References of "Mauw, Sjouke 50002343"
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See detailAttribute evaluation on attack trees with incomplete information
Buldas, Ahto; Gadyatskaya, Olga UL; Lenin, Aleksandr et al

in Computers and Security (2020), 88(101630),

Attack trees are considered a useful tool for security modelling because they support qualitative as well as quantitative analysis. The quantitative approach is based on values associated to each node in ... [more ▼]

Attack trees are considered a useful tool for security modelling because they support qualitative as well as quantitative analysis. The quantitative approach is based on values associated to each node in the tree, expressing, for instance, the minimal cost or probability of an attack. Current quantitative methods for attack trees allow the analyst to, based on an initial assignment of values to the leaf nodes, derive the values of the higher nodes in the tree. In practice, however, it shows to be very difficult to obtain reliable values for all leaf nodes. The main reasons are that data is only available for some of the nodes, that data is available for intermediate nodes rather than for the leaf nodes, or even that the available data is inconsistent. We address these problems by developing a generalisation of the standard bottom-up calculation method in three ways. First, we allow initial attributions of non-leaf nodes. Second, we admit additional relations between attack steps beyond those provided by the underlying attack tree semantics. Third, we support the calculation of an approximative solution in case of inconsistencies. We illustrate our method, which is based on constraint programming, by a comprehensive case study. [less ▲]

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See detailÆGIS: Shielding Vulnerable Smart Contracts Against Attacks
Ferreira Torres, Christof UL; Steichen, Mathis UL; Norvill, Robert UL et al

in Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS ’20), October 5–9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan (2020)

In recent years, smart contracts have suffered major exploits, cost- ing millions of dollars. Unlike traditional programs, smart contracts are deployed on a blockchain. As such, they cannot be modified ... [more ▼]

In recent years, smart contracts have suffered major exploits, cost- ing millions of dollars. Unlike traditional programs, smart contracts are deployed on a blockchain. As such, they cannot be modified once deployed. Though various tools have been proposed to detect vulnerable smart contracts, the majority fails to protect vulnera- ble contracts that have already been deployed on the blockchain. Only very few solutions have been proposed so far to tackle the issue of post-deployment. However, these solutions suffer from low precision and are not generic enough to prevent any type of attack. In this work, we introduce ÆGIS, a dynamic analysis tool that protects smart contracts from being exploited during runtime. Its capability of detecting new vulnerabilities can easily be extended through so-called attack patterns. These patterns are written in a domain-specific language that is tailored to the execution model of Ethereum smart contracts. The language enables the description of malicious control and data flows. In addition, we propose a novel mechanism to streamline and speed up the process of managing attack patterns. Patterns are voted upon and stored via a smart contract, thus leveraging the benefits of tamper-resistance and transparency provided by the blockchain. We compare ÆGIS to current state-of-the-art tools and demonstrate that our solution achieves higher precision in detecting attacks. Finally, we perform a large-scale analysis on the first 4.5 million blocks of the Ethereum blockchain, thereby confirming the occurrences of well reported and yet unreported attacks in the wild. [less ▲]

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See detailAttack-Tree Series: A Case for Dynamic Attack Tree Analysis
Gadyatskaya, Olga UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL

in Proc.\ 6th International Workshop on Graphical Models for Security (GraMSec'19) (2020)

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See detailPost-collusion security and distance bounding
Mauw, Sjouke UL; Smith, Zachary Daniel UL; Trujillo Rasua, Rolando UL et al

in Post-collusion security and distance bounding (2019, November 11)

Verification of cryptographic protocols is traditionally built upon the assumption that participants have not revealed their long-term keys. However, in some cases, participants might collude to defeat ... [more ▼]

Verification of cryptographic protocols is traditionally built upon the assumption that participants have not revealed their long-term keys. However, in some cases, participants might collude to defeat some security goals, without revealing their long-term secrets. We develop a model based on multiset rewriting to reason about collusion in security protocols. We introduce the notion of postcollusion security, which verifies security properties claimed in sessions initiated after collusion occurred. We use post-collusion security to analyse terrorist fraud on protocols for securing physical proximity, known as distance-bounding protocols. In a terrorist fraud attack, agents collude to falsely prove proximity, whilst no further false proximity proof can be issued without further collusion. Our definitions and the Tamarin prover are used to develop a modular framework for verification of distance-bounding protocols that accounts for all types of attack from literature. We perform a survey of over 25 protocols, which include industrial protocols such as Mastercard’s contactless payment PayPass and NXP’s MIFARE Plus with proximity check. For the industrial protocols we confirm attacks, propose fixes, and deliver computer-verifiable security proofs of the repaired versions [less ▲]

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See detailBreaking Unlinkability of the ICAO 9303 Standard for e-Passports using Bisimilarity
Horne, Ross James UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL; Smith, Zachary Daniel UL et al

in Breaking Unlinkability of the ICAO 9303 Standard for e-Passports using Bisimilarity (2019, September 23)

