![]() ; ; et al in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2022), 9(4), 787-852 Studying normative change has practical and theoretical interests. Changing legal rules poses interpretation problems to determine the content of legal rules. The question of interpretation is tightly ... [more ▼] Studying normative change has practical and theoretical interests. Changing legal rules poses interpretation problems to determine the content of legal rules. The question of interpretation is tightly linked to those of determining the validity and the ability to produce effects of legal rules. Different formal models of normative change seem better suited to capture these dimensions: the dimension of validity appears to be better captured by the AGM approach, whereas syntactic methods are better suited to model how rules’ effects are blocked or enabled. Historically, the AGM approach of belief revision (on which we focus in this chapter) was the first formal model of normative change. We provide a survey on the AGM approach along with the main criticisms made to it. We then turn to a formal analysis of normative change that combines AGM theory and input/output logic, allowing for a clear distinction between norms and obligations. Our approach addresses some of the difficulties of normative change, like the combination of constitutive and regulative rules (and the normative conflicts that may arise from such a combination), the revision and contraction of normative systems, as well as the contraction of normative systems that combine sets of constitutive and regulative rules. We end our chapter by highlighting and discussing some challenges and open problems of normative change in the AGM approach. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 34 (6 UL)![]() ; van der Torre, Leon ![]() in Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics (2018), 28(2-3), 189--217 Formal arguments are often represented by (support, conclusion) pairs, but in this paper we consider normative arguments represented by sequences of (brute, institutional, deontic) triples, where ... [more ▼] Formal arguments are often represented by (support, conclusion) pairs, but in this paper we consider normative arguments represented by sequences of (brute, institutional, deontic) triples, where constitutive norms derive institutional facts from brute facts, and regulative norms derive deontic facts like obligations and permissions from institutional facts. The institutional facts may be seen as the reasons explaining or warranting the deontic obligations and permissions, and therefore they can be attacked by other normative arguments too. We represent different aspects of normative reasoning by different kinds of consistency checks among these triples, and we use formal argumentation theory to resolve conflicts among such normative arguments. In particular, we introduce various requirements for arguing about norms concerning violations, contrary-to-duty obligations, dilemmas, conflict resolution and different kinds of norms, and we introduce a formal argumentation theory satisfying the requirements. In order to illustrate our framework, we introduce a running example based on university regulations for prospective and actual students. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 182 (16 UL)![]() ; van der Torre, Leon ![]() in IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications (2017) This article gives an overview of several challenges studied in deontic logic, with an emphasis on challenges involving agents. We start with traditional modal deontic logic using preferences to address ... [more ▼] This article gives an overview of several challenges studied in deontic logic, with an emphasis on challenges involving agents. We start with traditional modal deontic logic using preferences to address the challenge of contrary-toduty reasoning, and STIT theory addressing the challenges of non-deterministic actions, moral luck and procrastination. Then we turn to alternative normbased deontic logics detaching obligations from norms to address the challenge of Jørgensen’s dilemma, including the question how to derive obligations from a normative system when agents cannot assume that other agents comply with their norms. We discuss also some traditional challenges from the viewpoint of normative systems: when a set of norms may be termed ‘coherent’, how to deal with normative conflicts, how to combine normative systems and traditional deontic logic, how various kinds of permission can be accommodated, how meaning postulates and counts-as conditionals can be taken into account,how sets of norms may be revised and merged, and how normative systems can be combined with game theory. The normative systems perspective means that norms, not ideality or preference, should take the central position in deontic semantics, and that a semantics that represents norms explicitly provides a helpful tool for analysing, clarifying and solving the problems of deontic logic. We focus on the challenges rather than trying to give full coverage of related work, for which we refer to the handbook of deontic logic and normative systems. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 157 (17 UL)![]() ; ; et al in Social Choice and Welfare (2017), 48(2), 327--356 The literature on judgment aggregation is moving from studying impossibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific judgment aggregation rules. Here we give a structured list of ... [more ▼] The literature on judgment aggregation is moving from studying impossibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific judgment aggregation rules. Here we give a structured list of most rules that have been proposed and studied recently in the literature, together with various properties of such rules. We first focus on the majority-preservation property, which generalizes Condorcet-consistency, and identify which of the rules satisfy it. We study the inclusion relationships that hold between the rules. Finally, we consider two forms of unanimity, monotonicity, homogeneity, and reinforcement, and we identify which of the rules satisfy these properties. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 178 (6 UL) |
||