![]() ![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() in Telman, Jeremy (Ed.) Hans Kelsen in America : The Anxieties of Non-Influence (in press) The aim of this paper is to compare two authors: Hans Kelsen and Leo Strauss. More specifically, it will compare Kelsen’s “What is Justice?”—his Farewell Lecture given at Berkeley in 1952—and Leo ... [more ▼] The aim of this paper is to compare two authors: Hans Kelsen and Leo Strauss. More specifically, it will compare Kelsen’s “What is Justice?”—his Farewell Lecture given at Berkeley in 1952—and Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History—one of the main works on political philosophy published in twentieth century America. Both are key texts dealing with the same subject, justice. Although the two texts were written around the same time by authors who shared a similar history (they both immigrated to the United States to escape Nazism), they seem to defend radically opposed points of view. However, despite and beyond their otherwise real differences, the two texts articulate the same important idea: if one wants to think about political issues, one has to address the question of justice. This chapter will attempt to illustrate through a comparison of these two texts the importance of addressing the question of justice, especially in our modern democracies. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 271 (4 UL)![]() Burks, Deven ![]() ![]() in Burks, Deven; Grapotte, Sophie; Lequan, Mai (Eds.) et al Kant et les penseurs de langue anglaise (2017, May) The idea of Ralph Waldo Emerson as Kant's interlocutor may surprise philosophers. Yet Emerson's work has undergone rehabilitation since 1950, showing engagement with philosophical issues of his time. Of ... [more ▼] The idea of Ralph Waldo Emerson as Kant's interlocutor may surprise philosophers. Yet Emerson's work has undergone rehabilitation since 1950, showing engagement with philosophical issues of his time. Of importance are Emerson's contributions in ethics and epistemology, notably the struggle between skepticism and idealism. Therein, commentators like David Van Leer have found an “essentially Kantian orientation”, where others see engagement with broader idealist themes. This lack of consensus owes to Emerson's argumentative brushwork and few references to Kant, complicating the attempt “to delineate precisely the influence of philosophical idealism on any of the major texts”. Such complications do not prevent Van Leer from laying out a hypothetical, Kantian rereading of Emerson by “treat[ing] the essays as if they were both philosophical and organized” and “translat[ing] Emerson's private vocabulary into the more public one of traditional philosophy”. If Van Leer “tend[s] to be less concerned than most with identifying the sources of Emerson's ideas”, this holds because his “hypothetical account means only to disprove the claim that Emerson cannot be read seriously as a philosopher”. An assessment of whether this hypothesis holds water must acknowledge that “what we want to know is not Emerson's 'familiarity' with Kantian concepts, or even his 'knowledge' of them, but only his 'understanding' of those concepts”, for which “any study of the genesis of thought is irrelevant”. If, by Van Leer's own lights, his hypothesis' validity stands or falls with Emerson's understanding of Kantian concepts, one must first identify that understanding. To that end, this study shall accept Van Leer's terms by bracketing considerations of Emerson's style and sources and by charitably upholding Van Leer's replies thereto. So can attention shift to Emerson's engagement with two Kantian innovations mentioned in his work: transcendental idealism and the faculties. It will be necessary to set limits for this study, given the breadth of the authors' works. It shall thus focus on Emerson's treatment of idealism and faculties in his 1836 Nature. If this study judges Emerson's understanding of idealism at several removes from Kant's transcendental idealism, notably on the status of objective reality, it finds his understanding of the faculties more closely aligned on the function of understanding, reason and intuition, albeit with an important amendment to the latter. Accordingly, this study holds, with Winkler, Van Leer's hypothetical account to be both interpretively incomplete and constitutively unverifiable. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 166 (0 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() in Acosta, Emiliano (Ed.) Re-Thinking Europe. Book Series. Volume 2 (2015, December) In order to raise the question of a potential compatibility between the awareness of Otherness on the one hand, and a form of universality on the other, some hypotheses should first be formulated and ... [more ▼] In order to raise the question of a potential compatibility between the awareness of Otherness on the one hand, and a form of universality on the other, some hypotheses should first be formulated and defined. 1) How does moral relativism equate to the rejection of universal discourses? 2) Consequently, how can this rejection be understood as a result of Modernity? 