We clear up confusion surrounding privacy claims about the ICAO 9303 standard for e-passports. The ICAO 9303 standard includes a Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol that should protect the user from being ... [more ▼]

We clear up confusion surrounding privacy claims about the ICAO 9303 standard for e-passports. The ICAO 9303 standard includes a Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol that should protect the user from being traced from one session to another. While it is well known that there are attacks on BAC, allowing an attacker to link multiple uses of the same passport, due to differences in implementation; there still remains confusion about whether there is an attack on unlinkability directly on the BAC protocol as specified in the ICAO 9303 standard. This paper clarifies the nature of the debate, and sources of potential confusion. We demonstrate that the original privacy claims made are flawed, by uncovering attacks on a strong formulation of unlinkability. We explain why the use of the bisimilarity equivalence technique is essential for uncovering our attacks. We also clarify what assumptions lead to proofs of formulations of unlinkability using weaker notions of equivalence. Furthermore, we propose a fix for BAC within the scope of the standard, and prove that it is correct, again using a state-of-the-art approach to bisimilarity. [less ▲]

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See detailRobust active attacks on social graphs
Mauw, Sjouke UL; Ramirez Cruz, Yunior UL; Trujillo Rasua, Rolando UL

in Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery (2019), 33(5), 1357-1392

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See detailAttack-Tree Series: A Case for Dynamic Attack Tree Analysis
Mauw, Sjouke UL; Gadyatskaya, Olga

in Proc. 6th International Workshop on Graphical Models for Security (GraMSec'19) (2019)

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See detailProceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Security and Trust Management (STM 2019)
Mauw, Sjouke UL; Conti, Mauro

Book published by Springer (2019)

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See detailSemi-automatically Augmenting Attack Trees using an Annotated Attack Tree Library
Jhawar, Ravi UL; Lounis, Karim UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL et al

in Katsikas, Sokratis; Alcaraz, Cristina (Eds.) Security and Trust Management. STM 2018. (2018, October)

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See detailAutomated Identification of Desynchronisation Attacks on Shared Secrets
Mauw, Sjouke UL; Smith, Zachary Daniel UL; Toro Pozo, Jorge Luis UL et al

in Automated Identification of Desynchronisation Attacks on Shared Secrets (2018, September)

Key-updating protocols are a class of communication protocol that aim to increase security by having the participants change encryption keys between protocol executions. However, such protocols can be ... [more ▼]

Key-updating protocols are a class of communication protocol that aim to increase security by having the participants change encryption keys between protocol executions. However, such protocols can be vulnerable to desynchronisation attacks, a denial of service attack in which the agents are tricked into updating their keys improperly, so that they are no longer able to communicate. In this work we introduce a method that can be used to automatically verify (or falsify) resistance to desynchronisation attacks for a range of protocols. This approach is then used to identify previously unreported vulnerabilities in two published RFID grouping protocols. [less ▲]

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See detailAnonymising social graphs in the presence of active attackers
Mauw, Sjouke UL; Ramirez Cruz, Yunior UL; Trujillo Rasua, Rolando UL

in Transactions on Data Privacy (2018), 11(2), 169-198

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See detailThe Attacker Does not Always Hold the Initiative: Attack Trees with External Refinement
Horne, Ross James UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL; Tiu, Alwen

in Proc.\ 5th International Workshop on Graphical Models for Security (GraMSec'18) (2018, July 08)

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See detailProceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Graphical Models for Security (GraMSec 2017)
Liu, Peng; Mauw, Sjouke UL; Stolen, Ketil

Book published by Springer (2018)

This book constitutes revised selected papers from the 4th International Workshop on Graphical Models for Security, GraMSec 2017, held in Santa Barbara, CA, USA, in August 2017. The 5 full and 4 short ... [more ▼]

This book constitutes revised selected papers from the 4th International Workshop on Graphical Models for Security, GraMSec 2017, held in Santa Barbara, CA, USA, in August 2017. The 5 full and 4 short papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 19 submissions. The book also contains one invited paper from the WISER project. The contributions deal with the latest research and developments on graphical models for security. [less ▲]

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See detailDistance-Bounding Protocols: Verification without Time and Location
Mauw, Sjouke UL; Smith, Zachary Daniel UL; Toro Pozo, Jorge Luis UL et al

in Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), San Francisco 21-23 May 2018 (2018)

Distance-bounding protocols are cryptographic protocols that securely establish an upper bound on the physi- cal distance between the participants. Existing symbolic verification frameworks for distance ... [more ▼]

