![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() Article for general public (2023) Detailed reference viewed: 54 (3 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() Conference given outside the academic context (2023) How are contracts typically used in HREDD? Does contracting-as-usual support effective HREDD -- why / why not? What do the new laws say about contracts and the role they should play in HREDD? Specifically ... [more ▼] How are contracts typically used in HREDD? Does contracting-as-usual support effective HREDD -- why / why not? What do the new laws say about contracts and the role they should play in HREDD? Specifically, what do the new laws say about contracts and HREDD-related liability? Against this backdrop, what would you advise in-scope companies to include in their contracts to meet the new legal requirements? Article 12 of the EU’s proposed Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive indicates that the European Commission will develop guidance on model contractual clauses that companies can use to inform their own contracting practices. What are some key principles of due diligence-aligned contracting that you would like to see reflected in this guidance? More generally, what improvements are needed for contracts to better support HREDD regimes that effectively prevent and remedy adverse impacts? [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 232 (3 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() Article for general public (2023) Detailed reference viewed: 29 (2 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() Article for general public (2022) Detailed reference viewed: 32 (1 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() Scientific Conference (2022, November 29) Detailed reference viewed: 34 (1 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() in Kabarak Journal of Law and Ethics (2022), 6(1), 67-98 To date, almost 74 years since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the UDHR), the tensions between universalism and cultur-al relativism in the field of human rights, whose ... [more ▼] To date, almost 74 years since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the UDHR), the tensions between universalism and cultur-al relativism in the field of human rights, whose provenance can be traced back to the debates surrounding the drafting and adoption of the UDHR, still linger on, playing out on the national stage in countries such as Kenya. At its core, universalism argues that all human rights inhere in all individ-uals without distinction, and that they must stand even when in when in opposition to established cultural practices. In contrast, cultural relativism holds that no particular culture is superior to another, and centers on the need for forbearance and respect towards each culture to avoid imperialist tendencies of imposing beliefs. This paper argues that these binary ideolog-ical viewpoints are magnified in the context of female genital mutilation. Through an analysis of the case of Tatu Kamau v Attorney General & 2 others; Equality Now & 9 others (Interested Parties);Katiba Institute & another (amicus curiae) [2021] eKLR, it is proposed that a cultural ap-proach is needed in addition to legal measures in place to combat the practice. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 39 (6 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() in Journal of Human Rights Practice (2022), 14(1), 108-127 Article 33(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities provides for the establishment and designation of independent monitor- ing mechanisms charged with the promotion ... [more ▼] Article 33(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities provides for the establishment and designation of independent monitor- ing mechanisms charged with the promotion, protection and monitoring of its im- plementation. In numerous States parties, National Human Rights Institutions have been designated as Article 33(2) institutions, either individually or in co-ordination with other bodies, and have consequently made effective contributions to the reporting and inquiry procedures of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Drawing from experimentalist governance theory, this contribution interrogates whether, and to what extent, this dialogue between locally placed actors and institutions (such as National Human Rights Institutions) on the one hand, and internationally situated actors and institutions (such as the Committee) on the other, has the potential to bolster the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. At its core, experimentalism proffers a nor- matively attractive vision of how broadly agreed upon goals can be brought to life in a multi-level setting, such as the monitoring mechanism contemplated by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities with its unique role and defini- tion for both international and national actors. By analysing Article 33 through an experimentalist governance lens, the contribution thus hopes to highlight a rou- tinely neglected or underestimated aspect of the human rights treaty system, that is, the iterative and dynamic interaction between locally situated actors and institutions and internationally situated actors and institutions, and bring to light what this por- tends for the Convention’s implementation in reality. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 33 (6 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() Speeches/Talks (2022) Detailed reference viewed: 27 (0 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() Speeches/Talks (2022) Detailed reference viewed: 30 (0 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() in Nigerian Yearbook of International Law (2021), 2 The deployment of the minimum core concept in the sphere of Economic and Social Rights (hereinafter ESRs) can be attributed to the treaty body charged with the implementation of the International Covenant ... [more ▼] The deployment of the minimum core concept in the sphere of Economic and Social Rights (hereinafter ESRs) can be attributed to the treaty body charged with the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (hereinafter ICESCR). This treaty body, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter CESCR) first adopted the minimum core concept in 1990 in its General Comment No. 3 on the Nature of State Obligations [UNCESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of State Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1 of the Covenant), 14 December 1990, E/1991/23 (Hereinafter General Comment No. 3)]. The Committee averred that a failure on their part to introduce such a minimum core obligation would have amounted to depriving the ICESCR of its raison d’être. Since the inception of this concept however, numerous criticisms have been levelled against its normative and conceptual foundations as well as its implementation in practice. This article intends to contribute to this critical reflection on the prospects and challenges of the minimum core concept by utilizing a Third World Approaches to International Law (Hereinafter TWAIL) lens to critique the application of the concept to the Third World. The Article is divided into five sections. Sections 1 and 2 briefly sketch the contours of TWAIL as a critical school of thought, and focus on highlighting its application particularly in the area of international human rights law. Section 3 thereafter takes up the task of tracing the origins and utilization of the minimum core concept by the CESCR in its assessment of compliance with the ICESCR. The penultimate Sect. 4 undertakes an ambitious critical analysis of the minimum core concept from a TWAIL perspective. The paper concludes with Sect. 5 which offers a reconceptualized application of the minimum core concept potentially capable of alleviating the TWAIL concerns raised in earlier sections of the paper. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 28 (2 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() in Baade, Björnstjern; Burchardt, Dana; Feihle, Prisca (Eds.) et al Cynical International Law? Abuse and Circumvention in Public International and European Law (2021) Despite a promising start in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, economic and social rights still retain a second-class status in most national jurisdictions. What explains this reticence with ... [more ▼] Despite a promising start in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, economic and social rights still retain a second-class status in most national jurisdictions. What explains this reticence with which economic and social rights are (still) regarded? This chapter analyses how the sceptical gaze through which states view economic and social rights legitimises (or attempts to legitimise) government failures to provide for those members of their populace who are in most desperate need, and (unsuccessfully) masks the self-interest that pervades most of international law. The chapter commences with a brief introduction and subsequently proceeds in three subsequent parts. Section 2 demonstrates that cynicism was used as a sword to pierce the normative foundations of economic and social rights generally, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights particularly in the early days both before and after its adoption leading to economic and social rights’ lower status in the human rights family; Section 3 posits that cynicism has been relied upon as a shield to offer errant states a defence for not meeting their obligations under both international and national (constitutional) economic and social rights norms; and finally Section 4 argues that a certain amount of cynicism is inherent in the history of economic and social rights and how they advanced through the ages, but more optimistically that a light at the end of the tunnel exists because contemporary developments point to less rather than more cynicism in the area of economic and social rights in today’s world. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 24 (4 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() in Goettingen Journal of International Law (2021), 12(1), 1-35 We live in a world in crisis. These crises are experienced globally, regionally, by individual States and mostly by individuals themselves. Despite our differences, we are all united by crisis. However ... [more ▼] We live in a world in crisis. These crises are experienced globally, regionally, by individual States and mostly by individuals themselves. Despite our differences, we are all united by crisis. However, adopting a regional outlook, this paper focuses on Europe, which,like much of the rest of the world, has in recent times been buffeted by multiple crises ranging from the financial and economic crisis that begun in 2008, to the climate change crisis, to the migrant and refugee crisis, to the Brexit crisis, to the COVID-19 pandemic that has rocked the entire globe. In times of crisis, it is commonplace to turn to legal and institutional frameworks in the hopes of finding some reprieve. Within Europe, one such institution is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This Court, also known as the Strasbourg court, was established in 1959 under Article 19 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Despite its primarily Civil and Political Rights (CPRs) mandate, the ECtHR has in numerous cases proven to be fertile ground for planting the seeds of Economic and Social Rights (ESRs) protection,1 which is/was inevitable, given the widely accepted indivisible, interdependent and interrelated nature of all human rights, whether CPRs or ESRs. The ECtHR explicates that “the Convention is a living instrument which […] must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.” In the present day conditions of numerous crises that have only exacerbated the already precarious conditions of numerous vulnerable rightsholders in the family of European States, the question then