailHarmful Tax Competition from the European Union towards Third Countries?
Haslehner, Werner UL; Schwarz, Paloma

in Martín Jiménez, Adolfo (Ed.) The External Tax Strategy of the EU in a Post-BEPS Environment (2019)

The European Union does not have a harmonized – let alone centralized – tax system that offers specific tax incentives. It also does not explicitly regulate tax competition of its constituent parts (the ... [more ▼]

The European Union does not have a harmonized – let alone centralized – tax system that offers specific tax incentives. It also does not explicitly regulate tax competition of its constituent parts (the EU Member States) with third countries, but only regulates “internal tax competition” among them, through the mechanism of the Code of Conduct and, even more strongly, by prohibiting State aid from being granted through tax measures. The question asked by the title of this chapter thus seems to be easily answerable in the negative: since the European Union does not make external tax policies for its Member States and does not itself provide specific tax incentives, it is not an agent of tax competition. Consequently, it would be challenging to argue that the European Union engages in harmful tax competition towards third countries. Taking a broader view, however, the notion that the European Union may engage in harmful tax competition may not be so easily dismissed, as it takes regulatory action that impacts Member States as primary agents of tax competition in a variety of ways, which can either improve or reduce the Member States’ and, by extension the European Union’s competitive position vis-à-vis third countries. Such impact takes three different routes: (i) primary EU law, affecting the design of domestic tax incentives; (ii) secondary EU law, determining certain kinds of tax incentives; and (iii) soft-law instruments, affecting domestic tax design. This contribution aims at analysing these three routes of tax competition of the European Union in order to get a deeper understanding of the ways in which the European Union may be said to engage in harmful tax competition. Before the different models can be analysed in this light, however, it is first necessary to enquire into the nature of “harmful tax competition”, a term that is all too often used without a clear definition of its content. [less ▲]

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See detailMacht die Bekanntmachung zum Beihilfebegriff Steuerbeihilfen transparenter?
Haslehner, Werner UL; Schwarz, Paloma

in Jaeger, Thomas; Haslinger, Birgit (Eds.) Jahrbuch Beihilferecht 18 (2018)

The Commission's 2016 Notice on the Notion of Aid extensively covers the issue of tax measures constituting aid. This is a welcome development as it gives vital guidance to tax practice, which had been ... [more ▼]

The Commission's 2016 Notice on the Notion of Aid extensively covers the issue of tax measures constituting aid. This is a welcome development as it gives vital guidance to tax practice, which had been subject to increasing uncertainty in recent years in the area of tax aid. Due to the one-sided binding value of the notice, protected legitimate expectations are created for taxpayers to the extent that the Notice provides clear delimiting statements. Nevertheless, many of the interpretations of the Commission in the Notice are not based on case law, but rather the Commission's own views, which requires a critical examination of the positions taken by the Commission and their backing by the Court of Justice. [less ▲]

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See detail"LuxLeaks IV": Das Belgische Excess Profit Exemption Regime als steuerliche Beihilfe
Haslehner, Werner UL; Schwarz, Paloma

in Jaeger, Thomas; Haslinger, Birgit (Eds.) Beihilferecht Jahrbuch 2017 (2017)

The case under consideration in this contribution concerns the Belgian Excess Profit Exemption Regime, ruled to be illegal state aid by the Commission in 2016. Two questions arise from the case: First ... [more ▼]

The case under consideration in this contribution concerns the Belgian Excess Profit Exemption Regime, ruled to be illegal state aid by the Commission in 2016. Two questions arise from the case: First, what relevance the arm's length principle has under EU state aid law; second, whether the existence of "double non-taxation" (or so-called "white income") has any implications for a finding of state aid. The Commission takes the position that the arm's length principle is a necessary element of any Member State's corporate tax system as a consequence of the general equality principle underlying Article 107 TFEU. On the second question, the Commission's analysis is somewhat less unambiguous, but seems to clearly assign some relevance to the existence of double non-taxation. Both positions are reviewed critically in this contribution. [less ▲]

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