References of "Kordy, Barbara 40020790"
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See detailProceedings First International Workshop on Graphical Models for Security, GraMSec 2014
Kordy, Barbara UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL; Pieters, Pieters

in First International Workshop on Graphical Models for Security, GraMSec 2014, Grenoble, France, 12th April, 2014 (2014)

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See detailA Probabilistic Framework for Security Scenarios with Dependent Actions
Kordy, Barbara UL; Schweitzer, Patrick UL; Pouly, Marc UL

in The 11th International Conference on Integrated Formal Methods (iFM'14), Bertinoro, Italy (2014)

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See detailADTool: Security Analysis with Attack-Defense Trees (Tool Demonstration Paper)
Kordy, Barbara UL; Kordy, Piotr UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL et al

in 10th International Conference on Quantitative Evaluation of SysTems (2013)

The ADTool is free, open source software assisting graphical modeling and quantitative analysis of security, using attack-defense trees. The main features of the ADTool are easy creation, efficient ... [more ▼]

The ADTool is free, open source software assisting graphical modeling and quantitative analysis of security, using attack-defense trees. The main features of the ADTool are easy creation, efficient editing, and automated bottom-up evaluation of security-relevant measures. The tool also supports the usage of attack trees, protection trees and defense trees, which are all particular instances of attack-defense trees. [less ▲]

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See detailAttack-Defense Trees
Kordy, Barbara UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL; Radomirovic, Sasa UL et al

in Journal of Logic & Computation (2012)

Attack-defense trees are a novel methodology for graphical security modeling and assessment. They extend the well known formalism of attack trees by allowing nodes that represent defensive measures to ... [more ▼]

Attack-defense trees are a novel methodology for graphical security modeling and assessment. They extend the well known formalism of attack trees by allowing nodes that represent defensive measures to appear at any level of the tree. This enlarges the modeling capabilities of attack trees and makes the new formalism suitable for representing interactions between an attacker and a defender. Our formalization supports different semantical approaches for which we provide usage scenarios. We also formalize how to quantitatively analyze attack and defense scenarios using attributes. [less ▲]

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See detailConstructing Optimistic Multi-party Contract Signing Protocols
Kordy, Barbara UL; Radomirovic, Sasa UL

in Computer Security Foundations (CSF 2012) (2012)

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See detailAttribute Decoration of Attack-Defense Trees
Bagnato, Alessandra; Kordy, Barbara UL; Meland, Per H. et al

in International Journal of Secure Software Engineering (2012), 3(2), 1-35

Attack-defense trees can be used as part of threat and risk analysis for system development and maintenance. They are an extension of attack trees with defense measures. Moreover, tree nodes can be ... [more ▼]

Attack-defense trees can be used as part of threat and risk analysis for system development and maintenance. They are an extension of attack trees with defense measures. Moreover, tree nodes can be decorated with attributes, such as probability, impact and penalty, to increase the expressiveness of the model. Attribute values are typically assigned based on cognitive estimations and historically recorded events. This paper presents a practical case study with attack-defense trees. First, we create an attack-defense tree for an RFID-based goods management system for a warehouse. Then, we explore how to use a rich set of attributes for attack and defense nodes and how to assign and aggregate values to obtain condensed information, such as performance indicators or other key security figures. We discuss different modeling choices and trade-offs. The case study led us to define concrete guidelines that can be used by software developers, security analysts and system owners when performing similar assessments. [less ▲]

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See detailQuantitative Questions on Attack-Defense Trees
Kordy, Barbara UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL; Schweitzer, Patrick UL

in Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2012 - 15th International Conference, Seoul, Korea, November 28-30, 2012, Revised Selected Papers (2012)

Attack-defense trees are a novel methodology for graphical security modeling and assessment. The methodology includes intuitive and formal components that can be used for quantitative analysis of attack ... [more ▼]

Attack-defense trees are a novel methodology for graphical security modeling and assessment. The methodology includes intuitive and formal components that can be used for quantitative analysis of attack-defense scenarios. In practice, we use intuitive questions to ask about aspects of scenarios we are interested in. Formally, a computational procedure, using a bottom-up algorithm, is applied to derive the corresponding numerical values. This paper bridges the gap between the intuitive and the formal way of quantitatively assessing attack-defense scenarios. We discuss how to properly specify a question, so that it can be answered unambiguously. Given a well-specified question, we then show how to derive an appropriate attribute domain which constitutes the corresponding formal model. [less ▲]

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See detailComputational Aspects of Attack-Defense Trees
Kordy, Barbara UL; Pouly, Marc UL; Schweitzer, Patrick UL

in Security and Intelligent Information Systems - International Joint Conferences, SIIS 2011, Warsaw, Poland, June 13-14, 2011, Revised Selected Papers (2011)

Attack-defense trees extend attack trees with defense nodes. This richer formalism allows for a more precise modeling of a system’s vulnerabilities, by representing interactions between possible attacks ... [more ▼]

Attack-defense trees extend attack trees with defense nodes. This richer formalism allows for a more precise modeling of a system’s vulnerabilities, by representing interactions between possible attacks and corresponding defensive measures. In this paper we compare the computational complexity of both formalisms. We identify semantics for which extending attack trees with defense nodes does not increase the computational complexity. This implies that, for these semantics, every query that can be solved efficiently on attack trees can also be solved efficiently on attack-defense trees. Furthermore, every algorithm for attack trees can directly be used to process attack-defense trees. [less ▲]

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See detailAttack-Defense Trees and Two-Player Binary Zero-Sum Extensive Form Games Are Equivalent
Kordy, Barbara UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL; Melissen, Matthijs UL et al

in Proceedings of GameSec 2010 (2010)

Attack-defense trees are used to describe security weaknesses of a system and possible countermeasures. In this paper, the connection between attack-defense trees and game theory is made explicit. We show ... [more ▼]

Attack-defense trees are used to describe security weaknesses of a system and possible countermeasures. In this paper, the connection between attack-defense trees and game theory is made explicit. We show that attack-defense trees and binary zero-sum two-player extensive form game have equivalent expressive power when considering satisfiability, in the sense that they can be converted into each other while preserving their outcome and their internal structure. [less ▲]

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See detailFoundations of Attack-Defense Trees
Kordy, Barbara UL; Mauw, Sjouke UL; Radomirovic, Sasa UL et al

in Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust (2010)

We introduce and give formal definitions of attack–defense trees. We argue that these trees are a simple, yet powerful tool to analyze complex security and privacy problems. Our formalization is generic ... [more ▼]

We introduce and give formal definitions of attack–defense trees. We argue that these trees are a simple, yet powerful tool to analyze complex security and privacy problems. Our formalization is generic in the sense that it supports different semantical approaches. We present several semantics for attack–defense trees along with usage scenarios, and we show how to evaluate attributes. [less ▲]

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See detailA Rewrite Approach for Pattern Containment
Kordy, Barbara UL

in 19th International Workshop on Algebraic Development Techniques, WADT 2008 (2009)

In this paper, we introduce an approach that allows us to handle the containment problem for the fragment XP(/,//,[ ],*) of XPath. Using rewriting techniques we define a necessary and sufficient condition ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we introduce an approach that allows us to handle the containment problem for the fragment XP(/,//,[ ],*) of XPath. Using rewriting techniques we define a necessary and sufficient condition for pattern containment. This rewrite view is then adapted to query evaluation on XML documents, and remains valid even if the documents are given in a compressed form, as dags. [less ▲]

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