becomes what jurisprudential trends, prospects and pitfalls exist for the ECtHR in its dynamic interpretation of the ECHR to include ESRs. In seeking answers to this question, this paper analyzes the ESRs jurisprudence of the ECtHR with the intention of illuminating how the Court has, and ought to utilize its institutional role as an enforcer of human rights in general and ESRs in particular in the quest to mitigate the effects on rightsholders, of the crises being experienced within Europe. At the heart of this inquiry lies the assertion that in line with the ECtHR’s ESRs jurisprudence thus far, which evinces a willingness on the part of the Court to vindicate ESRs in order to bring these rights to life for the vulnerable rightsholders who need them the most, the myriad crises currently plaguing Europe continue to create opportunities for the ECtHR to craft a principled and consistent ESRs jurisprudence while simultaneously respecting the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the respective European States. This paper does not analyze State responses under Article 15 of the ECHR, which specifically allows the High Contracting Parties to derogate from their obligations under the Convention in times of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Rather, the analysis will be restricted to the ESRs jurisprudence of the ECtHR in times of the specific crises outlined below and where the States in question have not made an Article 15 derogation. The paper will proceed in three parts. Part A will give a brief overview of how the ECtHR has vindicated ESRs through its interpretation of the primarily CPRs found in the ECHR. Part B will thereafter briefly analyze three specific crises that have shaped the more recent ESRs jurisprudence of the Court: the financial and economic crisis, the migrant and refugee crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, Part C will offer some tentative recommendations on the way forward, arguing that while some progress has been made by the ECtHR in centering ESRs as a very necessary part of its response to contemporary European and global crises, the battle is far from won. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 32 (0 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() in ZaöRV: Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2021), 81(2), 497-532 In the last ten or so years a ‘new kid on the block’ has arrived on the Business and Human Rights scene; that is, the use of domestic legislation to regulate theGlobal Value Chains (GVCs) of Transnational ... [more ▼] In the last ten or so years a ‘new kid on the block’ has arrived on the Business and Human Rights scene; that is, the use of domestic legislation to regulate theGlobal Value Chains (GVCs) of Transnational Corporations (TNCs). The intention behind these so called ‘supply chain laws’ is to (begin to) hold TNCs accountable for violations of human rights and environmental norms within the context of their operations. This need for national legislation can be partly attributed to the fact that the international level has been plagued with paralysis in attempting to come up with binding rules to regulate the behaviour of TNCs.1 In fact, it is only as recently as August 2020 that the Second Revised Draft of the binding treaty on TNCs and human rights has been completed and awaits next steps. Given this regulatory gap in the international legal sphere, the mushrooming of domestic supply chain laws in diverse countries such as the United States of America (USA), France and Germany (which on 11 June 2021 finally passed a corporate due diligence in supply chains law, the ‘Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz – LkSG’) sets the stage for this paper’s analysis of these laws in light of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), a critical scholarly network that offers a distinctive way of thinking about international law. ‘TWAIL scholarship has addressed multiple issues related to society, politics, identity, and economics – with an underlying commitment to democratic values and concerns in relations within and between the Third World and developed countries’ and (as will be shown in subsequent sections of this article) can and should be extended to an analysis of domestic supply chain laws that are ‘made in the First World’. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 113 (1 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() Article for general public (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 15 (1 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() in East African Community, Law Journal (2020), 1(1), 33-50 Caroline Lichuma and Florence Shako posit that the goal of any modern insolvency regime is to salvage financially viable companies or to provide individuals in financial distress with breathing room ... [more ▼] Caroline Lichuma and Florence Shako posit that the goal of any modern insolvency regime is to salvage financially viable companies or to provide individuals in financial distress with breathing room without or before subjecting them to the liquidation or bankruptcy processes. The application of the Insolvency Act 2015 and the accompanying Insolvency Regulations of 2016, they note, is bound to have a more than positive change in the Kenyan insolvency regime. In that context, the rescue procedures should be adequately utilized in order to ensure a lasting change in the administration of the insolvency regime in Kenya. It is hoped that there will be no need to be ‘rescued from rescue’ procedures as a result of misuse or abuse of these mechanisms. They convey optimistsm that under the aegis of this fortified rescue culture, many deserving debtors in Kenya, especially companies worth saving, will live on to trade and enrich the country. