References of "Ryan, Mark D"
     in
Bookmark and Share    
Full Text
See detailPrivacy and Security in an Age of Surveillance
Ryan, Peter UL; Preneel, Bart; Rogaway, Phillip et al

Report (2015)

The Snowden revelations have demonstrated that the US and other nations are amassing data about people's lives at an unprecedented scale. Furthermore, these revelations have shown that intelligence ... [more ▼]

The Snowden revelations have demonstrated that the US and other nations are amassing data about people's lives at an unprecedented scale. Furthermore, these revelations have shown that intelligence agencies are not only pursuing passive surveillance over the world's communication systems, but are also seeking to facilitate such surveillance by undermining the security of the internet and communications technologies. Thus the activities of these agencies threatens not only the rights of individual citizens but also the fabric of democratic society. Intelligence services do have a useful role to play in protecting society and for this need the capabilities and authority to perform targeted surveillance. But the scope of such surveillance must be strictly limited by an understanding of its costs as well as benefits, and it should not impinge on the privacy rights of citizens any more than necessary. Here we report on a recent Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop addressing these issues - a four-day gathering of experts from multiple disciplines connected with privacy and security. The meeting explored the scope of mass-surveillance and the deliberate undermining of the security of the internet, defined basic principles that should underlie needed reforms, and discussed the potential for technical, legal and regulatory means to help restore the security of the internet and stem infringement of human-rights by ubiquitous electronic surveillance. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 207 (2 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailPrivacy and Security in an Age of Surveillance
Preneel, Bart; Rogaway, Phillip; Ryan, Mark D. et al

in Dagstuhl Reports (2014), 4(9), 106-123

The Snowden revelations have demonstrated that the US and other nations are amassing data about people's lives at an unprecedented scale. Furthermore, these revelations have shown that intelligence ... [more ▼]

The Snowden revelations have demonstrated that the US and other nations are amassing data about people's lives at an unprecedented scale. Furthermore, these revelations have shown that intelligence agencies are not only pursuing passive surveillance over the world's communication systems, but are also seeking to facilitate such surveillance by undermining the security of the internet and communications technologies. Thus the activities of these agencies threatens not only the rights of individual citizens but also the fabric of democratic society. Intelligence services do have a useful role to play in protecting society and for this need the capabilities and authority to perform targeted surveillance. But the scope of such surveillance must be strictly limited by an understanding of its costs as well as benefits, and it should not impinge on the privacy rights of citizens any more than necessary. Here we report on a recent Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop addressing these issues - a four-day gathering of experts from multiple disciplines connected with privacy and security. The meeting explored the scope of mass-surveillance and the deliberate undermining of the security of the internet, defined basic principles that should underlie needed reforms, and discussed the potential for technical, legal and regulatory means to help restore the security of the internet and stem infringement of human-rights by ubiquitous electronic surveillance. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 398 (3 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailCaveat Coercitor: coercion-evidence in electronic voting
Ryan, Peter UL; Grewal, Gurchetan S.; Ryan, Mark D. et al

in 2013 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY (SP) (2013)

The balance between coercion-resistance, election verifiability and usability remains unresolved in remote electronic voting despite significant research over the last few years. We propose a change of ... [more ▼]

The balance between coercion-resistance, election verifiability and usability remains unresolved in remote electronic voting despite significant research over the last few years. We propose a change of perspective, replacing the requirement of coercion-resistance with a new requirement of coercion- evidence: there should be public evidence of the amount of coercion that has taken place during a particular execution of the voting system. We provide a formal definition of coercion-evidence that has two parts. Firstly, there should be a coercion-evidence test that can be performed against the bulletin board to accurately determine the degree of coercion that has taken place in any given run. Secondly, we require coercer independence, that is the ability of the voter to follow the protocol without being detected by the coercer. To show how coercion-evidence can be achieved, we propose a new remote voting scheme, Caveat Coercitor, and we prove that it satisfies coercion-evidence. Moreover, Caveat Coercitor makes weaker trust assumptions than other remote voting systems, such as JCJ/Civitas and Helios, and has better usability properties. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 109 (0 UL)