Distance-bounding protocols are cryptographic protocols that securely establish an upper bound on the physi- cal distance between the participants. Existing symbolic verification frameworks for distance-bounding protocols consider timestamps and the location of agents. In this work we introduce a causality-based characterization of secure distance-bounding that discards the notions of time and location. This allows us to verify the correct- ness of distance-bounding protocols with standard pro- tocol verification tools. That is to say, we provide the first fully automated verification framework for distance- bounding protocols. By using our framework, we con- firmed known vulnerabilities in a number of protocols and discovered unreported attacks against two recently published protocols. [less ▲]

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See detailConditional adjacency anonymity in social graphs under active attacks
Mauw, Sjouke UL; Ramirez Cruz, Yunior UL; Trujillo Rasua, Rolando UL

in Knowledge and Information Systems (2018)

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See detailRefinement-Aware Generation of Attack Trees
Gadyatskaya, Olga UL; Ravi, Jhawar; Mauw, Sjouke UL et al

in Livraga, Giovanni; Mitchell, Chris J. (Eds.) Security and Trust Management - 13th International Workshop (2017, September)

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See detailReverse Bayesian poisoning: How to use spam filters to manipulate online elections
Jonker, Hugo; Mauw, Sjouke UL; Schmitz, Tom UL

in Krimmer, L. (Ed.) Proc. 2nd International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting (2017)

E-voting literature has long recognised the threat of denial-of-service attacks: as attacks that (partially) disrupt the services needed to run the voting system. Such attacks violate availability ... [more ▼]

E-voting literature has long recognised the threat of denial-of-service attacks: as attacks that (partially) disrupt the services needed to run the voting system. Such attacks violate availability. Thankfully, they are typically easily detected. We identify and investigate a denial-of-service attack on a voter's spam filters, which is not so easily detected: reverse Bayesian poisoning, an attack that lets the attacker silently suppress mails from the voting system. Reverse Bayesian poisoning can disenfranchise voters in voting systems which rely on emails for essential communication (such as voter invitation or credential distribution). The attacker stealthily trains the voter's spam filter by sending spam mails crafted to include keywords from genuine mails from the voting system. To test the potential effect of reverse Bayesian poisoning, we took keywords from the Helios voting system's email templates and poisoned the Bogofilter spam filter using these keywords. Then we tested how genuine Helios mails are classified. Our experiments show that reverse Bayesian poisoning can easily suppress genuine emails from the Helios voting system. [less ▲]

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See detailA security perspective on publication metrics
Jonker, Hugo; Mauw, Sjouke UL

in Stajano, F. (Ed.) Proc. 25th Security Protocols Workshop (2017)

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See detailModel-driven situational awareness for moving target defense
Jhawar, Ravi UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL

in Scanlon, Marc; Le-Khac, Nhien-An (Eds.) Proc. 16th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (2017)

Moving Target Defense (MTD) presents dynamically changing attack surfaces and system configurations to attackers. This approach decreases the success probabilities of attacks and increases attacker's ... [more ▼]

Moving Target Defense (MTD) presents dynamically changing attack surfaces and system configurations to attackers. This approach decreases the success probabilities of attacks and increases attacker's workload since she must continually re-assess, re-engineer and re-launch her attacks. Existing research has provided a number of MTD techniques but approaches for gaining situational awareness and deciding when/how to apply these techniques are not well studied. In this paper, we present a conceptual framework that closely integrates a set of models with the system and obtains up-to-date situational awareness following the OODA loop methodology. To realize the framework, as the first step, we propose a modelling approach that provides insights about the dynamics between potential attacks and defenses, impact of attacks and adaptations on the system, and the state of the system. Based on these models, we demonstrate techniques to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of MTD and show how to formulate decision-making problems. [less ▲]

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See detailSemantics for specialising attack trees based on linear logic
Horne, Ross James UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL; Tiu, Alwen

in Fundamenta Informaticae (2017), 153(1-2), 57-86

Attack trees profile the sub-goals of the proponent of an attack. Attack trees have a variety of semantics depending on the kind of question posed about the attack, where questions are captured by an ... [more ▼]

Attack trees profile the sub-goals of the proponent of an attack. Attack trees have a variety of semantics depending on the kind of question posed about the attack, where questions are captured by an attribute domain. We observe that one of the most general semantics for attack trees, the multiset semantics, coincides with a semantics expressed using linear logic propositions. The semantics can be used to compare attack trees to determine whether one attack tree is a specialisation of another attack tree. Building on these observations, we propose two new semantics for an extension of attack trees named causal attack trees. Such attack trees are extended with an operator capturing the causal order of sub-goals in an attack. These two semantics extend the multiset semantics to sets of series-parallel graphs closed under certain graph homomorphisms, where each semantics respects a class of attribute domains. We define a sound logical system with respect to each of these semantics, by using a recently introduced extension of linear logic, called MAV , featuring a non-commutative operator. The non-commutative operator models causal dependencies in causal attack trees. Similarly to linear logic for attack trees, implication defines a decidable preorder for specialising causal attack trees that soundly respects a class of attribute domains. [less ▲]

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