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 19 (2 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() E-print/Working paper (2019) Material inequality or (extreme) economic inequality has been touted as one of the greatest challenges of the twenty-first century. Wealth is “hemorrhaging upwards” rather than “trickling down.” In a ... [more ▼] Material inequality or (extreme) economic inequality has been touted as one of the greatest challenges of the twenty-first century. Wealth is “hemorrhaging upwards” rather than “trickling down.” In a world where the rich get richer, the poor get poorer, and the inequality gap in income and wealth continues intensifying at an alarming pace, there exists an “inequality explosion” that threatens the very fabric of our global society. While economic inequality and questions of (re)distribution of wealth and income have traditionally been examined within the spheres of development law and political economy, I argue that a human rights based approach that contains economic and social rights (hereinafter, ESRs) at its core is capable of mitigating economic inequality. International human rights norms enjoy a high level of global legitimacy, as evidenced by the fact that the key human rights instruments have been widely accepted in all regions of the world. 169 States have ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter, ICESCR). Underpinned by universally recognized moral values and reinforced by national and international legal obligations, ESRs therefore provide a compelling normative framework through which material inequality can be addressed. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 16 (0 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() Article for general public (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 16 (1 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() Article for general public (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 14 (1 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() in Kenya Law Review (2019), 7(1), 69-85 Before the commencement of the Insolvency Act of 2015, the statutory provisions regulating insolvency law in Kenya were found in the Companies Act, Cap 486 of the Laws of Kenya and the Bankruptcy Act, Cap ... [more ▼] Before the commencement of the Insolvency Act of 2015, the statutory provisions regulating insolvency law in Kenya were found in the Companies Act, Cap 486 of the Laws of Kenya and the Bankruptcy Act, Cap 53 of the Laws of Kenya. The pertinent provisions of the former outlined the procedure to be followed in the event of corporate insolvency while the latter detailed the course of action to be followed in the event of personal insolvency, or bankruptcy as it is more commonly known. Despite the dissimilarities in the two regimes of insolvency law there was one crucial similarity between them, that is, neither the Bankruptcy Act nor the Companies Act espoused a rescue culture. An individual found to have committed “an act of bankruptcy” would be declared bankrupt by a court of competent jurisdiction and a corporate body would in most cases be wound up. It is for this reason that the insolvency laws in Kenya were for a long time referred to as the “Kiss of Death” Laws. This reality was articulated in Jambo Biscuits v. Barclays Bank (2002) where Justice Ringera stated, “I think it is notorious facts of which judicial notice may be taken that receiverships in this country have tended to give the kiss of death to many a business.” The Kenyan Insolvency Act of 2015 is closely modelled upon the UK Insolvency Act of 1986. This latter Act epitomizes the rescue culture. As elaborated upon by Lord Browne-Wilkinson the rescue culture seeks to preserve viable businesses and is fundamental to much of the Insolvency Act of 1986. This Act was the governmental response to the report and recommendations of a multi-disciplinary committee tasked with reviewing insolvency law and practice in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s. The Cork Committee laid the foundations for the so called rescue culture and argued that a good, modern system of insolvency law should provide a means for preserving viable commercial enterprises capable of making a useful contribution to the economic life of the country: “We believe that a concern for the livelihood and well-being of those dependent upon an enterprise which may well be the lifeblood of a whole town or even a region is a legitimate factor to which a modern law of insolvency must have regard. The chain reaction consequences upon any given failure can potentially be so disastrous to creditors, employees and the community that it must not be overlooked.” Rescue procedures are thus major interventions necessary to avert the eventual failure of a company. Central to the notion of rescue is, accordingly, the idea that drastic remedial action should be taken at a time of corporate crisis. This remedial action should take place ex ante as opposed to attempting to deal with the backlash that follows total corporate failure ex post facto. The term rescue culture has primarily been used in the context of corporate insolvency, but the present research will attempt to extend its use to personal insolvency specifically arguing that the various alternatives to bankruptcy do have the effect of rescuing an insolvent individual from otherwise imminent bankruptcy which has grim ramifications for persons adjudged bankrupt. This research will be divided into three subsequent parts. Part I will endeavor to summarize the roots of the current insolvency regime in Kenya, as well as examine the meaning of rescue culture together with its importance in any well-functioning insolvency regime. Part II will analyze the aspects of the Insolvency Act, 2015 that espouse a rescue culture for insolvent natural persons. Part III will analyze the rescue options for corporate bodies whose financial position is redeemable. The paper will end with a brief conclusion. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 25 (3 UL)![]() Lichuma, Caroline Omari ![]() Article for general public (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 24 (2 UL) |
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