![]() ; Picard, Pierre M ![]() in Journal of Regional Science (2014) We study how the level of trade costs and the intensity of competition interact to explain the nature and intensity of trade within a given industry and the location of firms across countries. As trade ... [more ▼] We study how the level of trade costs and the intensity of competition interact to explain the nature and intensity of trade within a given industry and the location of firms across countries. As trade costs decrease from very high to very low values, the global economy moves from autarky to two-way trade, through one-way trade from the larger to the smaller region. By exploring the intensive and extensive margins of exports, we investigate how the intensity of trade reacts to the degree of competitiveness. Furthermore, when firms are free to change location, they flow from the small to the large country, and the larger country is always a net exported on the manufactured good. Firms located in the big country have a bigger size than those located in the small one. Under one-way trade, the relocation of firms changes their attitude toward export. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 169 (15 UL)![]() Picard, Pierre M. ![]() in Regional Science and Urban Economics (2012), 42(6), 961-974 In this paper we build an economic geography model where rms sell product varieties with heterogenous demands. We show that rms selling the products with higher demands select to set up their plants in ... [more ▼] In this paper we build an economic geography model where rms sell product varieties with heterogenous demands. We show that rms selling the products with higher demands select to set up their plants in larger countries. Larger countries do not only get better access to more varieties but also to the most demanded and valuable ones. The impact of such a spatial selection on fi rms location choice depends on the skewness of the distribution of demand intensity across varieties. In a model where only capital moves across regions, demand heterogeneity generally diminishes the amount of capital invested in the larger country. In a model where the work force moves across regions, demand heterogeneity is shown to eliminate dramatic changes in the location patterns and to result in the asymmetric dispersion of workers, rather their symmetric dispersion or complete agglomeration in a specic region. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 120 (7 UL)![]() ; Picard, Pierre M. ![]() E-print/Working paper (2011) We study how the level of trade costs and the intensity of competition can explain the existence of two-way, one-way or no trade within the same industry. As trade costs decrease from very high to very ... [more ▼] We study how the level of trade costs and the intensity of competition can explain the existence of two-way, one-way or no trade within the same industry. As trade costs decrease from very high to very low values, the economy moves from autarky to a regime of two-way trade, through a regime of one-way trade from the larger to the smaller country. Trade is less likely when the economy gets more competitive. Finally once capital is mobile across countries, the market delivers an outcome in which capital is too much concentrated in the large country. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 52 (2 UL)![]() ; Picard, Pierre M. ![]() in Journal of International Economics (2010), 82(2), 230-237 Empirical research on strategic alliances has focused on the idea that alliance partners are selected on the basis of social capital considerations. In this paper we emphasize instead the role of ... [more ▼] Empirical research on strategic alliances has focused on the idea that alliance partners are selected on the basis of social capital considerations. In this paper we emphasize instead the role of complementary knowledge stocks (broadly defined) in partner selection, arguing not only that knowledge complementarity should not be overlooked, but that it may be the true causal force behind alliance formation. To marshal evidence on this point, we design a simple model of partner selection in which firms ally for the purpose of learning and innovating, and in doing so create an industry network. We abstract completely from network-based structural and strategic motives for partner selection and focus instead on the idea that firms’ knowledge bases must “fit” in order for joint leaning and innovation to be possible, and thus for an alliance to be feasible. The striking result is that while containing no social capital considerations, this simple model replicates the firm conduct, network structure, and contingent effects of network position on performance observed and discussed in the empirical literature. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 126 (5 UL)![]() ; Picard, Pierre M. ![]() E-print/Working paper (2010) In this paper we study how the trade costs and the intensity of competition can explain the existence of bilateral trade, unilateral trade and no trade within an industry. We show as trade costs decrease ... [more ▼] In this paper we study how the trade costs and the intensity of competition can explain the existence of bilateral trade, unilateral trade and no trade within an industry. We show as trade costs decrease from very high to very low values, the global economy moves from autarky to a regime of bilateral trade, through a regime of unilateral trade from the larger to the smaller country. Bilateral or unilateral trade is less likely when the global economy gets more competitive. Finally, the market delivers an outcome in which capital is too much concentrated in the larger country. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 54 (3 UL) |
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