3) How can Modernity be understood as recognition of Otherness? The current paper will attempt to outline some answers to these questions based on a comparative reading between Kelsen and Lefort. Firstly, in order to explicate the main lines of the Kelsenian relativistic axiology it seems crucial to consider his second edition of the Pure Theory of Law, since one can find within it the grounds for a limitation of human cognition. His Farewell Lecture, “What is justice?”, is also relevant to this theme since in it he claims that the human world is a world of relative and conflicting values. The combination of these two ideas leads to the rejection of Universalist discourses – identified with the ones of Natural Law theories – in the name of science. Secondly, three of Lefort’s articles seem to be relevant. The first, “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism”, enables us to understand his symbolic political philosophy, and more importantly, to introduce his definition of Modernity. “Dissolution of Marks and Democratic Challenge” focuses more on the concept of moral relativism, whilst interpreting it as a consistent reaction to modern indeterminacy. Finally, “Politics and Human Rights” offers a restricted concept of Human Rights, reminiscent of Hannah Arendt’s views, namely that human rights mean the rights to have rights. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 429 (4 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() Doctoral thesis (2015) The work of Hans Kelsen has been largely discussed without the unity between its different questions has been plainly revealed. This unity is what we aim to demonstrate. In our opinion, an attentive and ... [more ▼] The work of Hans Kelsen has been largely discussed without the unity between its different questions has been plainly revealed. This unity is what we aim to demonstrate. In our opinion, an attentive and critical reading of Kelsen’s late works allows such a possibility since it is in these works that the scholar himself tries to achieve this unification. To be able to understand this try and its sense, one must read Kelsen’s late works with the perspective of the moral relativism he defends. Indeed, this relativism can be interpreted as a symptom of modernity. Moreover, it can be defined as a modern humanism. In the Kelsenian thought, what links the legal positivism, the moral relativism and the political conception of democracy is the concept of equality that underlies them implicitly. Under this perspective, the Kelsenian moral relativism reveals itself as an agnosticism that is a philosophy of perpetual questioning. This interpretation is what allows one to render explicit the systematic character of the Kelsenian work. Moreover, such a reading render also explicit the importance of this work. Kelsenian agnosticism expresses the essence of modern philosoph. Since it defines itself as a questioning, it becomes the condition of possibility of both an authentic recognition of the Other and of democracy itself. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 183 (13 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() Scientific Conference (2015, October) Si notre situation symbolique et politique actuelle se définit comme celle de la perte des derniers repères de la certitude, l’idée kantienne d’une histoire universelle, c’est-à-dire d’un dessein de la ... [more ▼] Si notre situation symbolique et politique actuelle se définit comme celle de la perte des derniers repères de la certitude, l’idée kantienne d’une histoire universelle, c’est-à-dire d’un dessein de la nature qui guiderait le dessein personnel de chacun, semble au premier abord désuète. Dans un contexte où tout absolutisme axiologique semble impossible, l’idée d’un mouvement sourd et immanent, qui pousserait l’humanité vers « une unification politique parfaite », apparaît comme une croyance datée. Et pourtant, l’opuscule kantien, Idée d’une histoire universelle au point de vue cosmopolitique, en prenant en compte les particularismes sans renoncer à l’idée universelle d’humanité, est d’une actualité cruciale, parce qu’il relève le défi imposé par la Modernité politique : celui de penser une voie philosophique intermédiaire, entre le Charybde qu’est l’absolutisme axiologique, et le Scylla qu’est le nihilisme. C’est ce que la présente étude voudrait mettre à jour en croisant l’opuscule kantien, avec la philosophie politique de Claude Lefort. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 150 (0 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() in Grapotte, Sophie; Ruffing, Margit; Terra, Ricardo (Eds.) Kant. La raison pratique : Concepts et héritages (2015, September) L’héritage kantien dans la fondation de la science du droit kelsénienne et la théorie des systèmes luhmanienne ne se limite pas uniquement à un héritage théorique : le geste opéré par le philosophe de ... [more ▼] L’héritage kantien dans la fondation de la science du droit kelsénienne et la théorie des systèmes luhmanienne ne se limite pas uniquement à un héritage théorique : le geste opéré par le philosophe de Königsberg dans sa Métaphysique des moeurs, de séparer l’entreprise juridique de l’entreprise morale est repris par le juriste autrichien, puis radicalisé par Niklas Luhmann. Ainsi, si la norme juridique pour Kelsen est à différencier de la norme morale, c’est parce que seule la norme juridique peut être un objet de connaissance, la norme morale elle, étant condamnée à la relativité. Lehmann radicalise alors l’approche kelsénienne par l’affirmation d’une autonomie complète du système juridique, par rapport au système moral. La lecture juridique du geste kantien par Kelsen et par Luhmann se réalise donc au détriment de la question morale qui, soit est reléguée à une affaire d’opinions (Kelsen), soit complètement abandonnée (Luhmann). Un retour à la lecture de Kant semble donc nécessaire, à la fois pour comprendre le cheminement de Kelsen et de Luhmann, mais plus encore, pour saisir pleinement jusqu’à quel point ces lectures trahissent la lettre du philosophe allemand. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 123 (8 UL)![]() ![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() Scientific Conference (2015, September) L’œuvre de Hans Kelsen est cet effort moderne d’inspiration kantienne, de fondation d’une science du droit. En effet, Kelsen reprend l’idée fondatrice de la Critique de la raison pure, selon laquelle ... [more ▼] L’œuvre de Hans Kelsen est cet effort moderne d’inspiration kantienne, de fondation d’une science du droit. En effet, Kelsen reprend l’idée fondatrice de la Critique de la raison pure, selon laquelle l’entendement humain serait strictement limité à la connaissance empirique. Il en déduit alors l’illégitimité de tout droit naturel et se sépare ainsi de Kant : pour Kelsen, la raison pratique humaine ne peut pas légitimement établir la liberté comme principe moral. Ce qui est en fait refusé par Kelsen, c’est la possibilité d’une articulation entre nature et liberté. Le juriste adresse donc deux arguments principaux contre la philosophie pratique kantienne : celui de paralogisme, et celui de la vacuité de l’impératif catégorique. Cette lecture par Kelsen de Kant permet de montrer à la fois les limites de l’héritage kantien dans l’œuvre du juriste, mais aussi, d’expliciter les limites de l’interprétation kelsénienne, du texte kantien. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 149 (0 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() Presentation (2015, May) Detailed reference viewed: 106 (0 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() in Trajectoires (2014) Le concept de masse est crucial dans la pensée de l’autorité politique, dans la mesure où il en démontre clairement le fondement psychologique : la masse est essentiellement irrationnelle et émotive. Plus ... [more ▼] Le concept de masse est crucial dans la pensée de l’autorité politique, dans la mesure où il en démontre clairement le fondement psychologique : la masse est essentiellement irrationnelle et émotive. Plus encore, elle ne peut pas se constituer sans un meneur qui lui dise ce qu’il faut qu’elle pense, ce qu’elle sente et ce qu’elle fasse. Pour former une unité, elle nécessite donc une forte figure d’autorité. La lecture de Le Bon, Freud et Kelsen permet de comprendre l’importance de cette dimension psychologique, cela par le croisement de trois disciplines : la socio psychologie, la psychanalyse et la théorie juridico politique. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 83 (1 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() Scientific Conference (2014, June) The aim of my presentation is to compare two authors: Hans Kelsen and Leo Strauss. Kelsen’s “What is justice?” – the farewell lecture given at Berkeley in 1952 – and Leo Strauss’ Natural Right and History ... [more ▼] The aim of my presentation is to compare two authors: Hans Kelsen and Leo Strauss. Kelsen’s “What is justice?” – the farewell lecture given at Berkeley in 1952 – and Leo Strauss’ Natural Right and History – one of the main works on political philosophy published in 20th Century America – are two key texts dealing with the same subject: justice. Moreover, they were written at the same period, by two authors who both emigrated to the US but who seem to defend radically opposed points of views. The hypothesis of this comparison is that the same important idea can be found in both authors, despite and beyond their otherwise real differences. This important idea I would like to stress is the following: if one wants to think about political issues, then, one has to address the question of justice. Reading Kelsen and Strauss reminds us of the importance of this question. According to this hypothesis, this is a main lesson one should retain from a comparative reading of these two authors. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 257 (4 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() Presentation (2014, February) Detailed reference viewed: 74 (1 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() in Le Portique (2013) Detailed reference viewed: 82 (2 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() Presentation (2013, March) Detailed reference viewed: 43 (1 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() Presentation (2012, November) Detailed reference viewed: 53 (0 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() Presentation (2012, October) Detailed reference viewed: 50 (1 UL)![]() Lefort, Elisabeth ![]() Book published by Peter Lang (n.d.) Detailed reference viewed: 84 (2 UL) |
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