References of "Quaglia, Lucia"
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See detailThe difficult construction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme: a step too far in Banking Union?
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in Journal of Economic Policy Reform (2018), 21(3), 190-209

The German Government refused to accept the development of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) for Banking Union member states. Publicly, the German Government was preoccupied with the creation of ... [more ▼]

The German Government refused to accept the development of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) for Banking Union member states. Publicly, the German Government was preoccupied with the creation of a moral hazard that common funds would create for banks in those participating countries that had weak banking systems. This paper argues that to understand German moral hazard concerns it is necessary to look beyond the ideational – notably concerns stemming from German Ordo-liberalism – and focus on the existing national institutional arrangements that the German Government sought to protect. German moral hazard concerns stemmed from the fear that well-funded German deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) – especially those of small savings and cooperative banks – could be tapped to compensate for underfunded (and largely ex post funded) DGS in other member states. We thus demonstrate that the difficulties facing the construction of an EDIS owe to the weakness of the previously agreed harmonization of national DGS. This failure to harmonize schemes beyond a low minimal standard can be explained through an analysis focused on national systems. Different existing national DGS stem from the different configuration of national banking systems, the longstanding relationships among national banks and well-entrenched regulatory frameworks. [less ▲]

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See detailThe policy narratives of European capital markets union
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in Journal of European Public Policy (2018), 25(7), 990-1009

This paper examines the ‘making’ of Capital Markets Union (CMU) through the theoretical lens of ‘actor-centred constructivism’, by considering the ‘policy narratives’ that bureaucratic actors have ... [more ▼]

This paper examines the ‘making’ of Capital Markets Union (CMU) through the theoretical lens of ‘actor-centred constructivism’, by considering the ‘policy narratives’ that bureaucratic actors have employed strategically to promote the project. It is argued that two main narratives were articulated by the European Commission in order to mobilize the political support necessary to push forward CMU and reduce potential opposition to it. The first narrative was to boost the size and internal and external competitiveness of European Union capital markets. The second narrative was the increased funding to the real economy, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructural projects. The Commission used these narratives instrumentally in ‘framing’ CMU as a positive-sum game, rather than a zero-sum game with potential winners and losers. [less ▲]

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See detailBrexit and the Single European Financial Market
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in Journal of Common Market Studies (2017), 55(S1), 149164

Brexit raises a set of important questions with reference to the Single Market, especially in financial services. What are the implications of Brexit for the UK and its financial industry; and what are ... [more ▼]

Brexit raises a set of important questions with reference to the Single Market, especially in financial services. What are the implications of Brexit for the UK and its financial industry; and what are the implications of Brexit for the EU and the single financial market? This topic is examined in four consecutive steps. We first discuss the UK’s influence in the development of the single financial market, including EU financial regulation, over the past two decades – and thus both prior to, and after, the international financial crisis. This overview is necessary in order to grasp the potential implications of Brexit for the UK, the EU and their financial industries – examined in the second step. We then examine the so-called safeguards secured by the UK government from the EU in the run up to the Brexit referendum and the position of the UK’s financial industry during the Brexit campaign and after the referendum. Finally, we review the post-Brexit options available to manage the relationship between the UK and the EU, specifically with regard to finance. It is argued that that the UK has been a key player in the development of the single financial market, especially prior to the international financial crisis, and has greatly benefited from it. The – at times considerable – British influence made EU financial regulation more market-friendly and open to third countries than it would have been otherwise. The EU–UK agreement signed prior to the Brexit referendum contained several clauses concerning economic governance, including non-discrimination provisions for the financial industry based in the UK. However, these provisions mainly reflected the status quo and re-stated existing commitments. The City of London and British financial industry were mostly in the pro-Remain camp during the referendum campaign – albeit there were some noteworthy financial sector supporters of Brexit. Following the June referendum, the City unsuccessfully mobilized in order to retain full access to the single financial market – the alternative options were considerably less appealing for the UK financial industry. [less ▲]

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See detailThe Political Economy of European Banking Union
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

Book published by Oxford University Press (2016)

The establishment of Banking Union represents a major development in European economic governance and European integration history more generally. Banking Union is also significant because not all ... [more ▼]

The establishment of Banking Union represents a major development in European economic governance and European integration history more generally. Banking Union is also significant because not all European Union (EU) member states have joined, which has increased the trend towards differentiated integration in the EU, posing a major challenge to the EU as a whole and to the opt-out countries. This book is informed by two main empirical questions. Why was Banking Union - presented by proponents as a crucial move to 'complete' Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) - proposed only in 2012, over twenty years after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty? Why has a certain design for Banking Union been agreed and some elements of this design prioritized over others? A two-step explanation is articulated in this study. First, it explains why euro area member state governments moved to consider Banking Union by building on the concept of the 'financial trilemma', and examining the implications of the single currency for euro area member state banking systems. Second, it explains the design of Banking Union by examining the preferences of member state governments on the core components of Banking Union and developing a comparative political economy analysis focused on the configuration of national banking systems and varying national concern for the moral hazard facing banks and sovereigns created by euro level support mechanisms. [less ▲]

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See detailInternationalised banking, alternative banks and the Single Supervisory Mechanism
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in West European Politics (2016), 39(3), 438-61

This paper sets out to explain the preferences of the seven northern euro area member states on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning the threshold set for direct European Central Bank (ECB ... [more ▼]

This paper sets out to explain the preferences of the seven northern euro area member states on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning the threshold set for direct European Central Bank (ECB) control over bank supervision. Building on the concept of the ‘financial trilemma’, it argues that different bank internationalisation patterns in the seven northern member states explain different preferences on the transfer of supervisory powers over less significant banks to the ECB. In particular, the reach of internationalisation into a national banking system – notably the extent to which even smaller banks were exposed to foreign banking operations – is shown to be the core factor explaining different national preferences on threshold. In the five countries with a large number of small and parochial alternative (cooperative and savings) banks, it is necessary to examine the system-specific structures of these banks to explain better the reach of internationalisation and national preferences on the threshold. Determined German opposition to ECB supervision of smaller alternative banks is juxtaposed with either less hostile or more positive support of at least four other countries despite the important presence of small alternative banks. [less ▲]

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See detailThe ComparativePoliticalEconomyofBaselIIIinEurope
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in Policy and Society (2016), 35

The Basel III Accord was the centerpiece of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis, setting new capital requirements for internationally active banks. This paper explains the ... [more ▼]

The Basel III Accord was the centerpiece of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis, setting new capital requirements for internationally active banks. This paper explains the divergent preferences on Basel III of national regulators in three countries that approximate what are frequently presented as distinct varieties of capitalism in Europe — Germany, the United Kingdom and France. It is argued that national regulators setting post crisis capital requirements had to reconcile three inter-related and potentially conflicting objectives: banking sector stability, the competitiveness of national banks and short to medium term economic growth. The different national preferences on Basel III reflected how different national regulators defined and pursued these objectives, which in turn reflected the structure of national banking systems — specifically, systemic patterns of bank capital and bank-industry ties.     [less ▲]

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