References of "Safronov, Mikhail"
     in
Bookmark and Share    
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailDeciding When To Decide: Collective Deliberation and Obstruction
Anesi, Vincent UL; Safronov, Mikhail

in International Economic Review (in press)

We study the impact of deliberation rules on collective learning and decision making in committees. In contrast to much of the existing literature, this paper makes a distinction between the final votes ... [more ▼]

We study the impact of deliberation rules on collective learning and decision making in committees. In contrast to much of the existing literature, this paper makes a distinction between the final votes over policy proposals and the cloture votes that bring them about. We show how deliberation rules can cause Pareto inefficient outcomes and failures to bring good proposals to a final vote, and how they affect the distribution of power among committee members in the deliberative process. We further show that deliberation rules are dynamically stable, even when they generate Pareto ineffcient outcomes. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 30 (1 UL)
Full Text
See detailCloturing Deliberation
Anesi, Vincent UL; Safronov, Mikhail

E-print/Working paper (2021)

We study how the institutional arrangements for ending deliberation --- the "cloture rules" --- interact with collective learning to affect the outcomes of decision making in committees. In contrast to ... [more ▼]

We study how the institutional arrangements for ending deliberation --- the "cloture rules" --- interact with collective learning to affect the outcomes of decision making in committees. In contrast to much of the previous literature on deliberative commit tees, this paper makes a distinction between the final votes over policy proposals and the cloture votes that bring them about. Using this approach, we explore how cloture rules influence the course of deliberation, the likelihood of inefficient deliberative outcomes, the circumstances surrounding failures to bring proposals to a final vote, and the distribution of power among committee members in the deliberative process. We also use our simple model to examine the issue of the stability of cloture rules, characterizing the rules that no coalition of committee members is able or willing to overturn. We show in particular that all cloture rules are dynamically stable. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 316 (26 UL)