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   The argument from small improvement is a red herringRaleigh, Thomas  in Inquiry (2023) The much-discussed ‘Argument from Small Improvement’ has been advanced both as a reason to reject (tripartite) Completeness, one of the standard axioms of decision theory, and to accept the possibility of ... [more ▼] The much-discussed ‘Argument from Small Improvement’ has been advanced both as a reason to reject (tripartite) Completeness, one of the standard axioms of decision theory, and to accept the possibility of rationally incomparable choices. But this form of argument cannot be an effective basis for either of these conclusions, unless one already has some prior, independent reason to prefer Transitivity to Completeness as a constraint on rational preferences (or rational values). In particular, I show how a reverse argument from small improvement can be constructed, starting from the assumption of tripartite Completeness, to the conclusion that Transitivity fails. I conclude that this form of argument as it has been standardly presented in the literature is a kind of ‘red herring’. We can only make progress here by evaluating the reasons independent of either such argument to prefer one or other of Transitivity or Completeness. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 26 (0 UL)Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and ExternalismRaleigh, Thomas in Journal of Philosophy (2022), 119(11), 602-627 According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision ... [more ▼] According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties such as natural kinds, artefactual kinds, causal relations, linguistic meanings, and moral properties. An important dialectical tool in the debate between Rich and Sparse theorists is the so-called ‘method of phenomenal contrast’. I explore how this method of phenomenal contrast interacts with the sort of content-externalism made familiar by Putnam. I show that the possibility of Twin Earth style cases places important restrictions on the range of properties that the method of phenomenal contrast could plausibly apply to. Moreover, these restrictions would apply to some paradigmatically low-level properties as well as to some of the frequently advanced high-level properties. I also draw some general lessons about the different ways one might conceive of the relation between phenomenal character and representational content. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 54 (2 UL)Comments on SmithiesRaleigh, Thomas in Asian Journal of Philosophy (2022), 1(13), Detailed reference viewed: 84 (5 UL)Philosophy of Perception & Liberal NaturalismRaleigh, Thomas in Macarthur, David; De Caro, Mario (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Liberal Naturalism (2022) Detailed reference viewed: 132 (2 UL) XAI and philosophical work on explanation: A roadmapKnoks, Aleks ; Raleigh, Thomas in Proceedings of 1st Workshop on Bias, Ethical AI, Explainability and the Role of Logic and Logic Programming (2022), 3319 What Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) can do is impressive, yet they are notoriously opaque. Responding to the worries associated with this opacity, the field of XAI has produced a plethora of methods ... [more ▼] What Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) can do is impressive, yet they are notoriously opaque. Responding to the worries associated with this opacity, the field of XAI has produced a plethora of methods purporting to explain the workings of DNNs. Unsurprisingly, a whole host of questions revolves around the notion of explanation central to this field. This note provides a roadmap of the recent work that tackles these questions from the perspective of philosophical ideas on explanations and models in science. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 110 (6 UL)Familiar Properties and Phenomenal PropertiesRaleigh, Thomas in Analytic Philosophy (2022) Detailed reference viewed: 31 (1 UL)A New Anti-Expertise DilemmaRaleigh, Thomas in Synthese (2021), 199 Detailed reference viewed: 136 (14 UL)Perceptual Experience and Degrees of BeliefRaleigh, Thomas ; in Philosophical Quarterly (2021), 71(2), 378-406 Detailed reference viewed: 106 (1 UL)Visual Acquaintance, Action and the Explanatory GapRaleigh, Thomas in Synthese (2021), 198 Detailed reference viewed: 84 (2 UL)Plenty of room left for the DogmatistRaleigh, Thomas in Analysis (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 93 (2 UL)Science, Substance and Spatial AppearancesRaleigh, Thomas in Philosophical Studies (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 92 (3 UL) |
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